



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

[REDACTED]

H5

DATE: DEC 19 2012

Office: PANAMA CITY, PANAMA

FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE:

[REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Panama City, Panama and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Colombia who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured admission to the United States through fraud or misrepresentation. The applicant is the spouse of a lawful permanent resident, the mother of three U.S. citizens, and is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to reside in the United States with her spouse and three children.

In a decision, dated October 27, 2011, the field office director concluded that although the denial of the applicant's admission would have an adverse effect on her family, the record did not demonstrate that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of her inadmissibility and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel states that the field office director erred in finding that the applicant's spouse would not suffer extreme hardship as a result of relocation or as a result of separation. In addition, counsel asserts that the field office director failed to consider the country conditions in Colombia and failed to follow precedent decisions applicable to the facts of this case.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides:

- (1) The [Secretary] may, in the discretion of the [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

In the present case, the record reflects that in March 1996, when applying for a nonimmigrant tourist visa, the applicant stated to the consular office at the U.S. Embassy that she previously stayed two months in the United States when she had truly stayed eight years, beginning in August 1985 and ending in January 1994. Based on this misrepresentation, the applicant was issued a tourist visa on March 8, 1996 and attempted to enter the United States as a nonimmigrant on June 21, 1996.

A misrepresentation is generally material if by it the alien received a benefit for which he or she would not otherwise have been eligible. *See Kungys v. United States*, 485 U.S. 759 (1988); *see also Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998); *Matter of Martinez-Lopez*, 10 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1962; AG 1964). A misrepresentation or concealment must be shown by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence to be predictably capable of affecting, that is, having a natural tendency to affect, the official decision in order to be considered material. *Kungys* at 771-72. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has held that a misrepresentation made in connection with an application for visa or other documents, or for entry into the United States, is material if either:

1. the alien is excludable on the true facts, or
2. the misrepresentation tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is relevant to the alien's eligibility and which might well have resulted in proper determination that he be excluded.

Matter of S- and B-C-, 9 I&N Dec. 436, 448-449 (BIA 1960; AG 1961).

In the applicant's case, she overstayed her authorized stay in the United States and took up residence for eight years. Her misrepresentation regarding her prior stays in the United States shut off a line of inquiry which is relevant to the applicant's immigrant intent and eligibility for a nonimmigrant visa, which might well have resulted in a proper determination that she be excluded. Thus, the applicant willfully misrepresented a material fact to procure a visa to the United States. The applicant is therefore inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act. The applicant's qualifying relative is her lawful permanent resident spouse.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido v. I.N.S.*, 138 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The record contains references to hardship the applicant's child would experience if the waiver application were denied. It is noted that Congress did not include hardship to an alien's children as a factor to be considered in assessing extreme hardship. In the present case, the applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative for the waiver under section 212(i) of the Act, and hardship to the applicant's child will not be separately considered, except as it may affect the applicant's spouse.

The record of hardship includes: counsel's brief, a statement from the applicant, a statement from the applicant's spouse, and documents indicating the applicant's and her spouse's educational background.

The applicant is claiming that her spouse will suffer extreme emotional hardship as a result of separation and emotional, financial, educational, and physical hardship as a result of relocation. The applicant's spouse, through counsel, states that separation is causing extreme emotional hardship because he is suffering emotionally from being separated from his wife and from being concerned over the safety and suffering of his wife and child in Colombia. The record does not include documentation to support these statements. We note counsel's assertion that the applicant's spouse's statements are legally and factually sufficient to establish hardship. We find that the assertions of the applicant's spouse are relevant evidence and have been considered. However, absent supporting documentation, these assertions cannot be given great weight. *See Matter of Kwan*, 14 I&N Dec. 175, 177 (BIA 1972) ("Information contained in an affidavit should not be disregarded simply because it appears to be hearsay. In administrative proceedings, that fact merely affects the weight to be afforded [it] . . ."). Going on record without supporting evidence generally is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)). The record indicates that the applicant and her spouse have been married for over 25 years and have never been separated. The AAO recognizes that separation would be emotionally difficult, but the record fails to establish that the separation from the applicant and her spouse would be above and beyond what would normally be expected upon the inadmissibility of a close family member.

In regards to relocation, the applicant asserts that her spouse will suffer extreme hardship because he will not be able to find work; their mental health will suffer; they will not be able to pursue their educational goals; their U.S. citizen son will not have access to the opportunities available in the United States; the applicant's spouse will have to relinquish his lawful permanent residence; and the country conditions indicate that Colombia has problems with poverty, violence, and other human rights abuses by both the government and rebel groups. We note that the current U.S. State Department Travel Warning for Colombia states that the security situation in Colombia has improved significantly in recent years, including in tourist and business travel destinations such as Cartagena and Bogota, but violence linked to narco-trafficking continues to affect some rural areas and parts of large cities. The country conditions reports cited by counsel and the current travel warning do not indicate that someone in the applicant's position would be at a great risk of experiencing violence or instability in Colombia. The record does indicate that the applicant's spouse works in "freelance construction equipment", resided in Colombia with the applicant and their son since 1996, and did not relocate to the United States until 2010, when he was granted lawful permanent residence. The record fails to establish that the applicant and her family were suffering when they resided together in Colombia for 14 years. Thus, given that the record fails to show how a person with the same cultural and professional background as the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of relocating to Colombia, coupled with the applicant's spouse's extended 14 year residence in Colombia, ending only three months before any hardship claims were made, we find that the record does not establish that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of relocation.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or

inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her spouse as required under section 212(i) of the Act.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.