




**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

(b)(6)



DATE: **JUL 06 2015**

FILE: 
APPLICATION RECEIPT #: 

IN RE: Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



Enclosed is the non-precedent decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) for your case.

If you believe we incorrectly decided your case, you may file a motion requesting us to reconsider our decision and/or reopen the proceeding. The requirements for motions are located at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Motions must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) **within 33 days of the date of this decision**. The Form I-290B web page (www.uscis.gov/i-290b) contains the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. **Please do not mail any motions directly to the AAO.**

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The District Director, New York, New York, denied the waiver application. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record establishes that the applicant is a native and citizen of Uzbekistan who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured a nonimmigrant visa and subsequent entry into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with his U.S. citizen mother.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Form I-601, Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility, accordingly.

In support of the appeal counsel for the applicant submits a letter. In his letter, counsel states that a brief and/or additional evidence in support of the instant appeal will be submitted within 30 days. As of today, no additional documentation in support of the appeal has been received by this office. The record is considered complete and was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

....

- (iii) Waiver authorized. – For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (i).

Section 212(i) of the Act provides:

- (1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien . . .

With respect to the district director's finding that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, for fraud or willful misrepresentation, the record establishes that the applicant misrepresented his marital status when he applied for a B Visa in December 2012.

Specifically, the applicant claimed to be married when in reality he was unmarried. On appeal, counsel asserts that at the time the applicant applied for a nonimmigrant visa he did not personally prepare the application and did not review the information within it properly to remove the reference to being married. Counsel thus contends that the applicant is not inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act.

The principal elements of a misrepresentation that renders an alien inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act are willfulness and materiality. In *Matter of S- and B-C-*, 9 I&N Dec 436 (BIA 1960 AG 1961), the Attorney General established the following test to determine whether a misrepresentation is material:

A misrepresentation . . . is material if either (1) the alien is excludable on the true facts, or (2) the misrepresentation tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is relevant to the alien's eligibility and which might well have resulted in a proper determination that he be excluded. *Id.* at 447.

The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of material misrepresentations in its decision in *Kungys v. United States*, 485 U.S. 759 (1988). In that case, which involved misrepresentations made in the context of naturalization proceedings, the Supreme Court held that the applicant's misrepresentations were material if either the applicant was ineligible on the true facts, or if the misrepresentations had a natural tendency to influence the decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. *Id.* at 771.

To establish eligibility for a non-immigrant B1/B2 visa, section 101(a)(15) of the Act states, in pertinent part:

- a. an alien...having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning and who is visiting the United States temporarily for business or temporarily for pleasure.

The U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual further provides:

The applicant must demonstrate permanent employment, meaningful business or financial connections, close family ties, or social or cultural associations, which will indicate a strong inducement to return to the country of origin.

DOS Foreign Affairs Manual, § 41.31 N. 3.4.

By stating that he was married when applying for a nonimmigrant visa, the applicant led the American Embassy in [REDACTED] to believe that he had close family ties, namely, a wife, in his home country. By not disclosing he was unmarried, he cut off a line of inquiry which was relevant to the applicant's request for a visitor visa. The applicant had the duty and the responsibility to review the

nonimmigrant visa application and all supporting documentation prior to submission, irrespective of the applicant's contention that he retained an agency to process and submit the application on his behalf. As such, the record establishes that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, for fraud and/or willful misrepresentation with respect to his December 2012 nonimmigrant application.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. The record establishes that the applicant's U.S. citizen mother is the only qualifying relative in this case. Hardship to the applicant can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the BIA provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The BIA added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The BIA has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the BIA has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381,

383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido v. I.N.S.*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir.1998) (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the applicant's mother's medical conditions and the deterioration of her health were not properly considered. Counsel further maintains that the applicant's mother is not working and is unable to support herself as a result of her physical and psychological ailments which require ongoing treatment and prevent her from being able to travel abroad.

We acknowledge the contentions in the record that the applicant's mother will experience emotional hardship were she to remain in the United States while the applicant relocates abroad, but the record does not establish the severity of this hardship or the effects on her daily life. Nor has the applicant provided a letter on appeal from the applicant's mother's treating physician to substantiate counsel's assertions that the applicant's mother's health has deteriorated and she is no longer able to support and care for herself as a result. Counsel has also not submitted any documentation on appeal establishing that the applicant's mother is unable to work. The most recent financial documentation in the record establishes that the applicant's mother is gainfully employed, earning over \$39,000 in 2013. Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

While the record establishes that the applicant's mother has been diagnosed with mental and medical conditions in the past, the documentation does not establish the hardships she would experience were the applicant specifically to relocate abroad. We note that the applicant's mother has a support network in the United States, including the presence of four U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident children. The applicant has not established that his siblings would be unable to assist their

mother emotionally or financially as needed. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)). Nor has the applicant established that he would be unable to obtain gainful employment abroad that would permit him to assist his mother financially should the need arise. The applicant has thus not established that his mother would experience extreme hardship were she to remain in the United States while he relocates abroad as a result of his inadmissibility.

In regard to relocating abroad to reside with the applicant as a result of his inadmissibility, the applicant and his mother contend that the applicant's mother will not be able to obtain affordable and effective medical treatments in Uzbekistan. As noted above, assertions without supporting documentation do not suffice to establish extreme hardship. The applicant has thus not established that his mother would experience extreme hardship were she to relocate to Uzbekistan, her native country, to reside with the applicant.

The record, reviewed in its entirety, does not support a finding that the applicant's U.S. citizen mother will face extreme hardship if the applicant is unable to reside in the United States. Rather, the record demonstrates that she will face no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a son or daughter is removed from the United States or is refused admission. There is no documentation establishing that the applicant's mother's hardships are any different from other families separated as a result of immigration violations. Although we are not insensitive to the applicant's mother's situation, the record does not establish that the hardships she would face rise to the level of "extreme" as contemplated by statute and case law.

In application proceedings, it is the applicant's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal will be dismissed.