


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ) Date: **MAR 16 2011**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:




INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,


Elizabeth J. Johnson
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for willful misrepresentation of a material fact in order to procure an immigration benefit. The applicant is married to a U.S. citizen and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to reside with her husband and child in the United States.

The district director found that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated August 19, 2008.

On appeal, counsel contends that the district director placed too much weight on the applicant's misrepresentation and that her motivation for entering the United States was merely to be with her husband. In addition, counsel contends that the applicant's husband, [REDACTED] has suffered severe mental and emotional hardship, and that the couple's separation has put [REDACTED] financial situation at risk at a time when he is starting his own business.

The record contains, *inter alia*: a copy of the marriage certificate of the applicant and her husband, [REDACTED], indicating they were married on June 29, 2005; an affidavit and a letter from [REDACTED] copies of bills, tax documents, and other financial documents; an offer of employment for the applicant; copies of photographs of the applicant and her family; letters of support; and an approved Petition for Alien Fiance (Form I-129F). The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision on the appeal.¹

Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

In general.—Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

¹ Although the record also contains documents that are written in Spanish, these documents have not been translated into English. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3) requires that any document containing foreign language submitted to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services be accompanied by a full English language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator's certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English. Consequently, these documents cannot be considered.

Section 212(i) provides, in pertinent part:

- (1) The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully permanent resident spouse or parent of such an alien

In this case, the record shows, and the applicant does not contest, that she attempted to enter the United States in July 2005 by presenting false documents in order to obtain entry to the United States. *Applicant's Brief*, dated June 11, 2007. Therefore, the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for willful misrepresentation of a material fact in order to procure an immigration benefit.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her child can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's husband is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact

that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding

hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

In this case, the applicant’s husband, [REDACTED] states that he and the applicant have a daughter together who was born in January 2006. [REDACTED] states he has been working as a food server since July 2000 and makes an average of \$3,200 per month. He states he has started a family business named “Wood Deal” where he employs his father and his brother. [REDACTED] states he bought a house with a big back yard, but that without his wife and daughter, it is empty and lonely. He contends he visits his

wife and daughter every other week, spending approximately \$500 each trip. [REDACTED] states he financially supports his wife and daughter in Mexico and that it is financially draining on him, particularly considering his wife has had a lot of dental work, which costs about \$420 per month. In addition, [REDACTED] claims he has been very depressed, has gained weight, and cannot sleep. According to [REDACTED], his daughter cries every time he returns to the United States. [REDACTED] states that his father, who is a lawful permanent resident, lives with him and that he financially supports his father. He states that if his wife is not permitted to enter the United States, he will have to go back to Mexico, which would be hard to do because the majority of his family lives in the United States and his business, his house, and his life are all in the United States. *Affidavit of [REDACTED]*, dated May 29, 2007; *Letter from [REDACTED]*, dated January 10, 2007.

After a careful review of the record, there is insufficient evidence to show that [REDACTED] has suffered or will suffer extreme hardship if his wife's waiver application were denied.

If [REDACTED] decides to stay in the United States, their situation is typical of individuals separated as a result of inadmissibility or exclusion and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. Regarding the financial hardship claim, there is insufficient evidence showing that [REDACTED] hardship is extreme. According to the tax documents in the record, [REDACTED] earned \$39,346 in wages in 2006. *2006 Wage and Tax Statements (Form W-2)*. In addition, the record shows that [REDACTED] earned \$11,400 in rental income and owns other property as well. *2006 Schedule E* (listing rental income for property located at [REDACTED]); *State of Nevada, Declaration of Value*, dated May 3, 2007 (showing [REDACTED] owns property located at [REDACTED]). Although [REDACTED] contends he financially supports his father, there is no letter from his father or any other evidence to corroborate this claim. [REDACTED] has not specifically addressed how much he financially supports his father and, at the same time, contends that he employs his father. *Affidavit of [REDACTED]*, *supra*; *Letter from [REDACTED]*, *supra*. Although the AAO does not doubt that the costs of visiting and supporting his wife and child in Mexico cause some financial hardship to [REDACTED], without more detailed information addressing the couple's total income and expenses, there is insufficient evidence in the record to determine the extent of his financial hardship.

Regarding [REDACTED] depression, weight gain, and sleep problems, although the AAO is sympathetic to his circumstances, there is no letter in plain language from any health care professional addressing the diagnosis, prognosis, treatment, or severity of [REDACTED] purported problems. Without more detailed information, the AAO is not in the position to reach conclusions regarding the severity of any medical or mental health condition or the treatment and assistance needed.

To the extent [REDACTED] contends his daughter cries whenever he leaves, as stated above, hardship to the applicant's child can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to [REDACTED], the only qualifying relative in this case. There is insufficient evidence in the record to show that any problems the couple's daughter may be experiencing has caused or will cause extreme hardship to [REDACTED]. There is no allegation that the couple's child, who was born in Mexico and appears to have lived in Mexico her entire life, has any physical or mental health issues. In sum, there is no evidence showing

that the applicant's situation is unique or atypical compared to other individuals separated as a result of inadmissibility or exclusion. *See Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996) (defining extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation).

Furthermore, the record does not show that [REDACTED] would suffer extreme hardship if he were to return to Mexico to be with his wife. The record shows that [REDACTED] is currently thirty-one years old. The record further shows that he was born in Mexico, married the applicant in Mexico, and that the couple's child was born in Mexico. Aside from the depression, weight gain, and sleep problems [REDACTED] claims he has experienced as a result of being separated from his wife and daughter, he does not claim that he suffers from any medical or mental health condition that would make his readjustment to living in Mexico any more difficult than would normally be expected. Although the AAO recognizes [REDACTED] contention that it would be hard to go back and make a living in Mexico, the record does not show that this hardship would be extreme or that his situation is unique or atypical compared to other individuals in similar circumstances. *See Perez v. INS, supra.*

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's husband caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.