

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
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Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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[Redacted]

Date: Office: HIALEAH, FLORIDA FILE: [Redacted]
OCT 22 2012
IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Hialeah, Florida, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Nicaragua who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for attempting to procure an immigration benefit through fraud or the willful misrepresentation of a material fact. The record indicates that the applicant is married to a U.S. citizen and is the father of a U.S. citizen stepson. He is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130). The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to reside in the United States with his spouse and stepson.

The Field Office Director found that the applicant failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on the applicant's qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated February 16, 2011.

On appeal, the applicant, through counsel, claims that the applicant's wife will suffer extreme hardship should he be denied admission to the United States. *Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion*, dated March 16, 2011. Counsel also asserts that the applicant's misrepresentation was not material. *Id.* He claims that since he never applied for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) during the initial registration period, he "could not qualify" for TPS; his misrepresentation, therefore, was improper but not material. *Id.* Additionally, counsel requests 30 days in order to submit a brief. As of the date of this decision, no additional statements or evidence have been submitted; therefore, the record is considered complete, and the AAO shall render a decision based upon the evidence now before it.

The record includes, but is not limited to, a statement from the applicant's wife, an employment document for the applicant's wife, financial documents, photographs, and documents pertaining to the applicant's removal proceeding. The entire record was reviewed and considered in arriving at a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

....

- (iii) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (i).

Section 212(i) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (1) The [Secretary] may, in the discretion of the [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an immigrant who is the

spouse, son, or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent first on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or his stepson can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's wife is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. See *Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors

concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

In the present case, the record indicates that on December 11, 2002, the applicant filed an Application for Temporary Protected Status (Form I-821), claiming that he had entered the United States without inspection on October 20, 1997. He also provided false documentation to show he was physically present in the United States during the required TPS eligibility period. *During his removal proceeding on March 12, 2008*, the applicant stated that he had entered the United States on September 18, 2001, on a B-2 nonimmigrant visa, and not without inspection on October 20, 1997 as he had previously stated in his Form I-821.

Counsel claims that since the applicant did not apply for TPS during the initial registration period, he was ineligible to apply for TPS in 2002; therefore, his misrepresentation was not material. In order for the applicant to be inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6), the applicant’s misrepresentations not only must be willful, but they must be material. A misrepresentation is generally material only if by making it the alien received a benefit for which he would not otherwise have been eligible. *See Kungys v. United States*, 485 U.S. 759 (1988); *see also Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998); *Matter of Martinez-Lopez*, 10 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1962; AG 1964). A misrepresentation must be shown by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence to be predictably capable of affecting, which is, having a natural tendency to affect, the official decision in order to be considered material. *Kungys*, 495 U.S. at 771-72. The Board has held that a misrepresentation made in connection with an application for visa or other documents, or for entry into the United States, is material if either:

1. the alien is excludable on the true facts, or
2. the misrepresentation tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is relevant to the alien’s eligibility and which might well have resulted in proper determination that he be excluded.

Matter of S- and B-C-, 9 I&N Dec. 436, 448-449 (BIA 1960; AG 1961).

“It is not necessary that an ‘intent to deceive’ be established by proof, or that the officer believes and acts upon the false representation,” but the principal elements of the willfulness and materiality of the stated misrepresentations must be established. 9 FAM 40.63 N3 (citing *Matter of S and B-C*, 9 I&N Dec. 436, 448-449 (A.G. 1961) and *Matter of Kai Hing Hui*, 15 I&N Dec. 288 (BIA 1975)).

In regards to the willfulness of the applicant’s stated misrepresentations, 9 FAM 40.63 N5, in pertinent part, states that:

The term “willfully” as used in INA 212(a)(6)(C)(i) is interpreted to mean knowingly and intentionally, as distinguished from accidentally, inadvertently, or in an honest belief that the facts are otherwise. In order to find the element of willfulness, it must be determined that the alien was fully aware of the nature of the information sought and knowingly, intentionally, and deliberately made an untrue statement.

