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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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FILE:



Office: SANTA ANA, CA


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IN RE:



APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion. The fee for a Form I-290B is currently \$585, but will increase to \$630 on November 23, 2010. Any appeal or motion filed on or after November 23, 2010 must be filed with the \$630 fee. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew,  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Field Office Director, Santa Ana, California, denied the Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) and it is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of [REDACTED] who, on April 20, 1985, was apprehended in [REDACTED]. The applicant was apprehended with 20 kilos of marijuana and was charged with importation of marijuana. On June 25, 1985, the applicant pled guilty to possession of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) and illegal entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325. The applicant was sentenced to 180 days in jail and 20 days in jail and five years of probation. On the same day the charges of importation were dismissed.

On November 18, 2008, the applicant filed an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) based on an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed on his behalf by his U.S. citizen adult child. The Form I-485 indicates that the applicant last entered the United States without inspection in September 2001. During an interview in regard to the Form I-485, the applicant admitted that he had been apprehended with 20 kilos of marijuana and that he was subsequently removed from the United States and returned to [REDACTED] after serving 5 months in jail. On May 21, 2009, the applicant filed the Form I-212, indicating that he has resided in the United States since 1999. On March 31, 2010, the Form I-485 was denied. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), for having illegally reentered the United States after accruing more than one year of unlawful presence in the United States. He seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) in order to reside in the United States with his two U.S. citizen adult children.

The field office director determined that the applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), for having been convicted of a crime relating to a controlled substance. The field office director determined that the applicant was ineligible for a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), and denied the Form I-212 accordingly. *See Field Office Director's Decision*, dated March 31, 2010.

On appeal, the applicant contends that he qualifies for treatment under the Federal First Offender Act (FFOA) because his possession of marijuana conviction has been expunged under the federal statute. *See Form I-290B*, dated April 17, 2010. In support of his contentions, the applicant submits only the referenced Form I-290B. On the Form I-290B, the applicant indicates that he will forward additional evidence and/or a brief within thirty days. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(viii) and the instructions to Form I-290B require the affected party to submit the brief or evidence directly to the AAO, not to the Santa Ana, California field office or any other federal office. The record does not contain the brief and/or evidence that the applicant indicated would be submitted to the AAO. Even if the applicant were to submit evidence that a brief was filed with an office other than the AAO, the AAO would not consider the brief on appeal because the applicant failed to follow the regulations or the instructions for the proper filing location. Accordingly the record is complete.

Section 212(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act states in pertinent part:

- (1) Criminal and related grounds. —

(A) Conviction of certain crimes. –

(i) In general. – Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –

\* \* \*

(II) a violation of (or conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), is inadmissible.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.-

(i) In general.-Any alien who-

(I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or

(II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other provision of law, and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.

Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States if, prior to the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary of Homeland Security has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

(iii) Waiver

The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the application of clause (i) in the case of an alien who is a [REDACTED] self-petitioner if there is a connection between—

(I) the alien's battering or subjection to extreme cruelty; and

(II) the alien's removal, departure from the United States, reentry or reentries into the United States; or attempted reentry into the United States.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I), (B), (D), and (E) or subsection (a)(2) *and subparagraph (A)(i)(II) of such subsection insofar as it relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana . . . .* (emphasis added.)

The record reflects that the applicant accrued unlawful presence in the United States from 1999, the date on which he entered the United States, until September 2001, the date on which he returned to [REDACTED]. The applicant subsequently reentered the United States without inspection. Accordingly, the applicant has illegally reentered the United States after having accrued more than one year of unlawful presence in the United States.

Section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), defines “conviction” for immigration purposes as:

A formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where –

- (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and
- (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.

The AAO finds that the applicant is not eligible for treatment as a first time offender under *Lujan-Armendariz v. INS*, 222 F.3d 728 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000). *Lujan* holds that the definition of “conviction” at section 101(a)(48) of the Act does not repeal the Federal First Offender Act (FFOA) or the rule that no alien may be deported based on an offense that could have been tried under the FFOA, but is instead prosecuted under state law, when the findings are expunged pursuant to a state rehabilitative statute. *Lujan* at 749.

