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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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#4

[Redacted]

FILE: [Redacted]

Office: LOS ANGELES, CA

Date:

IN RE: J [Redacted]

JUL 15 2010

APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Jerry Rhew,  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Field Office Director, Los Angeles, California, denied the Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) and it is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who, on August 1, 1983, was convicted of theft in violation of section 484(a) of the California Penal Code (CPC). The applicant was sentenced to 15 days in jail and 24 months of probation. On April 10, 1992, the applicant pled guilty to and was convicted of possession of marijuana in violation of section 13-3405(a)(1) of the Arizona Revised Statutes (ARS). The applicant was sentenced to a fine. On the same day, the applicant was found guilty of illegally entering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325. The applicant was sentenced to time served and a fine. On the same day, the applicant was placed into immigration proceedings for having entered the United States without inspection on April 1, 1992. On October 23, 1992, the immigration judge ordered the applicant removed from the United States. The applicant filed an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). On May 17, 1999, the BIA dismissed the applicant's appeal. On March 21, 2000, the applicant was removed from the United States and returned to Mexico.

On July 30, 2007, the applicant filed an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) based on an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed on his behalf by his U.S. citizen spouse. The Form I-485 indicates that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in June 1999. During an interview in regard to the Form I-485, the applicant testified that he entered the United States without inspection on April 1, 2000. On October 14, 2007, the applicant filed the Form I-212, indicating that he continued to reside in the United States. On June 10, 2009, the Form I-485 was denied. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). He seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with his U.S. citizen spouse and four U.S. citizen children.

The field office director determined that the applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i), for illegally reentering the United States after having been removed. The field office director determined that the applicant was not eligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission because he had not remained outside the United States for the required ten years. The field office director denied the Form I-212 accordingly. *See Field Office Director's Decision*, dated June 10, 2009.

On appeal, counsel contends that it would be impermissibly retroactive to apply *Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007), when the applicant, in filing the Form I-212, relied upon the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) decision in *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft*, 379 F.3d 783 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004). *See Counsel's Brief*, dated July 8, 2009. In support of his contentions, counsel submits only the referenced brief. The entire record was reviewed in rendering a decision in this case.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

- (i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
- (ii) Other aliens.-Any alien not described in clause (i) who-
  - (I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or
  - (II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
- (iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the [Secretary of Homeland Security] has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

.....  
(C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.-

- (i) In general.-Any alien who-
  - (I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or
  - (II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other provision of law, and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible.
- (ii) Exception.

Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States if, prior to the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary of Homeland Security has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

(iii) Waiver

The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the application of clause (i) in the case of an alien who is a VAWA self-petitioner if there is a connection between—

(I) the alien's battering or subjection to extreme cruelty; and

(II) the alien's removal, departure from the United States, reentry or reentries into the United States; or attempted reentry into the United States.

The AAO notes that a waiver to the section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) ground of inadmissibility is available to individuals classified as battered spouses under the cited sections of section 204 of the Act. *See also* 8 U.S.C. § 1154. There are no indications in the record that the applicant is or should be classified as such.

An alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act may not apply for consent to reapply unless he or she has *remained outside* the United States for more than 10 years since the date of the alien's last departure from the United States. *See Matter of Torres-Garcia*, 23 I&N Dec. 866 (BIA 2006); *Matter of Briones*, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007); and *Matter of Diaz and Lopez*, 25 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 2010). Thus, to avoid inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act, it must be the case that the applicant's last departure was at least ten years ago, the applicant has remained outside the United States since that departure, *and* that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has consented to the applicant's reapplying for admission. While the applicant's last departure from the United States occurred on March 21, 2000, more than ten years ago, he has not remained outside the United States since that departure and he is currently in the United States.<sup>1</sup> The applicant is currently statutorily ineligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission.

On appeal, counsel contends that it would be impermissibly retroactive to deny the applicant's Form I-212 because of his reliance on *Perez-Gonzalez*.

The applicant's Form I-212 was pending while an injunction restraining USCIS from applying agency policy as set forth in *Matter of Torres-Garcia* had been issued. The AAO finds, therefore, that in filing the Form I-212 under such circumstances, counsel's contention that the applicant reasonably relied upon the Ninth Circuit's *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision is illogical.

