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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
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**U.S. Citizenship
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
APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).


Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Field Office Director, Tucson, Arizona, denied the Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) and it is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who, on October 6, 1999, was apprehended by immigration officers. The applicant failed to provide his true identity to immigration officers.¹ On the same day, the applicant was returned to Mexico. On December 11, 2003, immigration officers apprehended the applicant. On the same day, the applicant was returned to Mexico.

On November 20, 2006, the applicant filed an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) based on an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed on his behalf by his U.S. citizen spouse. On the same day, the applicant filed the Form I-212, indicating that he resided in the United States. The Form I-485 indicates that the applicant last entered the United States without inspection in December 2003. The Biographical Information Sheet (Form G-325) accompanying the Form I-485 indicates that the applicant has resided in the United States since September 1995. On June 26, 2009, the Form I-485 was denied. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), for having illegally reentered the United States after accruing more than one year of unlawful presence in the United States. He seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(C)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(iii) in order to reside in the United States with his U.S. citizen spouse and lawful permanent resident parents.

The field office director determined that the applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i). The field office director determined that the applicant was not eligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission because he had not remained outside the United States for the required ten years. The field office director denied the Form I-212 accordingly. See *Field Office Director's Decision*, dated June 26, 2009.

On appeal, counsel contends that the decision in *Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007), is on appeal.² Counsel contends that the field office director erred in retroactively applying *Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, when the applicant, in filing the Form I-212, relied upon the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) decision in *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft*, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004). See *Form I-290B*, dated July 27, 2009. In support of her contentions, counsel submits only the referenced Form I-290B. On the Form I-290B, counsel indicates that she will forward additional evidence and/or a brief within thirty days. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(viii) and the instructions to Form I-290B require the affected party to submit the brief or evidence directly to the AAO, not to the Tucson, Arizona field office or any other federal office. The record does not contain the brief and/or evidence that counsel indicated would be submitted to the AAO. Even if counsel were to submit evidence that a brief was filed with an office other than the AAO, the AAO would not consider the brief on appeal because counsel failed to follow the regulations or the instructions for the proper filing location. Accordingly the record is complete.

¹ The applicant indicated that he was [REDACTED]

² As discussed below, the restraining order preventing USCIS from denying an applicant's Form I-212 because he or she has not remained outside the United States for a period of ten years, expired on February 6, 2009. The Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs' application for an injunction on February 6, 2009, finding that the plaintiffs were unlikely to be successful on appeal.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

- (i) Arriving aliens.- Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within five years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
- (ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-
 - (I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or
 - (II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case on a alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
- (iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the [Secretary of Homeland Security] has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

....

(C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.-

- (i) In general.- Any alien who-
 - (I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or
 - (II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other provision of law, and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible.
- (ii) Exception.

Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States if, prior to the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to

be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary of Homeland Security has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

(iii) Waiver

The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the application of clause (i) in the case of an alien who is a VAWA self-petitioner if there is a connection between—

- (I) the alien's battering or subjection to extreme cruelty; and
- (II) the alien's removal, departure from the United States, reentry or reentries into the United States; or attempted reentry into the United States.

The record reflects that the applicant accrued unlawful presence in the United States from April 1, 1997, the date on which unlawful presence provisions were enacted, until October 6, 1999, the date on which he was voluntarily returned to Mexico. The applicant accrued unlawful presence in the United States from an unknown date in October 1999, the date on which he illegally reentered the United States, until December 11, 2003, the date on which he was voluntarily returned to Mexico. The applicant subsequently reentered the United States without inspection. Accordingly, the applicant has illegally reentered the United States after having accrued more than one year of unlawful presence in the United States.

The AAO notes that a waiver to section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) ground of inadmissibility is available to individuals classified as battered spouses under the cited sections of section 204 of the Act. *See also* 8 U.S.C. § 1154. There are no indications in the record that the applicant is or should be classified as such.

An alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act may not apply for consent to reapply unless he or she has *remained outside* the United States for more than 10 years since the date of the alien's last departure from the United States. *See Matter of Briones*, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007) and *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, 23 I&N Dec. 866 (BIA 2006). Thus, to avoid inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act, it must be the case that the applicant's last departure was at least ten years ago, the applicant has remained outside the United States since that departure, *and* that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has consented to the applicant's reapplying for admission. In the present matter, the applicant's last departure from the United States occurred on December 13, 2003, less than ten years ago, he has not remained outside the United States since that departure and he is currently in the United States.³ The applicant is currently statutorily ineligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission.

