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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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H5

FILE: [REDACTED] Office: NEW YORK Date: SEP 22 2010
(GARDEN CITY)

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Thank you,

Argum Sikka
for

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**ACTION COMPLETED
APPROVED FOR FILING**
Initials: JT Date: 6/22/11
FCO/Unit COW

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, New York. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for willful misrepresentation of a material fact in order to procure an immigration benefit. The applicant is married to a U.S. citizen and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to reside with her husband and children in the United States.

The district director found that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to her spouse and denied the waiver application accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated December 4, 2007.

On appeal, counsel contends that the applicant is not inadmissible for willful misrepresentation. Specifically, counsel claims that although the applicant used another person's documents to purchase an airline ticket, she never presented the document to an immigration official or any government official. Alternatively, counsel contends that the applicant established the requisite extreme hardship.

The record contains, *inter alia*: a copy of the marriage certificate of the applicant and her husband, Mr. Hernandez, indicating they were married on April 20, 2001; an affidavit and a letter from Mr. Hernandez; an affidavit from the applicant; copies of tax and other financial documents; letters from the applicant's and her husband's employers; and an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130). The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act provides:

In general.—Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

In this case, the applicant contends that in 1998 she entered the United States on a raft from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico. She states she was not inspected by an immigration officer when she arrived in Puerto Rico. The applicant further contends she used another person's Dominican Republic birth certificate to purchase a plane ticket from Puerto Rico to Newark. She states she was not inspected by an immigration officer when she arrived in Newark. *Record of Sworn Statement of [REDACTED]* dated October 5, 2007; *Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601)*, dated February 23, 2007.

After a complete review of the record, the AAO concludes that the evidence does not support a finding that the applicant is inadmissible for willful misrepresentation a material fact in order to procure an immigration benefit. It is well established that fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact in the procurement or attempted procurement of a visa, or other documentation, must be made to an authorized official of the United States Government in order for excludability under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act to be found. *See Matter of Y-G-*, 20 I&N Dec. 794 (BIA 1994); *Matter of D-L- & A-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1991); *Matter of L-L-*, 9 I & N Dec. 324 (BIA 1961). There is no evidence in the record that the applicant presented the fraudulent birth certificate to a U.S. government official. Rather, the applicant entered Puerto Rico, a U.S. territory, without inspection. Upon arriving in Newark, she was again not inspected. Under these circumstances, the evidence does not support the finding that the applicant is inadmissible for willful misrepresentation of a material fact in order to procure an immigration benefit.

Nonetheless, an application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B), provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who -

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

In this case, the applicant entered the United States without inspection in 1998. The applicant was granted advance parole and departed the United States in December 2002 and in September 2005. Her last entry into the United States was on September 25, 2005. The applicant accrued unlawful presence from 1998 until the date she filed her first Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485), April 30, 2001. Therefore, the applicant accrued unlawful presence in excess of one year. She now seeks admission within ten years of her September 2005 departure. Accordingly, she is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for being unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year, and seeking admission within 10 years of the date of her last departure from the United States.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides for a waiver of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) inadmissibility as follows:

The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established . . . that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's husband is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. See *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. Cf. *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one’s present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm’r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be

considered in analyzing hardship. See *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; see also *U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. See, e.g., *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

In this case, the applicant’s husband, [REDACTED] states that the applicant is the primary wage earner, takes care of their home, and is his main source of emotional support. [REDACTED] states that he is self-employed as a construction worker and that he earns approximately \$450 per week. He contends that his wife supports him financially when he is not working, and that without his wife, he will be unable to meet all of his financial obligations. *Affidavit of* [REDACTED] dated February 23, 2007; *Letter from* [REDACTED] dated May 24, 2006; *Self-Employed Letter*, dated February 10, 2007; see also *Self-Employed Letter*, dated November 20, 2006 (stating [REDACTED] earns approximately \$525 per week).

The applicant states that she is the principal provider in her family as her husband is not steadily employed. In addition, the applicant contends that her son, [REDACTED], is a lawful permanent resident and that he has developed a very strong bond with his stepfather, [REDACTED]. According to the applicant, if she returns to the Dominican Republic, Julio will stay in the United States with [REDACTED]. The applicant states that her husband's income is not steady and that her income has allowed them to get through the year when her husband is not earning much. She also contends she takes care of her husband's children when they stay and visit. *Affidavits of [REDACTED]* dated January 1, 2008, and May 11, 2006. A letter from the applicant's employer states that the applicant works thirty-five hours per week, earning \$8 per hour. *Letter from [REDACTED]* dated February 6, 2007.

After a careful review of the record evidence, it is not evident that the applicant's spouse has suffered or will suffer extreme hardship as a result of the applicant's waiver being denied.

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's husband, [REDACTED], will endure hardship upon the applicant's departure and is sympathetic to the family's circumstances. However, if [REDACTED] decides to stay in the United States, their situation is typical of individuals separated as a result of inadmissibility and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Courts of Appeals have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. For example, *Matter of Pilch, supra*, held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *See also Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991) (uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported).

Regarding the financial hardship claim, although the record contains tax documents and other financial documents showing that the applicant has recently become the primary income earner, in July 2002, [REDACTED] submitted a Form I-864, affirming he would financially support the applicant based on his salary alone of \$17,704. *Affidavit of Support under Section 213A of the Act (Form I-864)*, dated July 23, 2002. Although the record shows that by 2005, [REDACTED] earned \$7,200 in business income and the applicant earned \$11,280 in wages, there is no explanation addressing why [REDACTED] could not obtain additional employment or earn a higher salary as he had previously done. In addition, although the applicant contends that her son would stay with [REDACTED] should she need to depart the United States, none of the tax documents in the record claim the applicant's son as a dependent. *Internal Revenue Service, Tax Return Transcripts for 2003, 2004, 2005*. Furthermore, although [REDACTED] states he has two children from a previous relationship, there is no evidence he is financially responsible for them. In sum, although the AAO does not doubt that [REDACTED] will experience some financial hardship, without more detailed information, the AAO cannot attribute this financial hardship to the applicant's departure. In any event, even assuming some economic

hardship, the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship. *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship).

Moreover, aside from a single, conclusory statement that he “will not be able to return to the Dominican Republic with [his wife,]” *Affidavit of* [REDACTED] dated February 23, 2007, [REDACTED] does not sufficiently address why relocating to the Dominican Republic with his wife would be an extreme hardship. Although [REDACTED] contends he has two children who visit him, he does not specify how old they are, how often he sees them, or whether he financially supports them. Without more detailed information, there is insufficient evidence to show that [REDACTED] would suffer extreme hardship if he relocated to the Dominican Republic with his wife.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant’s husband caused by the applicant’s inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.