

**Identifying data deleted to  
prevent clearly unwarranted  
invasion of personal privacy**

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**

**PUBLIC COPY**



*H6*

FILE:



(CDJ 2004 848 424)

Office: CIUDAD JUAREZ

Date:

**FEB 24 2010**

IN RE:



APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge, Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of one year or more. The applicant is the spouse of a U.S. citizen and the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to return to the United States and reside with her husband.

The officer in charge concluded that the applicant failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Officer in Charge* dated December 17, 2006.

On appeal, the applicant's husband asserts that he will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant is denied admission to the United States because he loves her and it breaks his heart to be separated from her. *See Notice of Appeal to the AAO (Form I-290B)*. He further states that they have four children born in the United States and he wants his wife to be with him as a family in the United States. In support of the appeal the applicant's husband submitted his children's birth certificates, a letter from his son's school, and school records for his daughter. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who –
  - (II) Has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.
- . . . .
- (v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The record contains references to hardship the applicant's children would experience if the waiver application were denied. It is noted that Congress did not include hardship to an alien's children as a factor to be considered in assessing extreme hardship. In the present case, the applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative for the waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, and hardship to the applicant's children will not be separately considered, except as it may affect the applicant's spouse.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship. These factors included the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

U.S. court decisions have additionally held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991). For example, in *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), the BIA held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, in *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996), the court held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. In *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968), the BIA held that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

The record reflects that the applicant is a twenty-eight year-old native and citizen of Mexico who resided in the United States from May 2003, when she entered without inspection, to January 2006, when she returned to Mexico. The record further reflects that the applicant's husband is a forty-two year-old native of Mexico and citizen of the United States whom she married on November 7, 2002. The applicant resides in Mexico and her husband resides in Omaha, Nebraska.

The applicant's husband states that he loves the applicant and he wants her to reside in the United States with him and their children as a family. He further states that he will not see his two children with the applicant grow up if they must remain in Mexico with her for ten years, and this would be cruel and very difficult for the children. *Letter from [REDACTED] submitted with waiver application.* No evidence was submitted to support these assertions, and the record does not establish that any emotional difficulties the applicant's husband is experiencing are more serious than the type of hardship a family member would normally suffer when faced with the prospect of his spouse's deportation or exclusion. Although the depth of his distress caused by the prospect of being separated from his spouse is not in question, a waiver of inadmissibility is only available where the resulting hardship would be unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation or exclusion. The prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families. But in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists.

The applicant's husband asserts that he would have to sell his assets to keep up with his expenses and send money to his family in Mexico. *Letter from [REDACTED]* No documentation was submitted concerning the family's expenses or the applicant's husband's income and overall financial situation to support the assertion that he is suffering financial hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Based on the record, it appears that the financial impact of maintaining two households appears to be a common result of exclusion or deportation, and would not rise to the level of extreme hardship for the applicant's husband. *See INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra* (holding that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship).

The evidence on the record is insufficient to establish that the applicant's husband would experience hardship beyond the type of hardship that a family member would normally suffer as a result of deportation or exclusion if he relocated to Mexico. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (defining "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation); *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991); *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship). No claim was made that the applicant's husband would suffer extreme hardship if he relocated to Mexico with the applicant. Therefore, the AAO cannot make a determination of whether the applicant's husband would suffer extreme hardship if he moved to Mexico.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or

inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. Citizen spouse as required under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.