The Ninth Circuit *Lujan* decision explained that:

The [FFOA] is a limited federal rehabilitation statute that permits first-time drug offenders who commit the least serious type of drug offense to avoid the drastic consequences which typically follow a finding of guilt in drug cases. The [FFOA] allows the court to sentence the defendant in a manner that prevents him from suffering any disability imposed by law on account of the finding of guilt. Under the [FFOA], the finding of guilt is expunged and no legal consequences may be imposed as a result of the defendant’s having committed the offense. The [FFOA’s] ameliorative provisions apply for all purposes.

*Id.* at 735. To qualify for first offender treatment under federal laws, an applicant must show that (1) he has been found guilty of simple possession of a controlled substance; (2) he has not, prior to the commission of the offense, been convicted of violating a federal or state law relating to controlled substances; (3) he has not previously been accorded first offender treatment under any law; and (4) the court has entered an order pursuant to a state rehabilitative statute under which the criminal proceedings have been deferred or the proceedings have been or will be dismissed after probation. *Cardenas-Uriate v. INS*, 227 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000).

In *Garberding v. INS*, 30 F.3d 1187 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit rejected, on equal protection grounds, the rule that only expungements under exact state counterparts to the FFOA could be given effect in deportation proceedings. “[U]nder *Garberding*, persons who received the benefit of a state expungement law were *not* subject to deportation as long as they *could* have received the benefit of the [FFOA] if they had been prosecuted under federal law.” *Lujan* at 738 (citing *Garberding* at 1190).

*Lujan* further explained that rehabilitative laws included “vacatur” or “set-aside” laws -- where a formal judgment of conviction is entered after a finding of guilt, but then erased after the defendant has served a period of probation. In addition, rehabilitative laws included “deferred adjudication” laws -- where no formal judgment of conviction or guilt is entered. *See Lujan* at 735. The Ninth Circuit then re-emphasized that determining eligibility for FFOA relief was not based on whether the particular state law at issue utilized a *process* identical to that used under the federal government’s scheme, but rather by whether the petitioner would have been *eligible* for relief under the federal law, and in fact received relief under a state law. *See Lujan* at 738.

The rule set forth in *Lujan* regarding first-time simple possession of a controlled substance offense is applicable only in the Ninth Circuit and is a *limited* exception to the generally recognized rule that an expunged conviction qualifies as a “conviction” under the Act. The Ninth Circuit continues to hold that “persons found guilty of a drug offense who could *not* have received the benefit of the [FFOA] [are] not entitled to receive favorable immigration treatment, even if they qualified for such treatment under state law.” *Lujan* at 738 (citing *Paredes-Urrestarazu v. INS*, 36 F.3d 801, 813 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994)). Moreover, in *Ramirez-Castro v. INS*, 287 F.3d 1172 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit further clarified that California Penal Code section 1203.4 provides a limited expungement even under state law, and that it is reasonable to conclude that, in general, a conviction expunged under that provision remains a conviction for purposes of federal law. *See Ramirez* at 1175. Furthermore, the holding set forth in the Ninth Circuit case, *Garcia-Gonzales v. INS*, 344 F.2d 804 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1965) remains applicable to expungement cases that do not fit the limited circumstances set forth in *Lujan*.

In deciding whether a criminal conviction expunged pursuant to section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code remained a “conviction” for immigration purposes, the Ninth Circuit in *Garcia* analyzed Congress’ intent in enacting section 241(a)(11) of the Act as in effect in 1965, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11). *See Garcia* at 806-7. Under section 241(a)(11), an alien in the United States was deportable if the alien:

At any time has been convicted of a violation of any law or regulation relating to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, or who has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation governing or controlling the taxing, manufacture, production,

compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, exportation, or the possession for the purpose of the manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation or exportation of . . . heroin.

