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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
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
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IN RE:



APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew,  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Field Office Director, San Bernardino, California, denied the Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) and it is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who, on May 10, 2002, was placed into immigration proceedings for having entered the United States without inspection on December 1, 1999. On May 23, 2002, the immigration judge ordered the applicant removed from the United States. On May 28, 2002, the applicant was removed from the United States and returned to Mexico.

On October 21, 2007, the applicant filed an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) based on an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed on his behalf by his lawful permanent resident mother. The Form I-485 indicates that the applicant entered the United States without inspection on January 1, 2000. On the same day, the applicant filed an Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) and the Form I-212, indicating that he continued to reside in the United States. During an interview in regard to the Form I-485, the applicant testified that he last entered the United States without inspection in 2004. On May 22, 2009, the Form I-485 and Form I-601 were denied. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). He seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with his lawful permanent resident mother and two U.S. citizen children.

The field office director determined that the applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i), for illegally reentering the United States after having been removed. The field office director determined that the applicant was not eligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission because he had not remained outside the United States for the required ten years. The field office director denied the Form I-212 accordingly. *See Field Office Director's Decision*, dated May 22, 2009.

On appeal, counsel contends that the specific language of section 245(i) of the Act permits the applicant to apply for adjustment of status. Counsel contends that 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 clearly sets forth that the applicant is eligible for permission to reapply for admission. Counsel contends that the field office director erred in applying *Matter of Briones*, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007) to the applicant.<sup>1</sup> Counsel contends that the BIA's decision in *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, 23 I&N Dec. 866 (BIA 2006) does not apply to the applicant, even though *Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.

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<sup>1</sup> The AAO finds counsel's contentions unpersuasive. The applicant is inadmissible under both section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) and (II) of the Act. While counsel notes that this case arises out of the Fifth Circuit and not the Ninth Circuit, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g), BIA precedent decisions are binding on officers of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). While counsel notes that *Acosta v. Gonzalez*, 439 F.3d 550 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006) would permit the applicant to apply for permission to reapply for admission, the case law upon which *Acosta* based its decision has been overturned. *See Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007) and *Herrera-Castillo v. Holder*, 573 F.3d 1004 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. Jul 27, 2009). Furthermore, the BIA has held that *Acosta* is no longer binding law and that *Matter of Briones*, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007) is applicable. *See Matter of Diaz and Lopez*, 25 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 2010).

2007), appears to have overturned the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft*, 379 F.3d 783 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004), since the decision in *Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007), is on appeal regarding questions of retroactivity.<sup>2</sup> See *Counsel's Brief*, dated July 11, 2009. In support of her contentions, counsel submits only the referenced brief. The entire record was reviewed in rendering a decision in this case.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

- (i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
- (ii) Other aliens.-Any alien not described in clause (i) who-
  - (I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or
  - (II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
- (iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the [Secretary of Homeland Security] has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

....

(C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.-

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<sup>2</sup> The restraining order preventing USCIS from denying an applicant's Form I-212 because he or she has not remained outside the United States for a period of ten years, expired on February 6, 2009. While counsel contends that USCIS' denial of the applicant's Form I-212 is premature because a further appeal has been filed in *Gonzalez*, the Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs' application for an injunction on February 6, 2009, finding that the plaintiffs were unlikely to be successful on appeal.

(i) In general.-Any alien who-

(I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or

(II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other provision of law, and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.

Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States if, prior to the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary of Homeland Security has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

(iii) Waiver

The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the application of clause (i) in the case of an alien who is a VAWA self-petitioner if there is a connection between—

(I) the alien's battering or subjection to extreme cruelty; and

(II) the alien's removal, departure from the United States, reentry or reentries into the United States; or attempted reentry into the United States.

The AAO notes that a waiver to the section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) ground of inadmissibility is available to individuals classified as battered spouses under the cited sections of section 204 of the Act. *See also* 8 U.S.C. § 1154. There are no indications in the record that the applicant is or should be classified as such.

An alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act may not apply for consent to reapply unless he or she has *remained outside* the United States for more than 10 years since the date of the alien's last departure from the United States. *See Matter of Torres-Garcia*, 23 I&N Dec. 866 (BIA 2006); *Matter of Briones*, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007); and *Matter of Diaz and Lopez*, 25 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 2010). Thus, to avoid inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act, it must be the case that the applicant's last departure was at least ten years ago, the applicant has remained outside the United States since that departure, *and* that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has consented to the applicant's reapplying for admission. The applicant's last departure from the United States occurred on May 28, 2002, less than ten years ago, he has not

remained outside the United States since that departure and he is currently in the United States.<sup>3</sup> The applicant is currently statutorily ineligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission.

Counsel contends that the specific language of section 245(i) of the Act permits the applicant to apply for adjustment of status. Counsel contends that 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 clearly sets forth that the applicant is eligible for permission to reapply for admission. Counsel contends that the BIA's decision in *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, 23 I&N Dec. 866 (BIA 2006) does not apply to the applicant, even though *Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007), appears to have overturned the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft*, 379 F.3d 783 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004), since the decision in *Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007), is on appeal regarding questions of retroactivity.

The applicant's Form I-212 was pending while an injunction restraining USCIS from applying agency policy as set forth in *Matter of Torres-Garcia* had been issued. The AAO finds, therefore, that in filing the Form I-212 under such circumstances, the applicant could not have reasonably relied upon the Ninth Circuit's *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision.

The retroactivity arguments on appeal in *Gonzales II* mirror retroactivity arguments dismissed by the Ninth Circuit in *Morales-Izquierdo v. Department of Homeland Security*, 2010 WL 1254137 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit, in *Morales-Izquierdo*, found that *Gonzales II* is a judicial interpretation of a federal statute, which places the decision on a fundamentally different plane from the body of retroactivity jurisprudence upon which counsel relies and that new judicial decisions interpreting old statutes have long been applied retroactively to all cases open on direct review, regardless of whether the events predate or postdate the statute-interpreting decision. *Morales-Izquierdo* at 10, 12. The Ninth Circuit held that applicants, even those eligible for adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Act, are bound by *Gonzales II*, that *Gonzales II* is not impermissibly retroactive and that a Form I-212 waiver cannot cure inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act until an applicant, while residing outside the United States, applies for and receives advance permission, but only after ten years have elapsed since the applicant's last departure from the United States. *Morales-Izquierdo* at 1, 12.

In *Gonzales II*, the Ninth Circuit, in deferring to the BIA's decision in *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, found that the BIA's findings were reasonable and that the statute is unambiguous and unchanged since its promulgation. The Ninth Circuit found that the issue might have been resolved under the first step of *Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 467 U.S. 87, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984), by examining the text of the relevant statutes and their legislative histories. The court found that it must defer to *Torres-Garcia* and that the statute itself is unambiguous. In *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, the BIA found that 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 was not promulgated to implement the current section 212(a)(9) of the Act and that the very concept of retroactive permission to reapply for admission, i.e., permission requested after unlawful reentry, contradicts the clear language of section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act, which in its own right makes unlawful reentry after removal a ground of inadmissibility that can only be waived by the passage of at least ten years. The BIA found that the *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision contradicts the clear language of the statute and the legislative

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<sup>3</sup> The applicant will be required to submit evidence establishing that he is currently outside the United States and has remained outside the United States for period of ten years when he becomes eligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission.

policy underlying the statute in general. Since the statute is unambiguous and has been in effect since April 1, 1997, any contention that the correct application of the statute is impermissibly retroactive is unfounded since the applicant's removal, unlawful reentry and filing of the Form I-212 occurred after the statute's enactment.

Finally, the statute and case law clearly states that an alien who has been ordered removed and enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted may seek an exception to permanent grounds of inadmissibility when seeking admission more than ten years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States, if, the applicant receives permission to reapply for admission prior to reentering the United States.<sup>4</sup> *Matter of Torres-Garcia, Supra.*; *Matter of Briones, Supra.*; *Matter of Diaz and Lopez, Supra.*; *Morales-Izquierdo, Supra.*

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that he is eligible for the benefit sought. The applicant in the instant case does not qualify for a waiver or the exception under section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) and (iii) of the Act. Thus, as a matter of law, the applicant is not eligible for approval of a Form I-212. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed as a matter of discretion.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.

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<sup>4</sup> The AAO notes that the reentry after obtaining permission to reapply for admission must be a lawful admission to the United States; otherwise, the applicant has again illegally reentered the United States after having been removed and renewed his or her inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act.