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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**

H6



FILE:



Office: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO  
(SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC)

Date:

**AUG 02 2010**

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

*Tariq Syed*  
for

Perry Rhew

Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Grenada who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking readmission within ten years of her last departure from the United States. The applicant is the daughter of a United States citizen and the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130). The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to reside in the United States with her United States citizen mother.

The District Director found that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on the applicant's spouse and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated December 6, 2007.

On appeal, the applicant's mother states the applicant did not arrive to the United States illegally. *Form I-290B*, filed January 3, 2008. Additionally, she claims that when the applicant was in the United States, she was caring for her elderly and sick father. *Id.*

The record includes, but is not limited to, statements from the applicant's mother, a letter from Dr. [REDACTED] regarding the applicant's father's medical conditions, and a death certificate for the applicant's father. The entire record was reviewed and considered in arriving at a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general.-Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....  
(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....  
(v) Waiver.-The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

In the present case, the record indicates that the applicant entered the United States in June 2001 on a B-1/B-2 nonimmigrant visa. On July 11, 2007, the applicant voluntarily departed the United States. On July 18, 2007, the applicant filed a Form I-601. On December 6, 2007, the District Director denied the Form I-601, finding that the applicant had accrued more than a year of unlawful presence and had failed to demonstrate extreme hardship to her qualifying relative.

The applicant accrued unlawful presence from December 2001, the date her status expired, until July 11, 2007, when she departed the United States. The applicant is seeking admission into the United States within ten years of her July 11, 2007 departure. The applicant is, therefore, inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for being unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year.

A section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar would result in extreme hardship for the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship an applicant experiences upon removal is not directly relevant to a determination of extreme hardship in a section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver proceeding. The AAO also notes that the record contains references to the hardship that the applicant's daughter would suffer if the applicant were denied admission into the United States. Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is applicable solely where the applicant establishes extreme hardship to her citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent. Unlike a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act, Congress does not mention extreme hardship to United States citizen or lawful permanent resident children. Therefore, hardship to the applicant's daughter is not considered in section 212(a)(9)(B) waiver proceedings except to the extent that it creates hardship for a qualifying relative. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See *Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative "is not...fixed and inflexible," and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566. The BIA has also held:

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine

whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.

*Matter of O-J-O*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted).

U. S. courts have stated, “the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States,” and also, “[w]hen the BIA fails to give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion.” *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); *Cerrillo-Perez v. INS*, 809 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding to BIA) (“We have stated in a series of cases that the hardship to the alien resulting from his separation from family members may, in itself, constitute extreme hardship.”) (citations omitted). Separation of family will therefore be given appropriate weight in the assessment of hardship factors in the present case.

The AAO notes, however, that the courts have repeatedly held that the common results of removal or inadmissibility are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship as extreme hardship has generally been defined as hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *See Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996); *see also Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship). Only “in cases of great actual or prospective injury...will the bar be removed.” *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246 (BIA 1984).

Extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must be established in the event of relocation to Grenada or if the qualifying relative remains in the United States, as the qualifying relative is not required to reside outside the United States based on the denial of the applicant’s waiver request.

The AAO notes that the applicant’s mother is a native of Grenada, and it has not been established that she has no family ties to Grenada. Additionally, the AAO notes that the record does not establish that the applicant’s mother would be unable to obtain employment upon relocation.

In a letter dated September 6, 2007, the applicant’s mother states the applicant’s daughter is suffering hardship by not being able to continue her education in the United States. The AAO notes that there is no evidence in the record that the applicant’s daughter has any legal immigration status to remain in the United States. Additionally, as previously noted, the applicant’s daughter is not a qualifying relative for the purpose of this proceeding and the record does not demonstrate how any hardship she might suffer would affect her grandmother, the only qualifying relative.

The AAO notes that the applicant’s father passed away on December 10, 2007, however, there is no evidence of the role that the applicant would play in caring for her mother if her mother remained in the United States.

Based on its review of the record, the AAO does not find the applicant to have submitted sufficient evidence of financial, medical, emotional or other types of hardship to establish that her mother would suffer extreme hardship if she joined her in Grenada or remained in the United States.

Going on record without supporting documentation is not sufficient to meet the applicant's burden of proof in this proceeding. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's mother caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.