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U. S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: [Redacted] Office: ACCRA, GHANA

Date: JAN 10 2011

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Immigrant Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Accra, Ghana and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Ghana who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having attempted to procure admission or having procured admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant is the daughter of a lawful permanent resident and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to reside in the United States with her mother.

The Field Office Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed upon a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated May 30, 2008.

On appeal, the record indicates that the applicant's mother would suffer extreme hardship should the waiver application be denied. *Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion and attached statement*.

In support of the waiver the record includes, but is not limited to, statements from the applicant's family members; a medical statement for the applicant's mother; and funeral information for the applicant's father. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

The record reflects that in 1994, the applicant applied for a nonimmigrant visa using the name [REDACTED] and stating her date of birth was January 22, 1963. *Nonimmigrant Visa Application, Optional Form 156*. This application was denied on February 7, 1994. *Id.* On May 8, 1997 the applicant applied for a nonimmigrant visa stating her name was [REDACTED] Mingle and her date of birth was January 22, 1953. *Nonimmigrant Visa Application, Optional Form 156*. On the day of the interview, the consular officer found the applicant presented a fraudulently obtained passport with a different date of birth. *Consular Memorandum, Embassy of the United States of America, Accra, Ghana*, dated February 13, 2008; *Form OF-194, Refusal Worksheet*. Additionally, the applicant did not disclose the fact that she had previously been refused a nonimmigrant visa and denied having a previous passport. *Id.* The applicant asserts that her passport was in error and she had no intention to defraud. *Attached statement to Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal*. The applicant therefore asserts that her misrepresentation was not willful. *Id.*

The AAO notes that the Supreme Court in *Kungys v. United States*, 485 U.S. 759 (1988) found that the test of whether concealments or misrepresentations were "material" was whether they could be shown by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence to be predictably capable of affecting, i.e., to have had a

natural tendency to affect, the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service's (now USCIS) decisions. In addition, *Matter of S- and B-C-*, 9 I&N Dec. 436 (BIA 1960; AG 1961) states that the elements of a material misrepresentation are as follows:

A misrepresentation made in connection with an application for visa or other documents, or with entry into the United States, is material if either:

- a. the alien is excludable on the true facts, or
- b. the misrepresentation tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is relevant to the alien's eligibility and which might well have resulted in proper determination that he be excluded.

Matter of S- and B-C-, 9 I&N Dec. 436, 448-449 (AG 1961).

By presenting a fraudulently obtained passport with a different name and a different date of birth, the applicant concealed her identity. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has found that if the use of the false identity was for a legitimate reason and was for a prolonged period prior to entry, a line of relevant inquiry was not cut off. *Matter of Gilikevorkian*, 14 I&N Dec. 454, 455 (BIA 1973). There is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the applicant used this false identity for a legitimate reason and for a prolonged period prior to entry. As such, the AAO finds that the applicant's use of a different name and different date of birth is a willful misrepresentation of a material fact. Additionally, the AAO finds that the applicant's failure to disclose her previous 1994 nonimmigrant visa refusal to have shut off a line of inquiry relevant to the applicant's eligibility and which might well have resulted in proper determination that she be excluded, as her name and date of birth differed from that submitted on the 1997 nonimmigrant visa application. As such, the applicant is inadmissible under Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's mother is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable

exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996)

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment

after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. See *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. See *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; see also *U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. See, e.g., *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their

parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

If the applicant’s mother joins the applicant in Ghana, the applicant needs to establish that her mother will suffer extreme hardship. The applicant’s mother is a native of Ghana. *Approved Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative*. The record does not address whether the applicant’s mother has family members in Ghana. The record does not address how the applicant’s mother would be affected if she resides in Ghana. As the record does not address this aspect of the hardship claim, the AAO is unable to find that the applicant’s mother would experience extreme hardship. When looking at the aforementioned factors, the AAO does not find that the applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to her mother if she were to reside in Ghana.

If the applicant’s mother resides in the United States, the applicant needs to establish that her mother will suffer extreme hardship. As previously noted, the applicant’s mother is a native of Ghana. *Approved Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative*. The applicant’s mother has another daughter and three grandchildren who reside in the United States. *Statement from the applicant’s sister*, dated January 16, 2008. According to her physician, the applicant’s mother is 80 years old and has hypertension, degenerative joint disease of all her major joints, previous fracture of the left humerus, and previous syncope. *Statement from [REDACTED]*, dated January 16, 2008. Her medical condition has made activities of daily living ever more difficult for her age. *Id.* She will definitely need a home health aid to assist her. *Id.* The applicant’s sister notes that her mother is in poor health and needs constant care and attention. *Statement from the applicant’s sister*, dated January 16, 2008. The business of the applicant’s sister takes her around to other parts of the United States, thus not allowing her to provide her mother with the maximum care she needs. *Id.* All three of the grandchildren of the applicant’s mother live in different states. *Id.* The spouse of the applicant’s mother is deceased. *Funeral information for the applicant’s father*. The AAO acknowledges the health conditions and care necessary for the applicant’s mother as documented by a licensed healthcare professional. When looking at the aforementioned factors, particularly the documented health conditions, the age of the applicant’s mother and her inability to work, as well as the lack of family support, the AAO finds that the applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to her mother if she were to reside in the United States.

However, as the record has failed to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant’s qualifying relative caused by the applicant’s inadmissibility to the United States if she relocates to

Ghana, the applicant is not eligible for a waiver of her inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.