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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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FILE:

Office: BALTIMORE, MD

Date: **NOV 15 2010**

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i)  
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion. The fee for a Form I-290B is currently \$585, but will increase to \$630 on November 23, 2010. Any appeal or motion filed on or after November 23, 2010 must be filed with the \$630 fee. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew

Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Baltimore, Maryland. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Pakistan who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact to procure an immigration benefit. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to reside with his U.S. citizen mother in the United States.

The district director found that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated February 26, 2008.

The record contains, *inter alia*: a declaration from the applicant's mother, [REDACTED] letters from [REDACTED] physicians; letters from the applicant's siblings; letters of support; and an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130). The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act provides:

In general.—Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) provides:

(1) The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully permanent resident spouse or parent of such an alien . . . .

In this case, the record shows, and the applicant does not contest, that he entered the United States using a fraudulent passport in July 2000. Therefore, the record shows that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for willful misrepresentation of a material fact in order to procure an immigration benefit.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or his children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's mother is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

*Id.* See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

*Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. See *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. See *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; see also *U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation."). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent's spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme

hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. See, e.g., *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

In this case, the applicant’s mother, [REDACTED], states that she has vascular dementia. According to [REDACTED], she does not speak English, cannot drive, and needs help with all her daily activities. [REDACTED] states that her son, the applicant, is the only person she can rely on to help her. She contends that although she has four other children, she cannot count on them for assistance. *Declaration of [REDACTED]*, undated.

A letter from [REDACTED] physician states that [REDACTED] is sixty-three years old and has hypertension and memory problems. The physician states that [REDACTED] was diagnosed with vascular dementia, brain damage due to strokes. According to the physician, [REDACTED] is unable to function on her own and unable to perform normal daily activities. The physician states that her dementia will continue to advance and is not reversible or curable. The physician contends that the “[b]rain damage has been done” and will interfere with basic cognitive functions. According to the physician, “the damage interferes with basic cognitive functions and disrupts every day functioning such as memory, handling keys, difficulty following instructions and possible abnormal behavior.” *Letter from [REDACTED]*, undated.

A letter from [REDACTED] psychiatrist states that [REDACTED] is suffering from dementia. According to the psychiatrist, [REDACTED] is unable to take care of herself, needs constant supervision, and gets lost if she is left by herself. The psychiatrist states that the applicant is the

person who drives [REDACTED] to appointments and takes care of her twenty-four hours a day. The psychiatrist further states that [REDACTED] does not trust anyone else other than the applicant. *Letter from [REDACTED]* dated May 1, 2006.

The record also contains letters from [REDACTED] four other children. A letter from her daughter, [REDACTED] states that she will soon be moving back to Pakistan as her husband has been deported to Pakistan. *Declaration from [REDACTED]* dated April 22, 2008. A letter from another daughter, [REDACTED] states that she is currently living in Pakistan. *Declaration from [REDACTED]*, dated April 16, 2008. A letter from a third daughter, states that she is currently living in Pakistan with her seven month old child and her husband, and that although they plan on moving to the United States, she will be unable to assist her mother because they will live in New York City. *Declaration from [REDACTED]* dated April 16, 2008. A letter from [REDACTED] son, [REDACTED], states that he is currently living in Pakistan with his wife. *Declaration from [REDACTED]* dated April 16, 2008. All four of [REDACTED] other children state that they are unable to care for their mother, who lives in Maryland, and that the applicant is the only person available to assist their mother with her dementia.

After a careful review of the record, it is not evident that the applicant's mother will suffer extreme hardship as a result of the applicant's waiver being denied.

The AAO finds that if [REDACTED] had to remain in the United States without her son, she would experience extreme hardship. The record shows that [REDACTED], who is currently sixty-eight years old, suffers from dementia. According to [REDACTED] physician and psychiatrist, she is unable to take care of herself and needs constant supervision. In addition, her doctors state that her dementia is irreversible, incurable, and will continue to advance. *Letters from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], supra.* Although [REDACTED] has four other children, according to the children's declarations, none are able to assist [REDACTED] as they either live in Pakistan or will be moving back to Pakistan. Given the applicant's mother's advanced age, her dementia, and her prognosis that she requires full-time care and that the disease will continue to advance, the AAO finds that the hardship [REDACTED] would experience if she had to remain in the United States without her son is extreme, going well beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with a child's inadmissibility to the United States.

Nonetheless, to endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. In this case, the AAO must find that the applicant has not established that his mother would also experience extreme hardship upon relocation to Pakistan because the applicant has not addressed this possibility. The record shows that [REDACTED] is a native of Pakistan and that four of her children continue to live in Pakistan. There is no allegation in the record that [REDACTED] dementia could not be adequately monitored or treated in Pakistan. In the absence of clear assertions from the applicant, the AAO may not speculate as to the hardship the applicant's mother may endure should she relocate to Pakistan.

Based on the foregoing, the applicant has not shown that his mother will endure extreme hardship should she decide to join him in Pakistan. Accordingly, the applicant has not established that the denial of the present waiver application “would result in extreme hardship” to his mother, as required for a waiver under section 212(i) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.