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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**



*H2*

*H6*

FILE: [redacted] Office: [redacted] Date: **JAN 07 2010**

IN RE: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. section 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) and section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. section 1182(h).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge (OIC), Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico. She was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, (the Act) 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more and seeking admission within ten years of her last departure, and section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude (CIMT). She is married to a United States citizen. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and (h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) and (h).

The Officer in Charge concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that the bar to her admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, her U.S. citizen spouse, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) on February 16, 2007.

On appeal, the applicant's spouse asserts that the applicant has complied with all requirements and should be granted a waiver application.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-

- (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (h) The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs (A)(i)(I) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if -

....

- (1) (B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . . .

The record establishes that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in 1996 and remained until she departed voluntarily in July 1998. Therefore, the applicant was unlawfully present in the United States for over a year from April 1, 1997, the effective date of the unlawful presence provisions of the Act until July 1998. As she is seeking admission within ten years of her last departure from the United States, the applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act. The applicant does not contest this finding.

In addition, the record indicates that the applicant was convicted of Grand Theft: Property Over \$400, under section 487(a) of the California Penal Code (CPC) on February 7, 1997, in the Municipal Court of Van Nuys, Los Angeles, California. Offenses involving theft have long been held to constitute CIMTs. *Matter of Garcia*, 11 I. & N. Dec. 521 (BIA 1966). As such, the applicant has been convicted of a CIMT. However, as the maximum penalty under section 487(a) of the CPC is imprisonment for up to one year, the conviction qualifies for the petty offense exception pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii). Therefore, the applicant is not inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(1), but remains inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B).

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, i.e., the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant is not directly relevant in section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) proceedings and will be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative, his United States citizen spouse. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the Secretary then assesses whether an exercise of discretion is warranted. See *Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative "is not . . . fixed and inflexible," and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals set forth a list of non-exclusive factors

relevant to determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566.

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.

*Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted).

The AAO notes that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must be established whether he or she accompanies the applicant or remains in the United States, as a qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request.

The record includes, but is not limited to, a statement from the applicant's spouse.

The entire record was reviewed and all relevant evidence considered in rendering this decision.

The applicant's spouse asserts that his wife has met the requirements for a waiver application. He states that the applicant and he have delayed starting a family because of her exclusion, that the applicant's mother has become very ill as a result of her body's rejection of a liver transplant, that the applicant has suffered a serious car accident, that separation has resulted in several relationship problems and that it is expensive to travel back and forth to Mexico.

The record contains no evidence to support the applicant's spouse's assertions. There are no medical records for the applicant or her mother, and no other evidence indicating financial or emotional hardship. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

As the applicant has failed to submit documentary evidence in support of the hardship claims to her spouse, the record does not establish that he would experience extreme hardship.

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant's spouse would face extreme hardship if she is refused admission. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal or inadmissibility are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468

(9th Cir. 1991). In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse as required under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.