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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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[Redacted]

FILE:

[Redacted]

Office: COLUMBUS (OHIO)

Date: FEB 28 2011

IN RE:

Applicant:

[Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Columbus, Ohio, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Ghana who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured entry into the United States by willfully misrepresenting a material fact. The record reflects that the applicant used a passport belonging to another person to enter the United States. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to reside in the United States with his United States citizen wife.

The Field Office Director found that the applicant failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on the applicant's spouse and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated September 2, 2008.

On appeal, counsel states that the director failed to properly apply the standards for determining extreme hardship and failed "to properly consider facts and applicable law" in denying the waiver application. Counsel submits a brief and additional evidence. *See Form I-290B and attachments.*

The record includes two notarized statements from the applicant's spouse describing the hardship claimed; a letter, dated September 16, 2008, from [REDACTED] dated July 17, 2008, from [REDACTED] and, counsel's brief. The entire record was reviewed and considered in arriving at a decision on the appeal.

The record reflects that on October 24, 2000, the applicant entered the United States using a passport belonging to another person. The record also reflects that the applicant is the beneficiary of a Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, filed on January 8, 2008, on behalf of the applicant by his United States citizen spouse. On January 8, 2008, simultaneously with the Form I-130, the applicant filed a Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, and a Form I-601. On July 22, 2008, the director approved the Form I-130 petition. On September 2, 2008, the director denied both the Form I-485 application, and the Form I-601 application. A subsequent motion to reopen the Form I-485 was denied on October 23, 2008. The applicant filed the current Form I-601 on October 7, 2008, which was also denied by the director on October 24, 2008.

The record reflects that the applicant procured entry into the United States by using another person's passport. Counsel does not dispute that the applicant procured entry into the United States by fraud and/or misrepresentation. Therefore, the AAO finds that the applicant is inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act for having gained entry into the United States by willfully misrepresenting a material fact.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) In general.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa,

other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

- (iii) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (i).

Section 212(i) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

*Id. See also Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996)

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one’s present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm’r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on

the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The applicant’s spouse states that she needs her husband to help her financially, emotionally, and to help with their four children. She states that she is currently employed as a home health aide which she states “is very tiring, and has never paid much;” that, in July 2008 she enrolled [REDACTED] where she is pursuing a Computer Officer Assistant diploma and she hopes to graduate in 2009, and will be able to get an office job; but, without “help and support from her [husband]” she would not be able to accomplish that goal; and, that now she, the children, and her husband “began living together as a family. [She] wasn’t alone anymore. [She] now has a partner to help through with this life.” Counsel states that by pursuing a diploma as an office assistant the applicant’s spouse will be able “to seek new employment that will enable her to support herself and family and hopefully eliminate the need for any form of public assistance.” It is noted that the applicant stated that she hopes to graduate in 2009, however, the record does not reflect updated information regarding the status of her pursuit of a Computer Officer Assistant diploma.

The applicant’s spouse may suffer some financial hardship without the financial contribution from the applicant if he returns to Ghana. However, the applicant does not provide evidence of the family’s

income and expenses. The applicant's spouse states that she is employed in a low paying job as a home health aide but she does not indicate her earnings, and whether the applicant himself is employed and his earnings, nor does the applicant's spouse specify the household bills for their home in the United States, and the expenses the applicant will incur to maintain a separate household in Ghana. Without details of the family's expenses, the AAO is unable to assess the nature and extent of financial hardship, if any, the applicant's spouse will face. It is noted that the record fails to demonstrate that the applicant will be unable to contribute to his family's financial wellbeing from a location outside of the United States.

The AAO notes that the applicant's spouse will suffer emotional hardships as a result of separation. However, it has not been established that any emotional hardships would be beyond that which would normally be experienced as a result of separation.

The AAO finds, therefore, that the applicant has failed to establish that any hardship his U.S. citizen spouse will experience as a result of separation would be extreme.

Regarding hardship in Ghana, in her statement submitted with the Form I-601, the applicant's spouse states that "It frightens [her] to think of moving to Ghana and she fears for their safety there. Counsel states that the applicant's spouse cannot relocate to Ghana with the four children because all of her family members are in the United States; that she risks being victim to societal ills, such as violence and discrimination against women and female genital mutilation. Counsel references a 2007 Department of State *Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Ghana*.

If the applicant's spouse is forced to leave her family and relocate to a country and culture to which she is not familiar, she would have to abandon her gainful employment in the United States without assurance of employment in Ghana. The AAO finds that the cumulative effects of the hardships in Ghana would be beyond that which would normally be expected due to inadmissibility.

However, as discussed above, a review of the documentation in the record fails to establish that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship in the United States as a result of separation. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.