Counsel's retroactivity arguments before the AAO mirror retroactivity arguments dismissed by the Ninth Circuit in *Morales-Izquierdo v. Department of Homeland Security*, 2010 WL 1254137 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit, in *Morales-Izquierdo*, found that *Gonzales II* is a judicial interpretation of a federal statute, which places the decision on a fundamentally different plane from the body of retroactivity jurisprudence upon which counsel relies and that new judicial decisions interpreting old

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<sup>1</sup> The applicant will be required to submit evidence establishing that he is currently outside the United States and has remained outside the United States for period of ten years when he becomes eligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission.

statutes have long been applied retroactively to all cases open on direct review, regardless of whether the events predate or postdate the statute-interpreting decision. *Morales-Izquierdo* at 10, 12. The Ninth Circuit held that applicants, even those eligible for adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Act, are bound by *Gonzales II*, that *Gonzales II* is not impermissibly retroactive and that a Form I-212 waiver cannot cure inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act until an applicant, while residing outside the United States, applies for and receives advance permission, but only after ten years have elapsed since the applicant's last departure from the United States. *Morales-Izquierdo* at 1, 12.

In *Gonzales II*, the Ninth Circuit, in deferring to the BIA's decision in *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, found that the BIA's findings were reasonable and that the statute is unambiguous and unchanged since its promulgation. The Ninth Circuit found that the issue might have been resolved under the first step of *Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 467 U.S. 87, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984), by examining the text of the relevant statutes and their legislative histories. The court found that it must defer to *Torres-Garcia* and that the statute itself is unambiguous. In *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, the BIA found that 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 was not promulgated to implement the current section 212(a)(9) of the Act and that the very concept of retroactive permission to reapply for admission, i.e., permission requested after unlawful reentry, contradicts the clear language of section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act, which in its own right makes unlawful reentry after removal a ground of inadmissibility that can only be waived by the passage of at least ten years. The BIA found that the *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision contradicts the clear language of the statute and the legislative policy underlying the statute in general. Since the statute is unambiguous and has been in effect since April 1, 1997, counsel's contention that the correct application of the statute is impermissibly retroactive is unfounded since the applicant's removal, unlawful reentry and filing of the Form I-212 occurred after the statute's enactment.

Finally, the statute and case law clearly states that an alien who has been ordered removed and enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted may seek an exception to permanent grounds of inadmissibility when seeking admission more than ten years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States, if, the applicant receives permission to reapply for admission prior to reentering the United States.<sup>2</sup> *Matter of Torres-Garcia, Supra.*; *Matter of Briones, Supra.*; *Matter of Diaz and Lopez, Supra.*; *Morales-Izquierdo, Supra.*

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that he is eligible for the benefit sought. The applicant in the instant case does not qualify for a waiver or the exception under section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) and (iii) of the Act. Thus, as a matter of law, the applicant is not eligible for approval of a Form I-212. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed as a matter of discretion.

Beyond the decision of the field office director, the AAO finds that the applicant is inadmissible under the provisions of section 212(a)(2)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C), as a trafficker, and

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<sup>2</sup> The AAO notes that the reentry after obtaining permission to reapply for admission must be a lawful admission to the United States; otherwise, the applicant has again illegally reentered the United States after having been removed and renewed his or her inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act.

no waiver is available.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, the applicant is mandatorily inadmissible to the United States and no purpose would be served in the favorable exercise of discretion in adjudicating an application to reapply for admission into the United States.<sup>4</sup>

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.

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<sup>3</sup> While the applicant's conviction was set aside, inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2)(C) of the Act does not require a conviction and is based on the standard "reason to believe." It was held in *United States v. Franklin*, 728 F.2d 994 (8th Cir., 1984), that intent to distribute may be established by circumstantial evidence. Evidence the applicant possessed a controlled substance with the requisite intent to distribute is sufficient as a matter of law, where the controlled substance is packaged in a manner consistent with distribution and/or there is evidence of paraphernalia, a large amount of cash, weapons, or other indicia of narcotics distribution. The intent to distribute a controlled substance has been inferred solely from possession of a large quantity of the substance. *United States v. Koua Thao*, 712 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1983) (154.74 grams of opium); *United States v. DeLeon*, 641 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1980) (294 grams of cocaine); *United States v. Grayson*, 625 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1980) (413.1 grams of 74% pure cocaine); *United States v. Love*, 559 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1979) (26 pounds of marijuana); *United States v. Muckenthaler*, 584 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1978) (147 grams of cocaine). While the record is unclear as to the amount of marijuana that was in the applicant's possession, the applicant was found with more than \$10,000 in cash, along with two baggies of marijuana. The AAO finds that it is reasonable to conclude that the applicant, in crossing state lines while in possession of such items, was involved in trafficking.

<sup>4</sup> An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).