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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090




**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

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FILE:  Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ), MEXICO Date: **OCT 26 2010**

IN RE: Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. The fee for a Form I-290B is currently \$585, but will increase to \$630 on November 23, 2010. Any appeal or motion filed on or after November 23, 2010 must be filed with the \$630 fee. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,


Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of [REDACTED] who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and again seeking admission within ten years of his last departure from the United States. The applicant is the spouse of a United States citizen. He seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with his wife.

In a decision dated February 8, 2008, the District Director found that the applicant failed to establish that his qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship as a consequence of his inadmissibility. The application was denied accordingly. *See Decision of the District Director* dated February 8, 2008.

On appeal, the applicant's qualifying relative submitted a letter, which accompanied the Notice of Appeal (Form I-290B). In the letter, the qualifying spouse detailed the hardships that she is facing as a result of her separation from the applicant. In her statement, the applicant's wife asserted that she was encountering medical and financial hardships as a result of the separation from her husband. In addition, she claims that relocation to [REDACTED] would be difficult for her because she would have to leave her elderly mother, who she helps to support. She also indicates that moving to [REDACTED] would be difficult because she is a [REDACTED] and there is not a [REDACTED] in her husband's town in [REDACTED]. She also contends that it would be difficult for her to modify her diet, as she claims she is not accustomed to spicy foods.

The record contains Biographic Information (Form G-325A) regarding the applicant, an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130), an Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601), Form I-290B, two letters from the qualifying relative and a reference letter from the applicant's friend.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides for a waiver of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) inadmissibility as follows:

The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established . . . that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. The applicant's wife is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a

qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S.*

v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. [REDACTED] was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to [REDACTED] finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The applicant’s qualifying relative in this case is his wife, who is a United States citizen.

The record indicates that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in May of 1998, and remained until February of 2007 when he voluntarily departed. The applicant accrued unlawful presence from May 1998 until February 2007, a period in excess of one year. In applying for an immigrant visa, the applicant is seeking admission within ten years of his departure from the United States. The applicant has not disputed his inadmissibility. Therefore, the applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(II) of the Act for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year.

A waiver of the bar to admission under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative of the applicant. The AAO notes that extreme hardship to the applicant’s wife must be established in the event that she relocates to [REDACTED] and in the event that she remains in the United States, as she is not required to reside outside the United States based on the denial of the applicant’s waiver request. The AAO will consider the relevant factors in adjudication of this case.

The evidence submitted relating to the potential hardships facing the applicant's spouse was Form I-601, Form I-290B, two letters from the qualifying relative and a reference letter from the applicant's friend. Although the applicant provided a reference letter from his friend, such evidence is not relevant to the hardship faced by the applicant's qualifying spouse, and its relevancy is limited to discretion after extreme hardship has been found.

As previously stated, the applicant's qualifying wife asserted on appeal that she was encountering medical and financial hardships as a result of her separation from the applicant. In addition, she claims that relocation to [REDACTED] would be difficult for her for family, religious and cultural reasons.

Although the qualifying spouse's separation from the applicant may be causing her emotional, medical and financial hardships, there is very little evidence in the record to demonstrate the hardships that she may be encountering. The applicant's wife, on appeal, asserts that she needs surgery and that she has delayed such surgery because she needs the help of the applicant in order to care for her in recovery. However, there was no evidence to indicate the surgery that the applicant's spouse needs and the reason the applicant's presence would be necessary for her care following such surgery, such as letters from doctors or medical documentation of her alleged necessary surgical procedure.

Further, the applicant's qualifying wife asserts that she will suffer financial hardships if the applicant's waiver is not granted. She states that she has a home and financial obligations that are dependent upon two incomes. However, no documentation was provided to indicate that the applicant's wife relies on the income of her husband or that she would not be able to afford her expenses on her own. For example, no documentation relating to the applicant's expenses or information regarding the applicant's income or the income of the applicant's wife was provided. Such assertions made by the applicant's spouse in her letters regarding her claimed medical and financial hardships are evidence and have been considered. However, assertions cannot be given great weight absent supporting evidence. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence generally is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). As such, the applicant failed to demonstrate that his wife will suffer medically and financially as a result of the waiver being denied

The AAO likewise finds that the applicant has not met his burden in showing that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if she relocated to [REDACTED]. If the applicant's spouse relocated to [REDACTED] she would no longer experience the emotional hardships associated with separation. Moreover, given the lack of information regarding the applicant's wife's income, the AAO cannot conclude that relocation would cause extreme financial hardship.

Likewise, although the applicant's wife indicates that she needs a medical procedure, there is no evidence that she has any significant health conditions that would be harmed by relocation to [REDACTED]. Lastly, the record also contains no documentation regarding unsafe country conditions in [REDACTED] particularly in the location where the applicant resides or other locations where he and his

wife would likely reside. Even were the AAO to take notice of general conditions in [REDACTED] the record lacks evidence demonstrating how the applicant's spouse would be affected specifically by any adverse conditions there.

In addition, the applicant's wife states that her mother lives in the United States in a nursing home and that she is the only one that take care of her. However, no evidence to substantiate such claim was provided, e.g. a letter from the nursing home or her mother. The applicant's spouse also indicates that she has many cultural reservations about relocating to [REDACTED], as she is not a native of [REDACTED]. She asserts that she is [REDACTED] in her husband's home town in [REDACTED]. However, there is no evidence in the record to confirm her affiliation with the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to demonstrate that she would be unable to practice her religion in [REDACTED]. Further, she indicates that she does not speak Spanish and is also not accustomed to [REDACTED] food. While these cultural differences may pose a hardship to the applicant's spouse, the adjustments she will have to make to the language and food do not rise to the level of extreme hardship. Accordingly, the record does not show that relocation to [REDACTED] would cause extreme hardship to the applicant's wife. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66.

In sum, although the record indicates that the applicant's wife may be encountering hardships based on separation, it does not support a finding that the difficulties, considered in the aggregate, would rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. *See Perez*, 96 F.3d at 392; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631. Although the distress caused by separation from one's spouse is not in question, a waiver of inadmissibility is only available where the resulting hardship would be unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon removal. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to his spouse, as required for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. As the applicant has not established extreme hardship to a qualifying family member, no purpose would be served in determining whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.