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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: KINGSTON, JAMAICA Date: **OCT 01 2010**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Immigrant Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Tariq Syed
for

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge, Kingston, Jamaica and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Jamaica who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having attempted to procure admission into the United States and for procuring admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant is married to a United States citizen and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to reside in the United States with her spouse.

The Officer in Charge concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed upon a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Officer in Charge*, dated May 12, 2006.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant states that the applicant's qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship should the waiver application be denied. *Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion; Attorney's brief*.

In support of the waiver, counsel submits a brief. The record also includes, but is not limited to, a statement from the applicant's spouse; telephone cards; statements from family members and friends; and a property deed. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

The record reflects that in 1993 the applicant gained admission to the United States by presenting false documentation. *Record of Sworn Statement*, dated December 8, 2000. She remained in the United States for three years, returning to Jamaica in August 1996. *Id.* On December 8, 2000 the applicant attempted to gain admission to the United States at JFK airport in New York by using a fraudulent visa issued by a travel agency. *Id.* The applicant was expeditiously removed from the United States. *Form ER-583, Withdrawal of Application for Admission, VWPPP Refusal, or Expedited Removal*. Based on her presentation of fraudulent documents at the port of entry, the applicant is inadmissible under Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the

application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996)

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful

permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S.*

v. *Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. See, e.g., *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

If the applicant’s spouse joins the applicant in Jamaica, the applicant needs to establish that her spouse will suffer extreme hardship. The applicant’s spouse is a native of Jamaica. *Naturalization certificate*. He has lived in the United States since 1983. *Attorney’s brief*. He has many family members residing in the United States, including his children from a previous relationship, his brother, and his father. *Statement from the applicant’s spouse*, dated March 21, 2005. The record does not address whether he has family members in Jamaica. The applicant’s spouse states that he earns \$40,000.00 annually working for the municipal bus district in Great Neck, New York. *Id.* He asserts that his position is covered by the union and he has full benefits which include a pension and medical insurance for himself and his family. *Id.* Counsel notes that if he were to leave his position, he would never be able to obtain similar employment in Jamaica. *Attorney’s brief*. Counsel notes that he could not provide health insurance nor would he be able to financially support his family. *Id.* While the AAO acknowledges these assertions, it notes that the record fails to include documentation, such as W-2 Forms, earnings statements, or tax statements to confirm the salary of the applicant’s spouse in the United States. Additionally, the record fails to include documentation, such as published country conditions reports, regarding the economy in Jamaica and the availability

of employment. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence will not meet the burden of proof of this proceeding. See *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998)(citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). The applicant's spouse notes that he has two United States citizen children from previous relationships who are a major part of his life, and they rely on him. *Statement from the applicant's spouse*, dated March 21, 2005. While his children reside with their biological mothers, the applicant's spouse sees them on a regular basis. *Id.* Counsel states that the applicant's spouse shares joint custody with his former spouse over one of his children. *Attorney's brief.* While the AAO acknowledges this statement, it notes that the applicant's spouse does not have physical custody over this child and it is unclear how his joint custody would be affected. Counsel asserts that it would be doubtful that the applicant's spouse could afford to have his children frequently visit Jamaica or that he could leave a new job to frequently visit them. *Attorney's brief.* While the AAO acknowledges counsel's assertions, it notes that these statements are speculative in nature and that the record fails to include documentation regarding the cost of travel to Jamaica. Without supporting documentation, the assertions of counsel are not sufficient to meet the burden of proof in these proceedings. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). When looking at the aforementioned factors, the AAO does not find that the applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to her spouse if he were to reside in Jamaica.

If the applicant's spouse resides in the United States, the applicant needs to establish that his spouse will suffer extreme hardship. As previously noted, the applicant's spouse is a native of Jamaica. *Naturalization certificate.* He has lived in the United States since 1983. *Attorney's brief.* He has many family members residing in the United States, including his children from previous relationships, his brother, and his father. *Statement from the applicant's spouse*, dated March 21, 2005. The record does not address whether the applicant's spouse would be affected on a financial level if he remained in the United States. The record does not include documentation, such as published country conditions reports, regarding the economy in Jamaica and whether he is having to financially support the applicant. The record also fails to include documentation as to whether the applicant is able to obtain employment in Jamaica. The applicant's spouse states that he misses the applicant a lot, especially when he returns to an empty home after a long day of work. *Statement from the applicant's spouse*, dated March 21, 2005.

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse will endure hardship as a result of his separation from the applicant. However, the record does not distinguish his situation, if he remains in the United States, from that of other individuals separated as a result of removal. Accordingly, it does not establish that the hardship experienced by the applicant's spouse would rise to the level of extreme hardship. When looking at the aforementioned factors, the AAO does not find that the applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to her spouse if he were to reside in the United States.

Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.