The AAO takes note of the preliminary injunction that had been entered against the ability of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to follow *Matter of Torres-Garcia*. *Gonzales v. DHS*, 239

³ The applicant will be required to provide evidence to establish that he is currently outside the United States and has resided outside the United States for a period of ten years at the time he becomes eligible to apply for permission to reapply for admission.

F.R.D. 620 (W.D. Wash. 2006). The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the district court, and ordered the vacating of that injunction. *Gonzales v. DHS (Gonzales II)*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007). In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that the Board's decision in *Matter of Torres-Garcia* was entitled to judicial deference. *Gonzales II*, 508 F.3d at 1241-42. The Ninth Circuit's mandate was issued on January 23, 2009. On February 6, 2009, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a new preliminary injunction. Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt # 59), *Gonzales v. DHS*, No. C06-1411-MJP (W.D. Wash. Filed February 6, 2006). Thus, as of the date of this decision, there is no judicial prohibition in force that precludes the AAO from applying the rule laid down in *Matter of Torres-Garcia*. Also See *Matter of Briones*, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007).

On appeal, counsel contends that the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Gonzales v. DHS* is impermissibly retroactive. Counsel contends that the Ninth Circuit's *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision should be applied in the applicant's case because he filed his Form I-212 in reliance on *Perez-Gonzalez* and it would be manifestly unjust and result in undue hardship to apply *Gonzalez II*.

The applicant's Form I-212 was filed while an injunction restraining USCIS from applying agency policy as set forth in *Matter of Torres-Garcia* had been issued. The AAO finds, therefore, that in filing the Form I-212 under such circumstances, counsel's contention that the applicant reasonably relied upon the Ninth Circuit's *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision is illogical.

The Ninth Circuit, in deferring to the BIA's decision in *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, found that the BIA's findings were reasonable and that the statute is unambiguous and unchanged since its promulgation. While the Ninth Circuit found that its decision in *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* was based on a finding of statutory ambiguity that left room for agency discretion, the court also found that the issue might have been resolved under the first step of *Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 467 U.S. 87, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984), by examining the text of the relevant statutes and their legislative histories. The court concluded that, by declining to adhere to the plain language of the inadmissibility provision and instead falling back on the regulations, *Perez Gonzalez* did not find the inadmissibility provision or the statutory scheme to be unambiguous. It is on this basis that the court found that it was not bound by the decision in *Perez Gonzalez* and must defer to *Torres Garcia*, while, at the same time, finding that the statute itself is unambiguous. In *Matter of Torres-Garcia*, the BIA found that 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 was not promulgated to implement the current section 212(a)(9) of the Act and that the very concept of retroactive permission to reapply for admission, i.e., permission requested after unlawful reentry, contradicts the clear language of section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act, which in its own right makes unlawful reentry after removal a ground of inadmissibility that can only be waived by the passage of at least ten years. The BIA found that the *Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft* decision contradicts the clear language of the statute and the legislative policy underlying the statute in general. The statute clearly states that an alien who has been ordered removed and enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted may seek an exception to permanent grounds of inadmissibility when seeking admission more than ten years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States, if, the applicant receives permission to reapply for admission prior to reentering the United States.⁴ Since the statute is unambiguous and has been in effect since April 1, 1997, counsel's contention that

⁴ The AAO notes that the reentry after obtaining permission to reapply for admission must be a lawful admission to the United States; otherwise, the applicant has again illegally reentered the United States after having been removed and renewed his or her inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act.

the correct application of the statute is impermissibly retroactive or manifestly unjust is unfounded since the applicant's accrual of unlawful presence, unlawful reentry and filing of the Form I-212 occurred after the statute's enactment.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that he is eligible for the benefit sought. The applicant in the instant case does not qualify for a waiver or the exception under section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) and (iii) of the Act. Thus, as a matter of law, the applicant is not eligible for approval of a Form I-212. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed as a matter of discretion.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.