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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals
20 Massachusetts Ave. NW MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

H/S

[REDACTED]

DATE: **JUN 18 2012** OFFICE: KENDALL, FL FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:
[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen with the field office or service center that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Kendall, Florida, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Cuba who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for attempting to gain admission to the United States through fraud or misrepresentation. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to reside in the United States with his U.S. citizen spouse.

On April 8, 2010, the Field Office Director concluded that the hardship that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse would suffer did not rise to the level of extreme as required by the statute.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant states that the evidence demonstrates that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse will suffer extreme hardship as a result of his inadmissibility.

In support of the waiver application, the record includes, but is not limited to counsel's brief, two letters from the applicant's spouse, biographical information for the applicant and his spouse, biographical information for the applicant's son, photographs of the applicant's family in the United States, country conditions information for Cuba, and documentation of the applicant's immigration history.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a de novo basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act, which provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) ...Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

...

The record demonstrates that the applicant attempted to gain admission to the United States on February 15, 2004 pursuant to the visa waiver program using a Spanish passport issued in the identity of another individual, but altered to carry the applicant's photograph. As such, the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act for having attempted to procure admission to the United States through fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant does not challenge his inadmissibility on appeal.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides a waiver for fraud and material misrepresentation. That section, in pertinent part, states that:

(1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien...

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which in this case is the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse. Congress did not include hardship to the applicant's children as a factor to be considered in assessing extreme hardship under section 212(i) of the Act. In the present case, the applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative for the waiver, and hardship to the applicant's child will not be separately considered, except as it may affect the applicant's spouse. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984);

Matter of Kim, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

The Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. See *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); but see *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

Counsel for the applicant states that the applicant’s spouse will experience extreme hardship as a result of the applicant’s inadmissibility. In regards to the hardship that the applicant’s spouse will experience if she were to be separated from the applicant, counsel states that the applicant’s spouse would suffer emotional and financial hardship. In particular, counsel states that the applicant is the main caregiver for the couple’s child and that if the applicant is no longer able to care for the child, the child would suffer from emotional harm, which in turn would harm the applicant’s spouse. Counsel also states that the applicant’s spouse would suffer financial harm if the applicant would no longer be able to care for the couple’s child, as the applicant’s spouse works long hours operating a family business. The record does not contain any evidence that the applicant is the main caregiver for the couple’s child. Additionally, the record does not contain any evidence of the applicant’s spouse’s family business, her role in that business, or her income and expenses. Without supporting evidence, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the applicant’s burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. See *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 n.2 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1, 3 n.2 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). The record contains two letters from the applicant’s spouse. In the second letter, dated March 26, 2010, the applicant’s spouse states that she and her son need the applicant “in order to keep our

family financially and emotionally stable.” The applicant’s spouse states that her son is emotionally attached to the applicant and relies on him as a “father figure,” but she does not state that the applicant is the child’s primary caregiver. In fact, she states that the applicant is the head of the household, which is critical for her financial welfare. No evidence was provided regarding the applicant’s financial contribution to his spouse. The AAO notes that the record contains a copy of the applicant’s tax returns from 2007 indicating that his adjusted gross income for that year was \$14,834.00. Without more information regarding the applicant’s spouse’s expenses and evidence of her reliance on the applicant’s income, it is not possible to determine the extent of the financial hardship that she would suffer in the applicant’s absence. Little weight can be afforded to the applicant’s spouse’s assertions in the absence of supporting evidence. *See Matter of Kwan*, 14 I&N Dec. 175 (BIA 1972) (“Information in an affidavit should not be disregarded simply because it appears to be hearsay; in administrative proceedings, that fact merely affects the weight to be afforded it.”). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Although the AAO notes the applicant’s spouse’s difficult situation and recognizes that the applicant’s spouse will endure hardship as a result of long-term separation from the applicant, the record does not establish that the hardships she would face, considered in the aggregate, rise to the level of “extreme.”

We must also consider whether the applicant’s U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship should she relocate to Cuba to reside with the applicant. The applicant’s spouse is a native of Cuba. Counsel for the applicant states that the applicant’s spouse has resided in the United States since a young age and has no family ties in Cuba. No evidence, however, was provided regarding the length of the applicant’s spouse’s residence in the United States or her family ties here. Additionally, counsel for the applicant states that the applicant’s spouse would have to abandon her family business were she to relocate, and as a result, would suffer financially. Again, no evidence was provided regarding the applicant’s spouse’s family business. The record contains the U.S. Department of State 2008 Human Rights Report for Cuba; however, the record does not indicate how the human rights situation in Cuba specifically would impact the applicant’s spouse. Counsel for the applicant states that “Cuba has one of the worse medical systems in the world with no access to proper medical care, not even for children” [sic]. The record does not indicate that the applicant’s spouse suffers from any medical condition, nor does it support counsel’s statement regarding the medical system in Cuba. Again, although the AAO notes the applicant’s spouse’s difficult situation, the record does not establish that the hardships that she would face upon relocation to Cuba would rise to the level of “extreme” as contemplated by statute and case law.

The applicant’s spouse’s concern over the applicant’s immigration status is neither doubted nor minimized, but the fact remains that Congress provided for a waiver of inadmissibility only under limited circumstances. In nearly every qualifying relationship, whether between husband and wife or parent and child, there is a deep level of affection and a certain amount of emotional and social interdependence. While, in common parlance, the prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families, in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of “*extreme* hardship,” Congress did not

intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship, and thus the familial and emotional bonds, exist. The point made in this and prior decisions on this matter is that the current state of the law, viewed from a legislative, administrative, or judicial point of view, requires that the hardship, which meets the standard in section 212(i), of the Act, be above and beyond the normal, expected hardship involved in such cases.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to his qualifying relative as required under section 212(i) of the Act. As the applicant has not established extreme hardship to a qualifying family member, no purpose would be served in determining whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.