

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
*Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)*  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

[Redacted]

#5

Date: OCT 09 2012 Office: PHILADELPHIA, PA

FILE: [Redacted]

IN RE: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) and section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew,  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having attempted to procure entry into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation and under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking readmission within ten years of her last departure from the United States. The applicant is married to a U.S. citizen and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility to reside in the United States with her family.

In a decision, dated July 29, 2010, the field office director found that the applicant had failed to establish extreme hardship to her spouse as a result of the applicant's inadmissibility and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly.

In a Notice of Appeal to the AAO (Form I-290B), dated August 25, 2010, counsel states that the field office's decision was erroneous in that it did not take into account the applicant's spouse's current medical condition and his inability to obtain the same kind of medical care in Mexico. Counsel also states that the applicant's spouse receives social security benefits, which would be terminated if he moved back to Mexico.

The record indicates that the applicant first entered the United States without inspection near Calexico, California in January 1997. The applicant remained in the United States until April 2000. In March 2001, the applicant attempted to enter the United States by presenting a passport and fraudulent visa. The applicant was subsequently removed on March 14, 2001. In January 2009, the applicant entered the United States without inspection for a second time.

The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.-

(i) In general.-Any alien who-

(I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or

(II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other provision of law, and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.- Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States if, prior to the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission. The Secretary, in the Secretary's discretion, may waive the provisions of section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) in the case of an alien to whom the Secretary has granted classification under clause (iii), (iv), or (v) of section 204(a)(1)(A), or classification under clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) of section 204(a)(1)(B), in any case in which there is a connection between—

(1) the alien's having been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty; and

(2) the alien's--

(A) removal;

(B) departure from the United States;

(C) reentry or reentries into the United States; or

(D) attempted reentry into the United States.

Because the applicant reentered the United States without being admitted after being unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year as well as after having been ordered removed, she is inadmissible to the United States under sections 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) and (II) of the Act.

An alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act may not apply for consent to reapply unless the alien has been outside the United States for more than ten years since the date of the alien's last departure from the United States. *See Matter of Torres-Garcia*, 23 I&N Dec. 866 (BIA 2006). In *Duran Gonzalez v. DHS*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit overturned its previous decision, *Perez Gonzalez v. Ashcroft*, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004), and deferred to the BIA's holding that section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act bars aliens subject to its provisions from receiving permission to reapply for admission prior to the expiration of the ten-year bar. Significantly, the Ninth Circuit clarified that its holding in *Duran Gonzalez* applies retroactively, even to those aliens who had Form I-212 applications pending before *Perez Gonzalez* was overturned. *Morales-Izquierdo v. DHS*, 600 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2010). *See also Duran Gonzales v. DHS*, 659 F.3d 930 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court's order denying the plaintiff's motions to amend its class certification and declining to apply *Duran Gonzales* prospectively only); *Nunez-Reyes v. Holder*, 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that the general default principle is that a court's decisions apply retroactively to all cases still pending before the courts).

In this case, the applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act for entering the United States without inspection after being unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year as well as after having been ordered removed, and not remaining outside of the United States for ten years as required. Because the applicant is mandatorily inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act and she is ineligible for the exception to this ground of inadmissibility until she has remained outside the United States for ten years, no purpose would be served in the favorable exercise of discretion in adjudicating the applicant's waiver application.

Nevertheless, were we to consider the waiver application, we would find that the applicant is also inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act for having attempted to enter the United States with a fraudulent visa in March 2001 and does not meet the requirements for a waiver of this inadmissibility.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. See *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful

permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The record of hardship includes counsel's brief, medical documents, country conditions information for Mexico, a letter from the applicant's daughter, a letter from the applicant's spouse's attorney who is handling his worker's compensation claim, a letter from the applicant's church, and various letters from other family members.

Counsel claims that the applicant's spouse will suffer extreme hardship as a result of being separated from the applicant because the applicant's spouse is disabled, suffers from various medical ailments, and relies on the applicant to help him with his daily needs. Counsel asserts that although the applicant's spouse has four daughters living in the United States, ranging in ages from 19 to 26 years old, they are not able to help him because they have their own families. Counsel also claims that relocating to Mexico is frightening for the applicant because all of his immediate relatives live in the United States and it would be difficult for him to receive the medical treatment he needs in Mexico.

The AAO finds that the record fails to show that the applicant's spouse will suffer extreme hardship as a result of relocating to Mexico. We acknowledge that the U.S. State Department Country Report for Mexico indicates that in certain areas of Mexico there is a high level of narcotic related violence and that in more remote areas medical care is limited. However, the report also indicates that certain areas of Mexico are safe, in major cities medical care is adequate, and in Mexico City health facilities are excellent. Without documentation showing where the applicant and her spouse would be likely to reside in Mexico and why, the AAO cannot find that relocating to Mexico, in general, would be extreme hardship. Furthermore, the record fails to show that the applicant's children and grandchildren would not be able to visit the applicant and her spouse in Mexico to alleviate any hardship that would occur due to separating from immediate family.

The AAO also finds that the record fails to show that the applicant's spouse will suffer as a result of separation. The record indicates that the applicant's spouse is permanently disabled and unable to work, but does not establish that the applicant's four adult daughters would not be able to help him in the applicant's absence. We note that the record includes birth certificates showing that some of the applicant's daughters have children of their own, but this fact alone does not show that they are unable or unwilling to help with their father's care. Thus, the AAO finds that the applicant has not shown that her spouse will suffer extreme hardship as a result of her inadmissibility.

In proceedings for application for admission, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.