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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals, MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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[REDACTED]

FILE:

[REDACTED]

Office: NEW YORK, NY

Date:

SEP 21 2010

IN RE:

[REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after
Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew,
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The District Director, New York, New York, denied the Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) and it is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Ecuador who, on December 11, 2000, appeared at Newark International Airport. The applicant presented her Ecuadorian passport containing a U.S. nonimmigrant visa and a fraudulent back-dated admittance stamp. The applicant was placed into secondary inspection. The applicant admitted that she had obtained the fraudulent back-dated admittance stamp in order to conceal the length of time she previously spent in the United States. The applicant was found to be inadmissible pursuant to sections 212(a)(6)(C)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for attempting to enter the United States by fraud and for being an immigrant without valid documentation. On December 12, 2000, the applicant was expeditiously removed from the United States pursuant to section 235(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).

On September 29, 2008, the applicant filed an Application to Register Permanent Residence of Adjust Status (Form I-485) based on an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed on her behalf by her naturalized U.S. citizen adult daughter. The Form I-485 indicates that the applicant entered the United States without inspection on December 15, 2000. On September 4, 2009, the applicant filed a Form I-212, indicating that she continued to reside in the United States. The applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). She seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to reside in the United States with her naturalized U.S. citizen adult daughter.

The district director determined that the applicant did not warrant a favorable exercise of discretion and denied the Form I-212 accordingly. *See District Director's Decision*, dated January 4, 2010.

On appeal, counsel contends that the applicant warrants a favorable exercise of discretion. *See Counsel's Brief*, undated. In support of his contentions, counsel submits the referenced brief, an affidavit from the applicant, a memo from the applicant's daughter and identity documentation for the applicant's daughter and siblings. The entire record was reviewed in rendering a decision in this case.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

- (i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

- (ii) Other aliens.-Any alien not described in clause (i) who-
 - (I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or
 - (II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
- (iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

....

(C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.-

- (i) In general.-Any alien who-
 - (I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or
 - (II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other provision of law, and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.

Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States if, prior to the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary of Homeland Security has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

(iii) Waiver

The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the application of clause (i) in the case of an alien who is a VAWA self-petitioner if there is a connection between—

- (I) the alien's battering or subjection to extreme cruelty; and
- (II) the alien's removal, departure from the United States, reentry or reentries into the United States; or attempted reentry into the United States.

On appeal, counsel contends that the applicant is not disregarding the laws of the United States.

Counsel states that the applicant's daughter and grandchild are U.S. citizens. Counsel states that the applicant has at least eight naturalized U.S. citizen siblings. Counsel states that the applicant does not work. Counsel states that the applicant resides with her daughter and cares for her grandchild. Counsel states that the applicant has never been convicted of a crime or committed one. Counsel states that the applicant cares for her family by babysitting, cooking, cleaning and doing whatever is necessary. Counsel states that the applicant has no need for outside income. Counsel states that, aside from the applicant's desperate actions taken to return to her loved ones, she is a model, churchgoing member of society. Counsel states that affidavits on appeal establish hardships which would be caused by the applicant's departure from the United States. Counsel states that the applicant is a hardworking, loving woman who has nowhere to return to in Ecuador. Counsel states that all of the applicant's family resides in the United States. Counsel states that the applicant is divorced and her parents are deceased.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis for deportation; recency of deportation; length of residence in the United States; applicant's moral character; his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; family responsibilities; any inadmissibility under other sections of law; hardship involved to himself and others; and the need for his services in the United States.

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would condone the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter the United States to work in the United States unlawfully. *Id.*

Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person

now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered.
Id.

The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Munoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998), need not be accorded great weight by the district director in a discretionary determination. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper. The AAO finds these legal decisions establish the general principle that "after-acquired equities" are accorded less weight for purposes of assessing favorable equities in the exercise of discretion.

As established by the record, the favorable factors in this matter are the applicant's naturalized U.S. citizen adult daughter, the general hardship to the applicant and her family if she were denied admission to the United States, the absence of a criminal record and the approved immigrant visa petition filed on her behalf. The AAO notes that the filing of the immigrant visa petition benefiting her occurred after the applicant was placed into immigration proceedings. It is, therefore, an "after-acquired equity," to which the AAO accords diminished weight.

The AAO finds that the unfavorable factors in this case include the applicant's attempt to enter the United States by fraud; her inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i)(I) of the Act; her unlawful reentry into the United States after having been removed; her inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i); and her unlawful presence in the United States.

The applicant in the instant case has multiple immigration violations. The totality of the evidence demonstrates that the favorable factors in the present matter are outweighed by the unfavorable factors.

Beyond the decision of the field office director, the AAO finds that the applicant is inadmissible under the provisions of section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) of the Act and does not qualify for a waiver or the exception under section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) and (iii) of the Act. Therefore, no purpose would be served in the favorable exercise of discretion in adjudicating an application to reapply for admission into the United States. Additionally, the AAO finds that the applicant is inadmissible under the provisions of section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act and the record reflects that she does not have a qualifying family member in order to qualify for a waiver under section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i). A section 212(i) waiver is dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on the U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident *spouse or parent* of the applicant. A section 212(i) waiver may not be based upon extreme hardship to the applicant or his or her child(ren). As such, the applicant's naturalized U.S. citizen adult daughter is not a qualifying relative upon which she can base a waiver application under section 212(i) of the Act. Therefore, the applicant is mandatorily inadmissible to the United States and no purpose would be served in the

favorable exercise of discretion in adjudicating an application to reapply for admission into the United States.¹

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish she is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

¹ An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).