


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ), MEXICO Date:

**OCT 26 2010**

IN RE: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of  
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Acting District Director, Mexico City, Mexico. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of [REDACTED] who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and again seeking admission within ten years of his last departure from the United States. The applicant is married to a United States citizen. He seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with his wife.

In addition, on June 11, 2007, the applicant was found inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii), as an alien classified as having a mental disorder and behavior associated with the disorder that may pose, or has posed, a threat to the property, safety or welfare of the alien or others. It appears that the applicant has complied with all the requirements for a waiver under section 212(g) of the Act. As such, this decision will only address the applicant's inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

In a decision dated June 2, 2008, the Acting District Director found that the applicant failed to establish that his qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship as a consequence his inadmissibility. The application was denied accordingly. *See Decision of the Acting District Director* dated June 2, 2008.

On appeal, the applicant's qualifying relative provided a letter with the applicant's Notice of Appeal (Form I-290B) detailing several hardships, including emotional and financial hardships, she claims she is experiencing as a result of the applicant's inadmissibility.

The record contains an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130), an Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601), Form I-290B, a letter from the qualifying spouse, a letter from a licensed clinical professional regarding the qualifying spouse, evidence of the medications prescribed to the qualifying spouse, letters from the applicant's children, several reference letters written in Spanish, a letter from the employer of the qualifying spouse, a letter from the leasing company that manages the property where the applicant and qualifying spouse lived and a reference letter written in English.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

- (i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides for a waiver of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) inadmissibility as follows:

The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established . . . that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or his children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to

establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

*Id.* See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine

whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to [REDACTED] finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The applicant's qualifying relative in this case is his spouse, who is a United States citizen.

The record indicates that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in 1999, and remained until January of 2007 when he voluntarily departed. The applicant thus accrued unlawful presence from when he entered the United States in 1999 until January 2007; a period in excess of one year. In applying for an immigrant visa, the applicant is seeking admission within ten years of his departure from the United States. The applicant has not disputed his inadmissibility. Therefore, the applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(II) of the Act for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year.

The evidence provided relating to the potential hardships facing the applicant's spouse includes Form I-601, Form I-290B, a letter from the qualifying spouse, a letter from a licensed clinical professional regarding the qualifying spouse, evidence of the medications prescribed to the qualifying spouse, letters from the applicant's children, a letter from the employer of the qualifying spouse, a letter from the leasing company that manages the property where the applicant and qualifying spouse lived and a reference letter written in English. Although the applicant provided several reference letters written in Spanish, the requisite translations were not provided. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(3) states:

(3) Translations. Any document containing foreign language submitted to the Service [now the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Bureau"] shall be accompanied by a full English language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator's certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English.

As such, these letters without translations cannot be considered in analyzing this case.

The applicant must first establish that his United States citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship were she to remain in the United States while the applicant resides abroad due to his inadmissibility. With respect to this criterion, the applicant's spouse contends that she will suffer emotional and financial hardships should the applicant not be granted a waiver. In her letter provided on appeal, the applicant's spouse details the emotional hardship that she is encountering not being with her husband. She indicates that she is unmotivated, depressed and experiencing panic attacks. The letter from the applicant's spouse and her counselor support the claim that the applicant's presence is crucial for his spouse's well-being. These letters demonstrate that the qualifying spouse is encountering severe depression and anxiety, and may potentially suffer from a nervous breakdown due to the applicant's inadmissibility. The letters also note the qualifying spouse's emotional struggle with raising children as a single parent. While the applicant's spouse's psychological issues alone may not be enough to warrant a finding of extreme hardship, as they reflect a typical result of separation, such problems have been analyzed in the context of her other hardships.

The applicant's spouse further asserts that due to her spouse's inadmissibility, she is experiencing financial hardship. The record indicates that her expenses are greater than her income. A letter from the employer of the applicant's spouse indicates that she has been employed by [REDACTED] since November 5, 2000, as a [REDACTED] and that her compensation is [REDACTED]. The applicant also provided a letter regarding her expenses for housing, which was [REDACTED] per month. The applicant's spouse indicated in her letter that she can no longer afford to maintain a separate household for herself and two children since the applicant left the United States. She stated that she and her children live with her parents and she pays rent to her parents. As such, the applicant has demonstrated that his wife is struggling financially without his assistance and that she would continue to suffer financially if she were to remain in the United States without him.

The record reflects that the cumulative effect of the emotional and financial hardships the applicant's spouse is experiencing living in the United States without her husband rises to the level of extreme.

However, extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must also be established in the event that she accompanies the applicant abroad based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request. With respect to this criterion, the applicant's spouse asserts in her letter that she "has never lived anywhere else but here" and that she is afraid that she would not be able to adjust to a life in [REDACTED]. She also contends that there is a lack of jobs in [REDACTED]. However, there was no evidence to demonstrate that she would have a difficult time adjusting to life in [REDACTED]. In fact, the record contains information indicating that she was born in [REDACTED], so it is unclear whether and how long she lived in [REDACTED]. Further, the record contains no evidentiary support for her contention that there is a lack of jobs in [REDACTED]. The assertions made by the applicant's spouse are evidence and have been considered. However, they cannot be given great weight absent supporting evidence. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence generally is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

Moreover, the record is silent regarding whether the applicant's spouse has family or friends in [REDACTED]. There is also no evidence that the applicant's spouse has any significant health conditions that would be harmed by relocation to [REDACTED]. If the applicant's spouse relocated to [REDACTED], she would no longer experience the emotional hardships associated with separation such as [REDACTED]. Lastly, the record also contains no documentation regarding unsafe country conditions in [REDACTED] particularly in the location where the applicant resides or other locations where he and his spouse would likely reside. Even were the AAO to take notice of general conditions in [REDACTED], the record lacks evidence demonstrating how the applicant's spouse would be affected specifically by any adverse conditions there. Accordingly, the record does not show that relocation to [REDACTED] would cause extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66.

In sum, although the record indicates that the applicant's spouse may be encountering hardships based on separation, it does not support a finding that the difficulties, considered in the aggregate,

would rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. See *Perez*, 96 F.3d at 392; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631. Although the distress caused by separation from one's spouse is not in question, a waiver of inadmissibility is only available where the resulting hardship would be unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon removal. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to his spouse, as required for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. As the applicant has not established extreme hardship to a qualifying family member, no purpose would be served in determining whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.