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
IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. section 1182(i).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

for
Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Baltimore, Maryland. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Honduras. She was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more and seeking admission within ten years of her last departure. She is married to a United States citizen. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

The District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that the bar to her admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, her U.S. citizen spouse, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) on September 27, 2007.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant asserts that the applicant has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The record indicates that the applicant made numerous entries into the United States with a B-2 visa, and may have remained beyond her authorized stay on several occasions. However, it is not clear that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, and as such this finding of the director will be withdrawn.

Beyond the decision of the District Director the AAO would note that evidence in the record clearly establishes the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act due to the fact that she was an intending immigrant entering under a non-immigrant visa. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

The applicant has made repeated entries into the United States since November 1999 as a B-2 visitor. Records from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) show that the applicant entered the United States on November 6, 1999, May 1, 2000, November 13, 2000, March 11, 2002, September 28, 2003, and December 25, 2003. The record reflects that the applicant and her spouse were married on March 17, 2000. The record contains evidence that the applicant has been residing, attending school and working in the United States since at least November 2000. Every time the applicant was admitted to the United States as a B-2 visitor during this period she was returning to resume her residency as an intending immigrant, and thus misrepresented her intent to immigration inspection officers at the port-of-entry. The AAO finds that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) on this basis.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or his children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's spouse is the qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the

applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. *See also Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a

chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their

parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The record includes, but is not limited to, counsel’s brief; statements from the applicant and her spouse; financial documentation such as tax returns, bank statements, payment stubs and employment verification letters; evidence of financial obligations such as utility bills, home mortgage notes; a Report of Psychological Evaluation for the applicant’s spouse from David S. Rose, Ph.D.; and receipts for numerous prescriptions, with instructions, issued to the applicant’s spouse.

The entire record was reviewed and all relevant evidence considered in rendering this decision.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Honduras. Her spouse, a 54-year-old native of Honduras, who has resided in the United States since August 5, 1988 as a lawful permanent resident, is now a U.S. citizen. The AAO would note that Honduras has been designated by DHS as requiring Temporary Protected Status, under section 244 of the Act, through January 2012, due to the conditions in the country. *Federal Register*, Vol. 75, No. 86, May 5, 2010. Based on these facts, and the other hardships associated with relocation, the AAO can determine that the applicant’s spouse, a United States citizen, would experience hardships upon relocation which rise above those normally experienced by the relatives of inadmissible aliens who relocate with them to their country of origin. Although the record establishes that the applicant’s spouse may experience extreme hardship if he were to relocate with the applicant to Honduras, the applicant must still establish that the applicant’s spouse would experience extreme hardship if the applicant were excluded and he remained in the United States.

Counsel for the applicant asserts the applicant’s spouse will experience emotional, physical and financial hardship due to the inadmissibility of the applicant. Specifically, counsel asserts that the applicant’s spouse has been diagnosed with depression, which is compounded by diabetes, and must take the medication Lisinopril. He further states that the applicant assists her spouse with his medical needs, and that he will experience emotional hardship.

The AAO will take judicial notice of the fact that Lisinopril may be used in relation to Diabetes, based on the NIH report. However, there is no objective evidence that in this case the medication has been prescribed by a doctor in relation to his diabetes treatment. Counsel and the applicant's spouse have asserted that the applicant's spouse has diabetes, and have submitted numerous other prescription receipts issued to the applicant's spouse. While these receipts are sufficient to establish the applicant more than likely has diabetes, the AAO would note that there is no objective documentation, e.g. a statement or copy of an official diagnosis by the applicant's spouse's doctor which discusses his diagnosis, its impact on his daily life and ability to function, or why it would be necessary for him to have a caretaker. In addition, the evidence submitted is not sufficiently probative of the impact the applicant's spouse is experiencing due to his medical condition. Counsel's characterization of the impact as being extreme is not supported by documentation in the record. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Without evidence establishing the impact of his condition, beyond a general description of the condition, the AAO cannot determine that this applicant is experiencing any significant medical impact as a result of his spouse's inability.

The record contains a psychological profile of the applicant's spouse by [REDACTED]. In his profile of the [REDACTED] narrates the applicant's spouse's symptoms as relayed to him by the applicant's spouse, and concludes that he has a mild degree of depression, and that this clearly meets the criteria for 'extreme and unusual' hardship.

Although the input of any mental health professional is respected and valuable, the AAO notes that the submitted evaluation is based on a single interview between the applicant's spouse and [REDACTED]. The record fails to reflect an ongoing relationship between a mental health professional and the applicant's spouse, or any history of treatment for the depression suffered by the applicant's spouse. Moreover, the conclusions reached in the submitted evaluation, being based on a single interview, do not reflect the insight and elaboration commensurate with an established relationship with a psychologist, thereby rendering [REDACTED] findings speculative and diminishing the evaluation's value to a determination of extreme hardship.

The record lacks sufficient evidence of other hardship impacts as well, such as financial or economic hardship. The record contains tax records and income information, but fails to reflect that the applicant's spouse is in any way financially dependent on the applicant. The AAO would also note that the applicant's spouse acted as a financial sponsor for the applicant when she filed her Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485).

When viewed in an aggregate context, the record does not contain sufficiently probative documentation to establish that the applicant's spouse will experience impacts which rise above those normally associated with separation from a family member.

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant's husband faces extreme hardship if his wife is refused

admission. The AAO recognizes that the applicant's husband will have to make adjustments, as would any qualifying relative in a similar situation. These assertions, however, are common hardships associated with removal and separation, and do not rise to the level of "extreme" as informed by relevant precedent. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal or inadmissibility are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse as required under section 212(i) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.