*Garcia* at 810. The Ninth Circuit in *Garcia* stated that in enacting section 241 of the Act as in effect in 1965, “Congress intended to do its own defining of ‘conviction’ rather than leave the matter to variable state statutes.” *Id.* at 807 (citing *Matter of A –F –*, 8 I&N Dec. 429, 445-46 (AG 1959)). The Ninth Circuit agreed that:

Congress did not intend that aliens convicted of narcotic violations should escape deportation because, as in California, the State affords a procedure authorizing a technical erasure of the conviction. Traffic in narcotics has been a continuing and serious Federal concern. Congress has progressively strengthened the deportation laws dealing with aliens involved in such traffic . . . . In the face of this clear national policy, I do not believe that the term “convicted” may be regarded as flexible enough to permit an alien to take advantage of a technical “expungement” which is the product of a state procedure wherein the merits of the conviction and its validity have no place . . . . I, therefore, regard it as immaterial for the purposes of § 241(a)(11) that the record of conviction has been cancelled by a state process such as is provided by § 1203.4 of the California Penal Code . . . .

*Garcia* at 809. *Lujan* discussed *Matter of A –F –*, stating that the case “remained the rule for all drug offenses until 1970, when Congress adopted the Federal First Offender Act . . . a rehabilitation statute that applies exclusively to first-time drug offenders who are guilty only of simple possession.” *Lujan* at 735. Thus, while *Lujan* supercedes *Garcia* in limited circumstances, the general holding that expungements do not erase “convictions” for federal immigration purposes remains valid, even in the Ninth Circuit.

In this case, the applicant has not established that his conviction has been expunged, vacated or set aside pursuant to the federal rehabilitative statute. The AAO finds that the applicant is ineligible for treatment as a first-time offender and is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Act for having been convicted of a crime related to a controlled substance.

The Act makes it clear that a section 212(h) waiver is not available to an alien who has been convicted of a crime related to a controlled substance which is more than simple possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana. In this case, the applicant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, in the amount of 20 kilos. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for waiver consideration.

*Matter of Martinez-Torres*, 10 I&N Dec. 776 (Reg. Comm. 1964) held that an application for permission to reapply for admission is denied, in the exercise of discretion, to an alien who is mandatorily inadmissible to the United States under another section of the Act, and no purpose would be served in granting the application.

The applicant is subject to the provisions of sections 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), which are very specific and applicable. No waiver is available to an alien who has been convicted of more than simple

possession of marijuana in an amount less than 30 grams. Therefore, no purpose would be served in the favorable exercise of discretion in adjudicating the application to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act. As the applicant is statutorily inadmissible to the United States, the appeal will be dismissed.

Beyond the decision of the field office director, the AAO finds that the applicant is inadmissible under the provisions of section 212(a)(2)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C), as a trafficker, and no waiver is available.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the applicant is mandatorily inadmissible to the United States and no purpose would be served in the favorable exercise of discretion in adjudicating an application to reapply for admission into the United States. Additionally, the AAO finds that the applicant is inadmissible under the provisions of section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) of the Act and does not qualify for a waiver or the exception under section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) and (iii) of the Act. Therefore, the applicant is statutorily ineligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission into the United States.<sup>2</sup>

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.

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<sup>1</sup> Even if the applicant's conviction is expunged at a later date and he becomes eligible for treatment under *Lujan*, inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2)(C) of the Act is based on the standard "reason to believe." It was held in *United States v. Franklin*, 728 F.2d 994 (8th Cir., 1984), that intent to distribute may be established by circumstantial evidence. Evidence the applicant possessed a controlled substance with the requisite intent to distribute is sufficient as a matter of law, where the controlled substance is packaged in a manner consistent with distribution and/or there is evidence of paraphernalia, a large amount of cash, weapons, or other indicia of narcotics distribution. The intent to distribute a controlled substance has been inferred solely from possession of a large quantity of the substance. *United States v. Koua Thao*, 712 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1983) (154.74 grams of opium); *United States v. DeLeon*, 641 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1980) (294 grams of cocaine); *United States v. Grayson*, 625 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1980) (413.1 grams of 74% pure cocaine); *United States v. Love*, 559 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1979) (26 pounds of marijuana); *United States v. Muckenthaler*, 584 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1978) (147 grams of cocaine). The record clearly establishes that the applicant was in possession of an excessive amount of marijuana, 20 kilos, at or near a port of entry. The AAO finds that it is reasonable to conclude that the applicant was involved in trafficking.

<sup>2</sup> An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See *Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003); see also *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).