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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
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


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DATE: APR 11 2011

Office: ACCRA, GHANA FILE:



IN RE: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) and § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Accra, Ghana. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Ghana who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and again seeking admission within ten years of his last departure from the United States, and pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for attempting to enter the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant's mother is a U.S. citizen and the applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) and § 1182(i), in order to reside in the United States with his mother.

In a decision dated October 7, 2008, the Field Office Director found that the applicant failed to establish that his qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship as a consequence of his continued inadmissibility. The application was denied accordingly. *See Decision of Field Office Director* dated October 7, 2008.

On appeal, the applicant's qualifying relative provided a statement. In her statement, the applicant's qualifying parent asserts that she would experience emotional, psychological and financial hardships as a result of the applicant's inadmissibility. No additional evidence was provided on appeal.

The record contains an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130), an Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601), a Notice of Appeal (Form I-290B), an appeal statement and a letter from the qualifying relative, the qualifying relative's naturalization certificate and some financial documentation submitted with the Affidavit of Support (Form I-864).

USCIS records reflect that the applicant attempted to enter the United States on January 24, 2002 using a fraudulent visa and was removed on January 26, 2002. The applicant again entered the United States on November 27, 2002, using a valid B2 visa that he appears to have obtained by failing to disclose his prior removal from the United States. On July 17, 2004, the applicant was taken into custody by the Department of Homeland Security during a temporary Border Patrol checkpoint. Shortly thereafter, his prior removal order was reinstated and he was removed on July 18, 2004.<sup>1</sup> The applicant accrued unlawful presence from May 27, 2003, the date his authorized stay expired, until his removal order was reinstated on July 18, 2004, a period of more than one year. As a result of his misrepresentation and unlawful presence, the applicant is inadmissible to the United States pursuant to sections 212(a)(6)(C)(i) and 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

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<sup>1</sup> The applicant's removal order was reinstated based on a finding that he had reentered the United States without inspection after his prior removal, when in fact it appears he was inspected and admitted in November 2002.

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien or, in the case of an alien granted classification under clause (iii) or (iv) of section 204 (a)(1)(A) or clause (ii) or (iii) of section 204(a)(1)(B), the alien demonstrates extreme hardship to the alien or the alien's United States citizen, lawful permanent resident, or qualified alien parent or child.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

- (i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

- (II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides for a waiver of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) inadmissibility as follows:

The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established . . . that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. The applicant's mother is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. See *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. Cf. *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

*Id.* See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship

factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. See *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. See *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; see also *U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation."). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent's spouse accompanying him to the Phillipines, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing "physical proximity to her family" in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the

United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The applicant’s qualifying relative is his mother, a United States citizen. The documentation provided that specifically relates to the qualifying relative’s hardship includes an appeal statement and a letter from the qualifying relative and some financial documentation submitted with Form I-864. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

As aforementioned, the applicant’s qualifying parent asserts that she would experience emotional, psychological and financial hardships as a result of the applicant’s inadmissibility.

Based on the evidence in the record, the AAO finds that the applicant has not established that his mother will suffer extreme hardship as a consequence of being separated from him. The qualifying parent contends that she is suffering from emotional and psychological hardships, due to her separation from the applicant. In her appeal statement, the qualifying parent states that she would be “devastated if [her family] were to be separated for the rest of [their] lives.” However, the record does not contain any documentary evidence, aside from the qualifying parent’s own statement, to explain the types of emotional hardships she may be enduring, and there is no evidence to support that any such hardships would be outside the ordinary consequences of being separated from an adult child. Assertions cannot be given great weight absent supporting evidence. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence generally is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

Moreover, in her statement, the qualifying parent indicates that she “cannot maintain two households, one in Ghana and one in the United States” and that her son would be unable to find sufficient employment in Ghana. The record only contains tax returns and a Wage and Tax Statement from 2005, which was submitted with Form I-864. However, the applicant failed to provide documentation regarding the qualifying relative’s current economic situation, including more recent financial documentation regarding her income, living expenses or proof that she is

currently sending money to the applicant. As such, the AAO is not in the position to reach conclusions regarding possible financial hardships that the qualifying parent may be encountering due to her separation from the applicant. With regard to the applicant's inability to find suitable employment in Ghana, there was no documentary evidence to support such assertions made by the qualifying parent. Moreover, even if there had been evidence to establish that he would be unable to find employment and/or adequate employment, the applicant failed to show how his economic problems in Ghana would pose a hardship to the qualifying parent.

The applicant also failed to demonstrate that his qualifying parent would suffer extreme hardship in the event that she relocates to Ghana to live with her son. If the applicant's mother relocated to Ghana, she would no longer experience the emotional hardships associated with separation or bear the financial obligation of supporting two households. Further, as the applicant's parent has lived more than half of her life in Ghana, she is unlikely to experience the hardships associated with adjusting to a foreign culture. The applicant has also not addressed whether his qualifying parent has close family ties to the United States, other than the applicant's two siblings, whose immigration status is not stated. Further, the record does not indicate whether the qualifying parent has immediate family in Ghana, and the AAO is thus unable to ascertain whether and to what extent she would receive assistance from family members for both herself and the applicant. The current record does not establish that the applicant's parent would experience extreme hardship upon relocating to Ghana.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying parent, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to his United States citizen parent as required under section 212(i) of the Act. As the applicant has not established extreme hardship to a qualifying family member, no purpose would be served in determining whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.