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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

[Redacted]

H5

Date: JUL 25 2012

Office: SAN FERNANDO FIELD OFFICE

FILE: [Redacted]

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,


for
Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the San Fernando Field Office Director and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant, a native and citizen of Mexico, is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for seeking to procure admission to the United States through fraud or misrepresentation. The applicant attempted to enter the United States in October 1996 using an altered passport and a fraudulent Form I-551. The applicant was subsequently deported from the United States on October 16, 1996, and reentered the United States in October 1996 without inspection. The applicant does not contest this finding of inadmissibility, but rather seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), to reside in the United States with her U.S. Citizen spouse.

The Field Office Director denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601), finding that the applicant was inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) of the Act as an alien who had been ordered removed from the United States and subsequently reenters the United States without being admitted. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated January 12, 2010. The AAO notes that the provisions of section 212(a)(9)(C) relating to aliens who have been removed from the United States and subsequently reenter the United States were added to the Act as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), and entered into effect on April 1, 1997. Section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) of the Act has been determined to apply to those aliens ordered removed before or after April 1, 1997, and who enter or attempt to reenter the United States unlawfully any time on or after April 1, 1997. *See Additional Guidance for Implementing Sections 212(a)(6) and 212(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act)*, Paul W. Virtue, Acting Executive Associate Commissioner, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, June 17, 1997. The memorandum further states, "The alien may have been placed in removal proceedings before or after April 1, 1997, but the unlawful reentry or attempted unlawful reentry must have occurred on or after April 1, 1997." As the applicant reentered the United States prior to that date, the applicant is not inadmissible under this provision of the law. However, the applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act for seeking to procure admission to the United States through fraud or misrepresentation.

The record contains the following documentation: a brief filed by the applicant's attorney; a declaration by the applicant; financial documentation, and letters of reference. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides:

The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. The applicant's lawful permanent resident husband is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be

considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-I-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. See *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); but see *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The record includes a declaration from the applicant in which she expresses remorse for the fraud she committed in 1996, and several letters of reference written on behalf of the applicant. The record also includes copies of financial documentation, including copies of federal income tax returns. However, there is no indication that the applicant’s spouse would suffer any financial hardship if the applicant’s waiver is not approved. There are no statements in the record indicating that the applicant’s spouse would suffer extreme hardship if the waiver is not approved, and no evidence in the record of any hardship that the applicant’s spouse would experience if the applicant is removed from the United States. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). The AAO recognizes that the applicant’s spouse will endure hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. However, his situation, if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record.

Similarly, there are no statements or evidence in the record that the applicant’s spouse is not able to relocate to Mexico if the applicant’s waiver is not approved. The applicant has not established that her spouse would suffer hardship beyond the common results of removal if he were to relocate to Mexico to reside with the applicant.

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant’s U.S. citizen spouse will face extreme hardship if the

applicant is unable to reside in the United States. Although the AAO is not insensitive to the applicant's husband's situation, the record does not establish that he would face any hardship which would arise to the level of extreme as contemplated by statute and case law.

In proceedings for an application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, the burden of establishing that the application merits approval rests with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. In this case, the applicant has not met her burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.