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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals
20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

PUBLIC COPY

H15

[REDACTED]

DATE: **JAN 10 2012**

OFFICE: CHICAGO

FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Maria F. Rhew

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Chicago, Illinois, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Greece who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on February 28, 1976. He was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured admission to the United States through fraud or misrepresentation. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to remain in the United States with his spouse.

The Field Office Director concluded that the record failed to establish the existence of extreme hardship for a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. *See Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated June 25, 2009.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant asserts that the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, arbitrary, and unreasonable. On a previously denied motion to reopen and reconsider, counsel for the applicant stated that the applicant did not procure admission to the United States through fraud or misrepresentation because he had no knowledge of the termination of his marriage. *See Decision on Service Motion to Reopen*, dated January 25, 2007.

The applicant did not submit evidence in support of the waiver application and appeal. In support of his previously filed motion to reopen and reconsider, the applicant submitted an affidavit, an affidavit from his former U.S. citizen spouse, transcripts from their divorce proceedings, and other documents concerning their divorce proceedings. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General (Secretary), waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General (Secretary) that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in

extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien...

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one’s present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm’r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For

example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

In the present case, the record reflects that the applicant applied for and received an IR1 immigrant visa based upon his marriage to his former United States citizen spouse. The applicant received his immigrant visa on February 24, 1976 and entered the United States pursuant to that visa on February 28, 1976. It was later discovered that the applicant was divorced from his former U.S. citizen spouse on January 10, 1975.

Counsel for the applicant asserts that the applicant did not make any misrepresentations to gain entry into the United States. Counsel states that the applicant was not aware of his divorce from his former U.S. citizen spouse at the time he applied for, received, and utilized his IR1 visa. It is noted that the applicant's former spouse stated during divorce proceedings that she and the applicant had been living apart from one another since April 30, 1974. *See Report of Proceedings*, dated April 22, 1975. On his visa application, dated July 29, 1975, the applicant stated that he was married and intending to join his former United States citizen spouse in the United States. *See Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration*, dated July 29, 1975. Based upon the fact that the applicant had been separated from his former spouse for over a year and had apparently not spoken to her since that date at the time he filed his visa application, the applicant misrepresented his marital relationship in expressing a desire to join his spouse in the United States. Accordingly, the applicant has failed to satisfy his burden of proof and demonstrate that he is not subject to inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The applicant is therefore inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act for having procured admission to the United States through fraud or misrepresentation. The applicant's qualifying relative is his current U.S. citizen spouse.

The applicant's spouse is a sixty-five year-old native of Greece and citizen of the United States. The applicant and his spouse are currently residing in Chicago, Illinois. It is noted that the applicant has failed to file any evidence with his waiver application or appeal concerning any extreme hardship that his spouse would face upon his departure from the United States. In response to a request for evidence for a separate application, the applicant's brother submitted a letter stating that the applicant, the applicant's spouse, and their child rent an apartment from him. *See Letter from* [REDACTED] dated March 12, 2005. There is no information concerning the amount of rent payments made to the applicant's brother. There is further no information concerning any other financial obligations of the applicant's spouse. The applicant states that his wife is not employed. *See Letter from* [REDACTED] dated March 7, 2005. It is noted that the record contains an offer of employment for the applicant's wife, for a manager position at [REDACTED] restaurant at a wage of ten dollars an hour. *See Letter from* [REDACTED] dated July

23, 2003. Further, the applicant's daughter is currently twenty-eight years old and there is no assertion that the applicant's spouse would suffer any financial hardship in the absence of the applicant. *See Application to Register Permanent Resident or Adjust Status*, dated July 23, 2003. In addition, the courts considering the impact of financial detriment on a finding of extreme hardship have repeatedly held that, while it must be considered in the overall determination, it is not enough by itself to justify an extreme hardship determination. *See INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (upholding BIA finding that economic detriment alone is insufficient to establish extreme hardship). The record contains insufficient evidence to find that the applicant's spouse would suffer hardship beyond the common consequences of inadmissibility or removal in the applicant's absence.

Similarly, the record does not contain any information concerning any hardship the applicant's spouse would experience if she relocated to Greece. It is, however, noted that the applicant's spouse is a native of Greece. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence generally is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). The record contains insufficient evidence to find that the applicant's spouse would suffer hardship beyond the common consequences of inadmissibility or removal if she relocated to Greece.

Although the depth of concern and anxiety over the applicant's immigration status is neither doubted nor minimized, the fact remains that Congress provided for a waiver of inadmissibility only under limited circumstances. While the prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families, in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996); *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship). "[O]nly in cases of great actual or prospective injury . . . will the bar be removed." *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246 (BIA 1984).

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse as required under section 212(i) of the Act. As the applicant has not established extreme hardship to a qualifying family member no purpose would be served in determining whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.