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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ) Date:
[REDACTED]

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

SEP 02 2010

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present for more than one year and seeking readmission within 10 years of her last departure. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen husband.

The district director found that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to her husband and denied the Form I-601 application for a waiver accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated February 8, 2008.

On appeal, the applicant states that her son is experiencing emotional hardship due to being separated from her husband, and she requests approval of her application so she and her son can be united with her husband in the United States. *Statement from the Applicant on Form I-290B*, dated March 22, 2008.

The record contains statements from the applicant and her husband, and documentation regarding the applicant's son's educational activities in the United States. The applicant further provided documents in a foreign language. Because the applicant failed to submit translations of the documents, the AAO cannot determine whether the evidence supports the applicant's claims. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3). Accordingly, the evidence is not probative and will not be accorded any weight in this proceeding. With the exception of the untranslated documents, the entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

The record shows that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in or about December 2000. She remained until or about January 2007. Accordingly, the applicant accrued

approximately six years of unlawful presence in the United States. She now seeks admission as an immigrant pursuant to an approved Form I-130 relative petition filed by her husband on her behalf. She was deemed inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for having been unlawfully present for more than one year and seeking readmission within 10 years of her last departure. The applicant does not contest her inadmissibility on appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides for a waiver of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) inadmissibility as follows:

The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established . . . that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her son can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's husband is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one’s present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm’r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. ██████ was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

In the present matter, the applicant states that she came to the United States to have a better life. *Statement from the Applicant on Form I-290B* at 2. She indicates that her husband provided everything she and her son needed, and that her husband treats her son as his own child. *Id.* She explains that she has had to stay in Mexico, and that her son is experiencing emotional hardship due to being separated from her husband. *Id.*

The applicant’s husband stated that he wishes for the applicant and his stepson to return to the United States so they can purchase a home and realize their goals. *Statement from the Applicant’s Husband*, dated March 24, 2007. He explained that he, the applicant, and his stepson have no health

problems, but that his stepson requires special education which he is not receiving in Mexico. *Id.* at 1. He expressed that he misses the applicant and his stepson. *Id.* He added that his stepson will endure hardship if the applicant must remain outside the United States for a lengthy duration. *Id.*

Upon review, the applicant has not shown that her husband will endure extreme hardship should the present waiver application be denied. The applicant has not asserted that her husband will suffer hardship should he join her in Mexico for the duration of her inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act. In the absence of clear assertions from the applicant, the AAO may not speculate as to the hardship the applicant's husband may endure. In proceedings regarding a waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Thus, as the applicant has not stated that her husband will face challenges should he relocate to Mexico, she has not shown that such relocation will result in extreme hardship.

The applicant has not shown that her husband will suffer extreme hardship should he remain in the United States until she is permitted to return. The record contains references to hardships experienced by the applicant's son. The applicant's husband asserted that his stepson will endure hardship if the applicant is not permitted to return to the United States, in part due to his need for special education. The applicant submits documentation relating to her son's education in the United States, yet the evidence does not support that her son has unusual educational needs, or that he was involved in special classes in the United States beyond English language training. The applicant has not asserted or shown that her son lacks access to adequate education in Mexico. The separation of a parent from a child often results in significant emotional hardship, and the AAO acknowledges that the applicant's son faces psychological difficulty due to living apart from the applicant's husband. However, the applicant has not distinguished her son's emotional difficulty from that which is common expected in his circumstances. Based on the foregoing, the applicant has not shown that her son is facing challenges that elevate her husband's emotional hardship to an extreme level.

The applicant's husband expressed that he is suffering emotional hardship due to residing apart from the applicant and his stepson. However, the applicant has not presented explanation or evidence that distinguishes her husband's emotional difficulty from that which is often expected when an individual is separated from a spouse due to inadmissibility.

The applicant has not stated other elements of hardship that her husband will endure should they remain separated for the duration of her inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act. Considering all presented elements of hardship in aggregate, the applicant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that denial of the present waiver application "would result in extreme hardship" to her husband, as required for a waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In the present matter, the applicant has not met her burden to prove that she is eligible for a waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.