


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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FILE: [Redacted] Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ) Date **NOV 15 2010**

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)


ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion. The fee for a Form I-290B is currently \$585, but will increase to \$630 on November 23, 2010. Any appeal or motion filed on or after November 23, 2010 must be filed with the \$630 fee. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,  
  
for  
Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

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**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant is married to a U.S. citizen and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to reside with his wife and children in the United States.

The district director found that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated January 30, 2008.

The record contains, *inter alia*: a copy of the marriage certificate of the applicant and his wife, ██████████. ██████████ indicating they were married on April 4, 2003; copies of the birth certificates of the couple's two U.S. citizen children; a declaration from ██████████; a letter from ██████████ employer; financial documentation; a letter from the couple's daughter's school and other school documents; family photographs; and an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130). The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) In General - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who -

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien

would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

In this case, the record shows, and the applicant does not contest, that he entered the United States in October 2001 without inspection and remained until his departure in November 2005. The applicant accrued unlawful presence of over four years. He now seeks admission within ten years of his November 2005 departure. Accordingly, he is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for being unlawfully present in the United States for a period of one year or more and seeking admission to the United States within ten years of his last departure.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or his children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's wife is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. See *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. Cf. *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

*Id.* See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one’s present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm’r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be

considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

In this case, the applicant’s wife, [REDACTED] states that the couple has two U.S. citizen children who are thirteen and nineteen years old. [REDACTED] contends she has suffered extreme emotional distress since her husband departed the United States and that she is depressed, sleeps only a few hours each night, has lost weight, has difficulty concentrating, and is often irritable, sad, and unhappy. She states she feels exhausted, often feels faint, and often feels like vomiting. [REDACTED] states that she works with machinery and cannot tell her employer how she feels because she does not want to lose her job. According to [REDACTED] she attended school for a few years in Mexico and does not possess any trade skills or a diploma. She states she has struggled to make her mortgage payments since the applicant’s departure and has asked her children to work part-time in order to help financially support the family. [REDACTED] states that if her car breaks down, she will not have the money to repair it. In

addition, [REDACTED] states that being a single parent to her teenage son and daughter has been a nightmare. Furthermore, [REDACTED] contends that if her husband's waiver application were denied, she would be forced to move back to Mexico where she will be unable to provide for herself or her children, placing her health at risk and forcing her children's education to be seriously compromised. *Declaration of [REDACTED]*, dated February 28, 2008.<sup>1</sup>

A letter from [REDACTED] employer states that she works full-time and earns \$9.75 per hour. *Letter from [REDACTED]* dated February 26, 2008. A copy of the couple's 2007 tax return shows that [REDACTED] earned \$26,506 in 2007. *2007 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040A); 2007 Wage and Tax Statement (Form W-2)*.

After a careful review of the record, there is insufficient evidence to show that [REDACTED] has suffered or will suffer extreme hardship if her husband's waiver application were denied.

The AAO recognizes that [REDACTED] has endured hardship since the applicant departed the United States and is sympathetic to the family's circumstances. However, if [REDACTED] decides to stay in the United States, their situation is typical of individuals separated as a result of inadmissibility and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. Federal courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. For example, *Matter of Pilch, supra*, held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *See also Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991) (uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported).

With respect to [REDACTED]'s contention that she is depressed and is suffering physical symptoms as a result, there is no documentation in the record, such as a letter from her physician or a mental health professional, showing that she has been diagnosed with depression or that her hardship is beyond what would normally be expected under the circumstances. There is no allegation that the applicant's situation is unique or atypical compared to other individuals separated as a result of inadmissibility or exclusion. *See Perez v. INS, supra* (defining extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation).

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<sup>1</sup> The record also contains a letter, dated February 28, 2007, from [REDACTED] and a letter, dated February 24, 2008, from the couple's daughter, [REDACTED]. Both letters are written in Spanish and have not been translated into English. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3) requires that any document containing foreign language submitted to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services be accompanied by a full English language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator's certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English. Consequently, these letters cannot be considered.

Regarding the financial hardship claim, there is insufficient evidence in the record showing that [REDACTED] hardship is extreme. Although the applicant's Biographic Information form indicates he worked in labor while living in the United States, there is no evidence addressing his income or wages, and thus, no evidence addressing the extent to which he helped to financially support the family. *Biographic Information (Form G-325A)*, dated February 28, 2007. In addition, although the record contains a copy of a gas bill for \$32 and a monthly mortgage bill of \$685, there is no additional information addressing [REDACTED] regular, monthly expenses. Furthermore, the record shows that [REDACTED] earned \$26,506 in 2007 and [REDACTED] contends that her children, who are currently sixteen and twenty-one years old, work part-time to help financially support the family. Based on this information, the AAO finds that the financial hardship [REDACTED] has experienced is not extreme.

Furthermore, the record does not show that [REDACTED] moving back to Mexico, where she was born, would amount to extreme hardship. The record shows that she is currently fifty-one years old and attended school in Mexico. She does not claim that she does not speak Spanish or that she has any physical or mental health issues that would make her transition to moving back to Mexico any more difficult than would normally be expected. To the extent [REDACTED] contends she would be unable to support her family in Mexico, as stated above, there is no allegation that her situation is unique or atypical compared to other individuals separated as a result of inadmissibility or exclusion. *See Perez v. INS, supra.*

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's wife caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.