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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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[REDACTED]

FILE: [REDACTED]

Office: MANILA, PHILIPPINES Date: **OCT 26 2010**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. The fee for a Form I-290B is currently \$585, but will increase to \$630 on November 23, 2010. Any appeal or motion filed on or after November 23, 2010 must be filed with the \$630 fee. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Manila, Philippines. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of the [REDACTED] who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and again seeking admission within ten years of her last departure from the United States. The applicant is married to a United States citizen. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with her spouse.

In a decision dated June 17, 2008, the Field Office Director found that the applicant failed to establish that her qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship as a consequence of her inadmissibility. The application was denied accordingly. *See Decision of the Field Office Director* dated June 17, 2008.

On appeal, the applicant's attorney submitted a brief in which she detailed the hardships that the applicant's husband has faced as a result of his separation from the applicant. In the brief, the applicant's attorney asserted that the applicant's husband was encountering emotional, medical and financial hardships as a result of the separation from his wife.

The record contains an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130), an Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601), a Notice of Appeal (Form I-290B), a statement that accompanied the Form I-290B, an appeal brief, affidavits from the qualifying relative, an affidavit from the applicant, a letter from the qualifying relative's doctor, country condition materials, psychological evaluations, a brief submitted with Form I-601, the applicant's passport, birth certificates for the applicant and her qualifying spouse, letters exchanged between the applicant and her qualifying spouse, the marriage certificate, the qualifying spouse's prescription, a letter from the applicant's sister-in-law, a letter from a friend, photographs, banking information, tax returns, receipts for money sent to the applicant, telephone bills and a certificate of title for their automobile.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides for a waiver of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) inadmissibility as follows:

The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established . . . that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's husband is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*,

10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the

Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to [REDACTED] finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The applicant’s qualifying relative in this case is her spouse, who is a United States citizen.

The record indicates that the applicant entered the United States on August 27, 1992 with a B-2 visa, which expired on August 26, 1993. The applicant filed an application for asylum (Form I-589) on December 1, 1992, which was denied on February 28, 1994. Thereafter, she was placed in removal proceedings and subsequently removed in absentia on July 15, 1994. She remained in the United States until November 22, 2003. The applicant thus accrued unlawful presence for a period in excess of one year. In applying for an immigrant visa, the applicant is seeking admission within ten years of her departure from the United States. The applicant has not disputed her inadmissibility. Therefore, the applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(II) of the Act for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year.

A waiver of the bar to admission under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative of the applicant. The AAO

notes that extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse must be established in the event that he relocates to the Philippines and in the event that he remains in the United States, as he is not required to reside outside the United States based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request. The AAO will consider the relevant factors in adjudication of this case.

The evidence submitted relating to the potential hardships facing the applicant's spouse was Form I-601, Form I-290B, a statement that accompanied the Form I-290B, an appeal brief, affidavits from the qualifying relative, an affidavit from the applicant, a letter from the qualifying relative's doctor, country condition materials, psychological evaluations, a brief submitted with Form I-601, a prescription for the qualifying spouse, a letter from the applicant's sister-in-law, a letter from a friend, banking information, tax returns, receipts for money sent to the applicant and telephone bills.

As previously stated, the applicant's attorney asserted on appeal that the applicant was encountering emotional, health-related and financial hardships as a result of the separation from his wife. In addition, the applicant's attorney indicates that the applicant's husband has close family ties to the United States, including his three children and a grandchild.

The AAO finds that the applicant's spouse would not suffer extreme hardship as a consequence of being separated from the applicant if he stayed in the United States. The applicant established that he is suffering [REDACTED] and that as a [REDACTED], he is susceptible to returning to his previous history of alcohol abuse. However, the [REDACTED] evaluation indicates that the applicant's [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED]. Further, although he is suffering from [REDACTED] "he can function adequately well in his employment and does not have many of the standard symptoms associated with depression." Further, the applicant's attorney asserts that the applicant's spouse is experiencing financial hardships as a result of his wife's return to the [REDACTED]. Although the applicant's attorney provided receipts for the money the applicant has sent to his wife in the [REDACTED], documentation regarding his current income and his increased expenses with regard to weekly phone calls to the [REDACTED] such evidence failed to demonstrate that the applicant's spouse is experiencing financial hardship. Further, the record does not indicate that the applicant's spouse relied on any financial contributions by the applicant. As such, the applicant has not sufficiently demonstrated that her husband would experience extreme hardship as a result of her inadmissibility.

The applicant has also failed to demonstrate that her qualifying spouse would suffer an extreme hardship in the event that he relocates to the [REDACTED]. Although the applicant's attorney contends that the applicant's husband has strong family ties to the United States including his children and grandchild, there is no supporting evidence regarding the assertions of counsel, such as letters from his children or family in the United States. The assertions made by the applicant's attorney are evidence and have been considered. However, they cannot be given great weight absent supporting evidence. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence generally is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). As such, the record is not clear and not fully developed with regard to the applicant

spouse's family ties in the United States. Therefore, the applicant has not demonstrated that her spouse has family ties to the United States that prevent him from moving to the [REDACTED]

Further, the qualifying spouse's attorney asserted in her initial brief, dated September 19, 2007, that the applicant's spouse "would not be able to have access to the medical care that he needs" presumably in the [REDACTED] for his intestinal condition which "requires daily [REDACTED] and a strict diet." However, there was no evidence to support the assertion that the applicant's spouse would not have access to such medical care in the [REDACTED]. Further, according to the [REDACTED] letter, dated May 13, 2008, the applicant's spouse "has been treated for [REDACTED] [REDACTED]" and there is no mention from the doctor of the applicant's spouse of his daily need to take [REDACTED]. Further, the doctor noted that it would be beneficial to have the applicant "nearby to help him during his times of need." Moreover, if the applicant's spouse relocated to the [REDACTED] he would no longer experience the emotional hardships associated with separation, such as [REDACTED]. Accordingly, the record does not show that relocation to the Philippines would cause extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66.

In sum, although the record indicates that the applicant's spouse may be encountering hardships based on separation, it does not support a finding that the difficulties, considered in the aggregate, would rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. *See Perez*, 96 F.3d at 392; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631. Although the distress caused by separation from one's spouse is not in question, a waiver of inadmissibility is only available where the resulting hardship would be unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon removal. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her spouse, as required for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. As the applicant has not established extreme hardship to a qualifying family member, no purpose would be served in determining whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.