


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
*Office of Administrative Appeals*  
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W. MS 2090  
Washington, D.C. 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**



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DATE: **APR 10 2012** OFFICE: SAN SALVADOR, EL SALVADOR

FILE:

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew

Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Acting Field Office Director, San Salvador, El Salvador, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and a citizen of El Salvador who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking admission within 10 years of her last departure from the United States. The applicant is the spouse of a U.S. Citizen and is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130). The applicant does not contest this finding of inadmissibility. Rather, she seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to reside with her husband and child in the United States.

The Acting Field Office Director concluded that the applicant failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *See Decision of Field Office Director*, dated December 15, 2009.

On appeal, the applicant's spouse asserts that the applicant never came to the United States illegally because she entered with a K visa, but they were unable to get married as initially planned due to unexpected reasons; they were poorly advised by counsel in December 2006 to return to El Salvador to "fix" the applicant's immigration papers; he has been alone in the United States and suffers from a back problem that requires surgery and that does not allow him to work in a normal job; he has not had the surgery because he needs the applicant to care for him and to assist him with post-surgery care. *See Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B)*, dated January 13, 2010.

The record includes, but is not limited to: letters of support as well as identity, employment, financial, and medical documents. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) ALIENS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT.-

(i) In General.- Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

...

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

...

(v) Waiver.-The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by the Attorney General [Secretary] regarding a waiver under this clause.

The record establishes that the applicant was admitted to the United States on November 30, 2002, as a K-1 fiancé, valid until February 28, 2003. The applicant did not timely marry the K-1 petitioner, but did eventually marry him on April 15, 2005. The applicant then filed an Application to Register Permanent Resident or Adjust Status (Form I-485) on June 20, 2005, which was denied by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on November 29, 2005. The applicant voluntarily departed the United States and returned to El Salvador on or about December 10, 2006, and has remained to date. The applicant accrued unlawful presence from March 1, 2003 to June 20, 2005, and from November 29, 2005 to December 10, 2006, a period in excess of one year. As the applicant is seeking admission within 10 years of departure, she is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or the applicant's child can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's husband is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly

when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The record contains references to hardship the applicant's child would experience if the waiver application were denied. It is noted that Congress did not include hardship to an alien's child as a

factor to be considered in assessing extreme hardship. In the present case, the applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative for the waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, and hardship to the applicant's child will not be separately considered, except as it may affect the applicant's spouse.

The applicant's spouse contends that he would suffer extreme emotional, medical, and financial hardship as a result of separation from the applicant because the applicant is his confidant and moral support; she takes care of him; they share responsibilities in the home; he has been suffering from severe depression, anxiety, and sleeping disorders; he has severe back problems that require surgery and post-care; he requires a special diet due to his cholesterol; he has endured the expense of supporting two households and hiring a person to clean; he has increased medical bills due to his health concerns; and the applicant is not working in El Salvador. In support of his physical condition, the spouse submitted a medical report. And, in support of his financial situation, the spouse submitted evidence of remittances to El Salvador, the mortgage and bank statements, and tax returns. The spouse also contends that his stepdaughter would suffer emotionally without his assistance in raising her.

The record is sufficient to establish that the applicant's spouse may experience some emotional, medical, and financial hardship because of separation from the applicant. However, the record does not establish that the hardship that the spouse may experience goes beyond what is normally experienced by qualified family members of inadmissible individuals. The record does not include any evidence of the spouse's current mental health or his inability to function in the applicant's or stepdaughter's absence. Also, the record includes medical documentation that contains medical terminology and abbreviations that are not easily understood. The documents submitted are otherwise indiscernible and do not contain a clear explanation of the current medical condition of the applicant's husband. Absent an explanation in plain language from the treating physician of the exact nature and severity of any condition and a description of any treatment or family assistance needed, the AAO is not in the position to reach conclusions concerning the severity of a medical condition or the treatment needed. Further, the AAO notes that the applicant's spouse is the sole breadwinner, but the record does not include any evidence that the spouse would be unable to support himself or to meet his financial obligations in the applicant's absence.

The AAO notes the concerns regarding the applicant's spouse's emotional ties to the applicant and stepdaughter as well as the hardship that he has experienced in their absence, but finds that even when this hardship is considered in the aggregate, the record fails to establish that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of separation from the applicant.

The applicant's spouse also contends that he would suffer emotional and financial hardship if he were to relocate to El Salvador because he has lived in the United States for about 30 years; his work is in the United States; and he would be unable to find work in El Salvador.

The record is sufficient to establish that the applicant's spouse would suffer hardship if he were to relocate to El Salvador with the applicant. The spouse has lived in the United States since in or

around 1979, he has been steadily employed by [REDACTED] since November 19, 2001, in the capacity of Machinist, Class II, and he has financial investments in the United States. The AAO notes that the record is unclear concerning whether the spouse maintains any social or financial ties to El Salvador, and the record does not include any evidence of economic, political, or social conditions and employment opportunities and healthcare in El Salvador, or how such conditions would directly impact the spouse. Nevertheless, in the aggregate, the AAO finds that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he were to relocate to El Salvador because of his length of residence and strong ties to the United States.

Although the applicant has demonstrated that the qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship if he relocated to be with the applicant, the AAO can find extreme hardship warranting a waiver of inadmissibility only where an applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to a qualifying relative in the scenario of separation and the scenario of relocation. The AAO has long interpreted the waiver provisions of the Act to require a showing of extreme hardship in both possible scenarios; as a claim that a qualifying relative will remain in the United States and thereby suffer extreme hardship as a consequence of separation can easily be made for purposes of the waiver even where there is no intention to separate in reality. *See Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 886 (BIA 1994). Furthermore, to separate and suffer extreme hardship, where relocating abroad with the applicant would not result in extreme hardship, is a matter of choice and not the result of inadmissibility. *Id.*; *see also Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996). As the applicant has not demonstrated extreme hardship from separation, the AAO cannot find that refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to the qualifying relative in this case.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardship faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rises beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her United States Citizen spouse as required under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. As the applicant has not established extreme hardship to a qualifying family member, no purpose would be served in determining whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.