


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090
U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services




H5



Date: FEB 16 2012

Office: ACCRA

FILE: 

IN RE: Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), and section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), and Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

for

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Form I-601, Application for Waiver of Ground of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) and the Form I-212, Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission Into the United States After Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) were concurrently denied by the Field Office Director, Accra, Ghana, and are now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeals will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Ghana who entered the United States with a valid nonimmigrant visa in June 1985 with permission to remain until December 1985. The applicant remained beyond her period of authorized stay. In October 1994 an immigration judge denied her applications for suspension of deportation and voluntary departure and ordered her deported. In January 2001, the BIA dismissed the applicant's appeal but granted her voluntary departure to be effected within thirty days of the decision, with an alternate order of deportation. The applicant filed an appeal of the BIA decision with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which was subsequently dismissed in October 2001. The applicant did not depart the United States until January 2005. The applicant was thus found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year, and under section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii), as an alien previously removed. In addition, the record establishes that in January 1988, the applicant attempted to procure a U.S. passport by presenting a U.S. birth certificate that did not belong to her. The applicant was thus found to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having attempted to procure documentation and an immigration benefit by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant does not contest the field office director's findings of inadmissibility. Rather, she seeks waivers of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), and under section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse. In addition, the applicant seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii).

The Field Office Director determined that the applicant had failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative and denied the Form I-601. The Field Office Director further noted that approving the Form I-212 would serve no purpose as the Form I-601 was being denied. As such, the I-212 was denied concurrently with the Form I-601. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated September 23, 2009.

On appeal, the applicant's spouse submits the following: a letter, dated November 16, 2009; an extreme hardship statement, dated October 20, 2009; and documentation from the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in regards to the applicant's child, [REDACTED]. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

....

- (ii) Waiver authorized. – For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (i).

Section 212(i) of the Act provides:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (A) Certain alien previously removed.-

- (i) Arriving aliens.-Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

- (ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

- (I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

- (II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent

removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens' reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General [now, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security] has consented to the aliens' reapplying for admission.

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien...

The AAO notes that in April 1988, the applicant was convicted of Second Degree Theft and Attempt in violation of 22 D.C.C. §3811, 3812(b) and 22 D.C.C. §103. The applicant was placed on probation for a period of eighteen months. The issue of whether or not this conviction is for a crime involving moral turpitude rendering the applicant inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act has not been addressed. Nevertheless, because the applicant is inadmissible under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) and 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act and demonstrating eligibility for a waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) also satisfies the requirements for a waiver of criminal grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h), the AAO will not determine whether the applicant is also inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act.

Waivers of inadmissibility under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Act are dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her child can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. See *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); but see *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse contends that he will suffer emotional and financial hardship were he to remain in the United States while the applicant resides abroad due to her inadmissibility. In a declaration, the applicant's spouse explains that he and his wife have been trying to start a family for many years and have undergone fertility treatments but he needs his spouse to be physically present to continue the process of trying to conceive. He notes that although they have recently adopted, it is their goal to have a biological child. In addition, the applicant's spouse explains that the applicant's daughter is estranged from both her mother and him as a result of the applicant's inadmissibility and such a predicament is causing him hardship. He notes that the applicant's daughter had to be removed from her place of residence because of an attempted rape and contends that she needs both her mother and step-father to be present in her life. Finally, the applicant's spouse asserts that in spite of his earning capacity, he is experiencing financial hardship due to his wife's absence. He references that he has credit card debt which escalates every time he travels to Ghana and a mortgage which he is unable to pay off. See *Letter from* [REDACTED] dated October 20, 2009.

To begin, although documentation has been provided establishing the applicant and her spouse's fertility treatments from 2001-2002, the record lacks an explanation from her physician of her current condition and evidence of any more recent treatments and efforts to conceive a child. The evidence on the record is insufficient to establish that the applicant's relocation to Ghana in January 2005 has directly impacted their ability to have a child. As for the applicant's child's estrangement to the applicant's spouse, no documentation has been provided establishing the applicant's spouse's relationship with his step-child prior to the applicant's relocation abroad, to support his assertion that long-term separation is causing him hardship. Finally, no documentation has been provided on appeal establishing the applicant's and her spouse's income and expenses and assets and liabilities to establish that as a result of the applicant's physical absence, her husband is experiencing hardship. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting

the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse will endure hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. However, his situation, if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal or inadmissibility and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record.

Extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must also be established in the event that he or she accompanies the applicant abroad based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request. To begin, the applicant's spouse explains that he has resided in the United States for over 35 years and has no ties to Ghana at this time. In addition, the applicant's spouse explains that he has been professionally successful in the United States and a relocation abroad would cause him career disruption. *Supra* at 2.

The record reflects that the applicant's spouse became a U.S. citizen in 1996, and has been residing in the United States for over 35 years. In addition, the record establishes the applicant's spouse's employment as both [REDACTED] since 1994 for numerous institutions of higher learning, including [REDACTED] in Talladega, Alabama. Were he to relocate to Ghana to reside with the applicant, he would have to return to a country with which he is no longer familiar, as he only resided in Ghana for 11 years. He would have to leave his community and his career. It has thus been established that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship were he to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant due to her inadmissibility.

We can find extreme hardship warranting a waiver of inadmissibility only where an applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to a qualifying relative in the scenario of separation *and* the scenario of relocation. A claim that a qualifying relative will relocate and thereby suffer extreme hardship can easily be made for purposes of the waiver even where there is no actual intention to relocate. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 886 (BIA 1994). Furthermore, to relocate and suffer extreme hardship, where remaining in the United States and being separated from the applicant would not result in extreme hardship, is a matter of choice and not the result of inadmissibility. *Id.*, also *cf. Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996). As the applicant has not demonstrated extreme hardship from separation, we cannot find that refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to the qualifying relative in this case.

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse will face extreme hardship if the applicant is unable to reside in the United States. Rather, the record demonstrates that he will face no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States and/or refused admission. Although the AAO is not insensitive to the applicant's spouse's situation, the record does not establish that the hardship he would face rises to the level of "extreme" as contemplated by statute and case law.

As noted above, the field office director concurrently denied the applicant's Form I-212 and Form I-601. *Matter of Martinez-Torres*, 10 I&N Dec. 776 (reg. Comm. 1964) held that an application for permission to reapply for admission is denied, in the exercise of discretion, to an alien who is mandatorily inadmissible to the United States under another section of the Act, and no purpose would be served in granting the application. As the applicant is inadmissible under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) and 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act and is not eligible for a waiver under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Act, no purpose would be served in granting the applicant's Form I-212.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.