Additionally, “materiality” is defined in 9 FAM 40.63 N6.1, which states, in pertinent part, that:

Materiality does not rest on the simple moral premise that an alien has lied, but must be measured pragmatically in the context of the individual case as to whether the misrepresentation was of direct and objective significance to the proper resolution of the alien's application for a visa. The Attorney General has declared the definition of “materiality” with respect to INA 212(a)(6)(C)(i) to be as follows: “A misrepresentation made in connection with an application for a visa or other documents, or with entry into the United States, is material if either: (1) The alien is inadmissible on the true facts; or (2) The misrepresentation tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is relevant to the alien's eligibility and which might well have resulted in a proper determination that he or she be inadmissible.” (*Matter of S- and B-C*, 9 I & N 436, at 447.)

Even though the applicant’s Form I-821 was denied based on failing to provide evidence of his eligibility for filing after the initial registration period of January 5, 1999 to August 20, 1999, the applicant attempted to obtain an immigration benefit, TPS, through the misrepresentation of his date of entry into the United States. Additionally, he provided false documentation in support of his misrepresentation. Therefore, the applicant’s misrepresentations were willful and material, and based on these misrepresentations, the AAO finds that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act.

The record contains references to hardship the applicant’s stepson would experience if the waiver application were denied. It is noted that Congress did not include hardship to an alien’s child as a factor to be considered in assessing extreme hardship. In the present case, the applicant’s spouse is the only qualifying relative for the waiver under section 212(i) of the Act, and hardship to the applicant’s stepson will not be separately considered, except as it may affect the applicant’s spouse.

The AAO notes that no claim has been made that the applicant’s wife will endure hardship should she relocate to Nicaragua. The AAO acknowledges that the applicant’s wife is a U.S. citizen, and relocation would involve some hardship. However, the applicant’s wife is a native of Nicaragua, and no evidence has been submitted demonstrating that she will experience hardship in Nicaragua. Therefore, based on the

record before it, the AAO finds that, considering the potential hardships in the aggregate, the applicant has failed to establish that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if she relocated to Nicaragua.

In addition, the record fails to establish extreme hardship to the applicant's wife if she remains in the United States. In her statement dated October 27, 2010, the applicant's wife claims that she worries about losing the applicant, and she is suffering emotionally. She states that the applicant helps care for her son, and if they are separated, she will suffer watching her son suffer. *Additionally, she states that the applicant helps care for her parents, who do not work and have various medical conditions. She claims that her mother suffers from heart problems and high blood pressure; and her father has high blood pressure, diabetes, and deformative arthrosis. She states that her parents receive Social Security benefits. She also states that she currently works full-time, but without the applicant's assistance with her son and parents, she will be unable to work full-time.*

The AAO acknowledges that the applicant's wife may suffer emotional difficulties in being separated from the applicant. While it is understood that the separation of spouses often results in significant psychological challenges, the applicant has not distinguished his wife's emotional hardship upon separation from that which is typically faced by the spouses of those deemed inadmissible. The AAO also notes that the applicant's stepson may experience hardship in being separated from the applicant, and his wife may be affected by his stepson's hardship, but he has not shown that his hardship will elevate his wife's challenges to an extreme level. Moreover, though the applicant's wife refers to financial difficulties, the record does not contain evidence establishing that she would be unable to support herself in the applicant's absence. Additionally, the applicant has not distinguished his wife's financial challenges from those commonly experienced when a family member remains in the United States. Further, the record does not contain documentary evidence establishing that the applicant would be unable to obtain employment in Nicaragua and, thereby, financially assist his wife from outside the United States. With respect to the applicant's in-law's medical hardships, there is no medical documentation establishing that they have serious medical conditions, that separation from the applicant will elevate their symptoms, or that they require the applicant's assistance because of their medical conditions. Based on the record before it, the AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if his waiver application is denied and she remains in the United States.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse as required under section 212(i) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, the AAO finds no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.