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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

H6

FILE: [REDACTED] Office: MANILA, PHILIPPINES Date: DEC 29 2010

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
for

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Manila, Philippines. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of the Philippines who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant's wife and the applicant's parents are lawful permanent residents of the United States. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to reside with his wife and parents in the United States.

The field office director found that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated August 5, 2008. On appeal, counsel contends the applicant established the requisite hardship.

The record contains, *inter alia*: a letter from the applicant; letters from the applicant's wife, [REDACTED]; copies of prescriptions and medical records; a letter from the couple's son's physician; a neurodevelopmental evaluation of the couple's son; letters from the applicant's parents; copies of tax records and other financial documents; letters of support; photos of the applicant and his family; and an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130). The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) In General - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who -

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien

would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

In this case, the record shows, and the applicant does not contest, that he entered the United States in January 1994 without inspection. The applicant filed an application for asylum, which was referred to an immigration judge. The applicant was placed in deportation proceedings and did not renew his request for asylum. The applicant was granted voluntary departure until January 8, 1998, with an alternate order of deportation. The applicant did not timely depart the United States and remained until he was removed on June 24, 2002. The applicant accrued unlawful presence from January 9, 1998, until his removal on June 24, 2002. Thus, the applicant accrued unlawful presence of more than four years. He now seeks admission within ten years of his June 2002 departure. Accordingly, he is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for being unlawfully present in the United States for a period of one year or more and seeking admission to the United States within ten years of his last departure. In addition, the applicant is also inadmissible to the United States under 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act as an alien previously removed from the United States. The applicant filed an Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States After Deportation or Removal (Form I-212), which was approved on September 13, 2005.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or his children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's wife and his parents are the only qualifying relatives in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying

relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

In this case, the applicant’s wife, [REDACTED] states that since her husband’s departure, their son, [REDACTED], has had to stay with a babysitter many hours per day. [REDACTED] states that, as a result, she has been unable to monitor [REDACTED] activity and he is now obese, has high cholesterol, and will soon be

diabetic. She contends she cries every time he asks about his father. [REDACTED] also contends that she is the only person working to support her family. *Letters from [REDACTED]*, dated November 29, 2006, and undated.

Letters from the applicant's parents state that they feel sorry for their grandson because he is growing up without his father's presence. They also state that [REDACTED] has struggled without her husband. *Letter from [REDACTED]*, undated; *Letters from [REDACTED]* dated June 30, 2008, and November 28, 2006; *Letter from [REDACTED]* dated November 28, 2006.

A note from [REDACTED] physician states, in its entirety, that [REDACTED] "is a case of exogenous obesity, hyperactive behavior, sleep apnea and hypertension. He is being followed up by endocrinologist, cardiologist, and developmental pediatrician." *Letter from Dr. [REDACTED]*, dated April 21, 2008.

A neurodevelopmental evaluation of [REDACTED] states that [REDACTED] does not feel that her son's behavior is inappropriate and that his kindergarten teacher reported his behavior as being perfectly normal. However, the evaluation states that [REDACTED] behavior, as observed during the assessment, was "highly suspect." The evaluation states that [REDACTED] motor coordination skills "are not entirely normal, over and above the effects of the obesity," and that his gross motor skills are poor for his age. *Pediatric Neurodevelopmental Evaluation*, dated March 27, 2008.

After a careful review of the record, there is insufficient evidence to show that [REDACTED] or the applicant's parents have suffered or will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant's waiver application were denied.

The AAO recognizes that [REDACTED] and the applicant's parents have endured hardship since the applicant departed the United States and is sympathetic to the family's circumstances. However, neither [REDACTED] nor the applicant's parents discuss the possibility of moving back to the Philippines, where they were born, to avoid the hardship of separation and they do not address whether such a move would represent a hardship to them.

If [REDACTED] and the applicant's parents decide to stay in the United States, their situation is typical of individuals separated as a result of inadmissibility and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. Federal courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. For example, *Matter of Pilch, supra*, held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *See also Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991) (uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported).

Regarding [REDACTED] obesity, poor gross motor skills, and the fact that he misses his father greatly, as stated above, hardship to the applicant's children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to the qualifying relatives – [REDACTED] or the applicant's parents. Although the record contains substantial documentation to substantiate the claim that [REDACTED] is obese, there is insufficient evidence to show that [REDACTED] obesity has caused extreme hardship to either [REDACTED] or the applicant's parents. There is no evidence addressing whether Jericho's obesity problem would be alleviated by relocating to the Philippines with his father and there is no evidence any hardship [REDACTED] or the applicant's parents have experienced is any more difficult than would normally be expected under the circumstances. In sum, there is no allegation that the applicant's situation is unique or atypical compared to other individuals separated as a result of inadmissibility. *See Perez v. INS, supra* (defining extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation).

With respect to [REDACTED] financial hardship claim, although the record contains a copy of her W-2 form (2007 Wage and Tax Statement), there is no evidence in the record addressing the applicant's income or wages when he lived in the United States. Therefore, there is no evidence addressing the extent to which the applicant helped to financially support the family. In addition, although the record contains copies of some bills, there is no evidence addressing [REDACTED] regular, monthly expenses, such as rent or child care expenses. Without more detailed information, the AAO is not in the position to attribute any financial difficulties [REDACTED] may be experiencing to the applicant's departure. The AAO notes that the applicant's parents have not made a financial hardship claim.

To the extent the record contains copies of the applicant's mother's medical records, there is no letter in plain language from any health care professional addressing the diagnosis, prognosis, treatment, or severity of the applicant's mother's health conditions. Indeed, neither the applicant nor his parents have claimed extreme hardship based on the applicant's mother's health problems. There is no allegation the applicant's parents needs their son's assistance in any manner and the AAO notes that when the applicant was in the United States, he and his wife lived in New Jersey while his parents live in California.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's wife or parents caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.