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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals, MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

PUBLIC COPY

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FEB 04 2010

FILE:

Office: SAN BERNARDINO, CA

Date:

RELATES)

IN RE:

APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after
Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Field Office Director, San Bernardino, California denied the Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212). The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be rejected as untimely filed

In order to properly file an appeal, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(i) provides that the affected party must file the complete appeal within 30 days of service of the unfavorable decision (33 days if mailed). If the decision was mailed, the appeal must be filed within 33 days. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(b). The date of filing is not the date of mailing, but the date of actual receipt. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(i).

The record indicates that the field office director issued the decision on June 4, 2009. It is noted that the field office director properly gave notice to the applicant that she had 30 days to file the appeal (33 days if mailed). U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) received the appeal on August 7, 2009, or 64 days after the decision was issued. Accordingly, the appeal was untimely filed.

Counsel contends that the applicant did not receive the field office director's decision until she received a request for further evidence in regard to her Application for Employment Authorization (Form I-765) indicating that her Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) had been denied. Counsel contends that, pursuant to *Hubrec v. INS*, 828 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), the 30-day appeal period should be reinstated because the applicant did not receive notice of her right to appeal the decision. Counsel contends that the applicant only received notice of the decision to deny the Form I-212 and her right to appeal the decision on July 9, 2009, the date on which she appeared at the San Bernardino, California field office and was provided with a copy of the decision. The AAO finds that the principle set forth in *Hubrec* is not applicable in the applicant's case. In *Hubrec*, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (legacy INS) did not assert that they had issued the decision and provided notice to the plaintiff of his right to appeal. In the instant case, the record reflects that the decision and notice of right to appeal was mailed to the applicant at the address of record on June 4, 2009. The record reflects that the address of record remains the applicant's address.

Neither the Immigration and Nationality Act nor the pertinent regulations grant the AAO or the field office director authority to extend the 33-day time limit for filing an appeal. As the appeal was untimely filed, the appeal must be rejected. Nevertheless, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(v)(B)(2) states that, if an untimely appeal meets the requirements of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, the appeal must be treated as a motion, and a decision must be made on the merits of the case.

A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be proved in the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2). A motion to reconsider must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions to establish that the decision was based on an incorrect application of law or Service policy. A motion to reconsider a decision on an application or petition must, when filed, also establish that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence of record at the time of the initial decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). A motion that does not meet applicable requirements shall be dismissed. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4).

Here, the untimely appeal does not meet the requirements of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider because counsel does not set forth any new facts or establish that the field office director's decision was based on an incorrect application of law or policy. The AAO notes that, while counsel asserts that it would be fundamentally unfair and impermissibly retroactive to apply *Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007) when the applicant, in filing the Form I-212, relied upon the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) decision in *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft*, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004), the record reflects that the applicant's Form I-212 was filed while an injunction restraining USCIS from applying agency policy as set forth in *Matter of Torres-Garcia* had been issued. The AAO finds, therefore, that in filing the Form I-212 under such circumstances, counsel's contention that the applicant reasonably relied upon the Ninth Circuit's *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision is illogical. The Ninth Circuit, in deferring to the BIA's decision in *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, found that the BIA's findings were reasonable and that the statute is unambiguous and unchanged since its promulgation. The Ninth Circuit found that the issue might have been resolved under the first step of *Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 467 U.S. 87, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984), by examining the text of the relevant statutes and their legislative histories. The court found that it must defer to *Torres-Garcia* and that the statute itself is unambiguous. In *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, the BIA found that 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 was not promulgated to implement the current section 212(a)(9) of the Act and that the very concept of retroactive permission to reapply for admission, i.e., permission requested after unlawful reentry, contradicts the clear language of section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act, which in its own right makes unlawful reentry after removal a ground of inadmissibility that can only be waived by the passage of at least ten years. The BIA found that the *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision contradicts the clear language of the statute and the legislative policy underlying the statute in general. Since the statute is unambiguous and has been in effect since April 1, 1997, counsel's contention that the correct application of the statute is fundamentally unfair and impermissibly retroactive is unfounded since the applicant's removal, unlawful reentry and filing of the Form I-212 occurred after the statute's enactment. Therefore, there is no requirement to treat the appeal as a motion under 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(v)(B)(2).

As the appeal was untimely filed and does not qualify as a motion, the appeal must be rejected.

ORDER: The appeal is rejected.