

(b)(6)


U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals  
20 Massachusetts Ave. NW MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090  
**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**



DATE: FEB 26 2013

OFFICE: PANAMA CITY

FILE: 

IN RE: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ron Rosenberg".

Ron Rosenberg, Acting Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Panama City, Panama, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant, a native and citizen of Guyana was found inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), due to his attempted procurement of admission to the United States through fraud or material misrepresentation. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility (Form I-601) under section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) in order to reside in the United States with his U.S. lawful permanent resident spouse.

In a decision dated June 12, 2012, the Field Office Director concluded that the applicant did not demonstrate that his U.S. lawful permanent resident spouse would suffer extreme hardship and the application for a waiver of inadmissibility was denied accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant states that the evidence illustrates that his spouse will suffer from extreme hardship as a result of his inadmissibility.

In support of the waiver application, the record includes, but is not limited to a statement by the applicant, a letter from the applicant's spouse's physician, training certificates for the applicant's spouse, a letter from the applicant's spouse, biographical information for the applicant and his spouse, and documentation concerning the applicant's immigration history.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), which provides, in pertinent part, that:

Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

The record illustrates that the applicant presented himself for admission at the Miami International Airport on October 29, 1993 using his passport, which contained a counterfeit U.S. nonimmigrant visa. The applicant was found to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, his visa was cancelled, his application for admission was withdrawn, and he was returned to his country of origin. The applicant remains inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, a permanent grounds of inadmissibility.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse or parent. Hardship to the applicant is not considered in 212(i) waiver proceedings unless it is shown to cause hardship to a qualifying relative, in this case the applicant's spouse. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N

Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. See *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); but see *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

On appeal, the applicant states that the hardships that his lawful permanent resident spouse face as a result of his inadmissibility rise to the level of extreme. He states that his spouse is suffering from emotional, physical, and financial hardship. The applicant’s spouse obtained an immigrant visa through a petition filed on her behalf by her U.S. citizen sister and immigrated to the United States in September 2010 without her husband as a result of his inadmissibility. In a letter in the record, the applicant’s spouse states that she is suffering depression as a result of being separated from her husband of 37 years. She states that “this is the first time that we have been apart and I am very depressed without my husband’s company.” She also states that she is at risk of developing high blood pressure and stroke. On appeal, in support of that statement, the record contains a letter from Dr. [REDACTED], of [REDACTED], dated July 10, 2012. Dr. [REDACTED] states that the applicant’s spouse has a past history of “[h]yperlipidemia, [h]ypertension and [a]ngina.” He goes on to state that the applicant’s spouse is taking various medications and “needs to be scheduled for a [c]ardiac procedure as soon as possible, but she will need 24 hour assistance during her recovery period.” The doctor states as well that the applicant’s spouse cannot afford a home health aide, and therefore her husband’s assistance would be helpful. There is no documentation in the record to indicate the applicant’s spouse’s financial situation.

The AAO notes the certificates in the record indicating the applicant's spouse's training as a [REDACTED] but there is no documentary evidence of her income or expenses. There is also no indication in the doctor's letter that the applicant's spouse has been unable to work as a result of her health condition. Moreover, the AAO notes that the applicant's spouse has family members who reside in the United States. It is unclear why there is no one available to assist her for the 24 hour period following her heart procedure. Although the applicant's assertions are relevant and have been taken into consideration, little weight can be afforded them in the absence of supporting evidence. See *Matter of Kwan*, 14 I&N Dec. 175 (BIA 1972) ("Information in an affidavit should not be disregarded simply because it appears to be hearsay; in administrative proceedings, that fact merely affects the weight to be afforded it."). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Although the AAO notes the applicant's spouse's difficult situation and recognizes that the applicant's spouse will endure hardship as a result of long-term separation from the applicant, particularly as result of their long-term marriage, the record does not establish that the hardships she would face, considered in the aggregate, rise to the level of "extreme."

The applicant does not address the hardship that his spouse would suffer if she were to move back to her native Guyana to reside with the applicant. The AAO notes the letter mentioned above that indicates that the applicant's spouse suffers from various medical conditions. There is no indication in the record, however, that those conditions are untreatable in Guyana. The AAO notes that significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate, are relevant factors in establishing extreme hardship. The evidence on the record, however, is insufficient to establish that the applicant's spouse suffers from such a condition. Additionally, the only evidence of the applicant's spouse's family ties in the United States is the indication in the record that she obtained her U.S. lawful permanent residence through a petition filed on her behalf by her U.S. citizen sister. There is no evidence of the hardship that she would face if she were to be separated from her family member(s) in the United States. As stated above, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158 at 165. The evidence, when considered in the aggregate, does not establish that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship were she to relocate to Guyana to reside with the applicant.

Although the applicant's spouse's concern over the applicant's immigration status is neither doubted nor minimized, the fact remains that Congress provided for a waiver of inadmissibility only under limited circumstances. In nearly every qualifying relationship, whether between husband and wife or parent and child, there is a deep level of affection and a certain amount of emotional and social interdependence. While, in common parlance, the prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families, in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship, and thus the familial and emotional bonds, exist. The point made in this and prior

decisions on this matter is that the current state of the law, viewed from a legislative, administrative, or judicial point of view, requires that the hardship, which meets the standard in section 212(i) of the Act, be above and beyond the normal, expected hardship involved in such cases.

Considered in the aggregate, the hardship to the applicant's spouse does not rise to the level of extreme beyond the common results of removal. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991); *Perez*, 96 F.3d at 392 (defining "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation); *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative as required under section 212(i) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for an application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.