



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

(b)(6)

DATE: **OCT 27 2014** Office: NEWARK

FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case.

This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or policy to your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 days of the date of this decision. **Please review the Form I-290B instructions at <http://www.uscis.gov/forms> for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. See also 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Do not file a motion directly with the AAO.**

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ron Rosenberg".

Ron Rosenberg  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by Field Office Director, Newark, New Jersey. An appeal of the denial was dismissed by the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The matter is now before the AAO on motion. The motion will be granted and our prior decision is affirmed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Ukraine who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for procuring a visa to the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact. The applicant's spouse is a U.S. citizen. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States.

The Field Office Director found that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative and denied the Form I-601, Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility, accordingly. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated September 9, 2013. We found that the applicant failed to establish that his spouse would experience extreme hardship, specifically if he relocated with her to Ukraine; and we dismissed the appeal accordingly. *Decision of the AAO*, dated June 19, 2014.

On motion, counsel provides country-conditions information about Ukraine and a statement from the applicant's spouse asserting that he would experience hardship upon relocation to Ukraine.

A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be proved in the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2). A motion to reconsider must: (1) state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions to establish that the decision was based on an incorrect application of law or USCIS policy; and (2) establish that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence of record at the time of the initial decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3).

Based on the additional documentation provided, which presents new facts, the requirements of a motion to reopen have been met. The requirements of a motion to reconsider have not been met.

The record includes but is not limited to, previously submitted documents from the applicant, the applicant's spouse's statement and country-conditions information about Ukraine. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United

States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

The record reflects that the applicant entered the United States in December 2005 with a B-2 nonimmigrant visitor's visa that she obtained by claiming she wanted to visit the United States to help her pregnant daughter. However, the applicant did not have a daughter in the United States. She is therefore inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act for procuring a visa to the United States through willful misrepresentation of a material fact. The applicant does not contest her inadmissibility.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative, in this case the applicant's spouse. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. See *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); but see *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

As we have already found that the applicant’s spouse would experience extreme hardship if he remained in the United States without the applicant, we will only address hardship to her spouse upon relocating to Ukraine.

In our initial decision, we found that the applicant did not address the possibility of her spouse relocating to Ukraine and the hardship he would experience there. Although we found that the record established that the applicant’s spouse has chronic renal disease and severe left hip and lower back issues, the applicant did not submit evidence that her spouse’s medical conditions could not be adequately monitored or treated in Ukraine. On motion the applicant’s spouse states that he has been living in the United States for over 11 years; his mother and sister are U.S. citizens and his only living relatives; separation from his family will be very difficult for him; he does not speak Ukrainian; he would not be able to obtain medical treatment in Ukraine, as the health-care system there is “very bad”; he is part-Russian and part-Jewish; as a result he would be mistreated in Ukraine due to the “present situation” there; and the Ukrainian people and the government are “very hostile towards Russians.” The applicant submits documentation about the current conflict in Ukraine, including a Department of State human-rights report about Ukraine.

The record reflects that the applicant’s spouse does not have family in Ukraine. The record, however, does not include evidence to corroborate claims that his family members live in the United States, that they are U.S. citizens, and that they have a close relationship. Moreover, although the applicant’s spouse states he does not speak Ukrainian, among the reports the applicant submits is an article stating that most of the country speaks both Ukrainian and Russian and that the country is not divided across language lines.

The record lacks evidence showing that he would live in an area where not speaking Ukrainian would cause him difficulty. Similarly, the applicant does not address where she and her spouse would reside in Ukraine and whether he would have difficulty living there given his Russian background. Also, although the applicant's spouse has serious medical issues, the applicant on motion submits no evidence showing that he could not receive adequate care in Ukraine. Furthermore, though the applicant's spouse is concerned about mistreatment related to his ethnicity and religion, the applicant submits no evidence to establish that her spouse is part-Jewish, and some of her evidence, including a Department of State report, indicates that issues related to anti-Semitism are in decline. See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013- Ukraine* (February 27, 2014). Although the applicant submits several articles and reports about the current situation in Ukraine, the record lacks documentary evidence of emotional, financial, medical or other types of hardship that, considered in the aggregate, establishes that her qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship upon relocation to Ukraine.

We can find extreme hardship warranting a waiver of inadmissibility only where an applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to a qualifying relative in the scenario of separation *and* the scenario of relocation. A claim that a qualifying relative will remain in the United States and thereby suffer extreme hardship as a consequence of separation can easily be made for purposes of the waiver even where there is no intention to separate in reality. See *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 886 (BIA 1994). Furthermore, to separate and suffer extreme hardship, where relocating abroad with the applicant would not result in extreme hardship, is a matter of choice and not the result of inadmissibility. *Id.*, see also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996). As the applicant has not demonstrated extreme hardship from relocation, we cannot find that refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to the qualifying relative in this case.

The record does not establish the existence of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Therefore, we find that no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of overall discretion.

In application proceedings, it is the applicant's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The motion is granted and the prior decision of the AAO is affirmed.