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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
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U.S. Citizenship  
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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ), MEXICO Date: **SEP 30 2010**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED


INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office



**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Acting District Director, Mexico City, Mexico. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and again seeking admission within ten years of her last departure from the United States. The applicant is married to a United States citizen. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with her spouse.

In a decision dated June 2, 2008, the Acting District Director found that the applicant failed to establish that her qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship as a consequence of her inadmissibility. The application was denied accordingly. *See Decision of the Acting District Director* dated June 2, 2008.

On appeal, the applicant's qualifying relative, her husband, submitted a letter in which he detailed the hardships that he has faced as a result of his separation from the applicant. In his letter, he asserted that he was encountering emotional, medical and financial hardships as a result of the separation from his wife. In addition, the applicant's qualifying spouse indicated that he has family ties to the United States and that his mother, who lives in the United States, is dependent upon his help.

The record contains Biographic Information (Form G-325A) regarding the applicant, an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130), an Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601), a Notice of Appeal (Form I-290B), a letter from the qualifying relative, a prescription for the qualifying relative written in Spanish, a marriage certificate, mortgage statements, the applicant's transcript for her coursework written in Spanish, home instructions for the qualifying spouse relating to his surgery, internet information regarding the qualifying spouse's claimed disease, congressional emails regarding the status of the applicant's waiver application, a letter in Spanish from the qualifying spouse, a bank statement and home insurance coverage information.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such

alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides for a waiver of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) inadmissibility as follows:

The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established . . . that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's husband is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. See *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. Cf. *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

*Id.* See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one’s present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm’r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. See *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. See *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The

question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The applicant’s qualifying relative in this case is her spouse, who is a United States citizen.

The record indicates that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in July of 1999, and remained until March of 2007 when she voluntarily departed. The applicant thus accrued unlawful presence from when she entered the United States in July 1999 until March 2007, a period in excess of one year. In applying for an immigrant visa, the applicant is seeking admission within ten years of her departure from the United States. The applicant has not disputed her inadmissibility. Therefore, the applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(II) of the Act for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year.

A waiver of the bar to admission under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative of the applicant. The AAO

notes that extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse must be established in the event that he relocates to Mexico and in the event that he remains in the United States, as he is not required to reside outside the United States based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request. The AAO will consider the relevant factors in adjudication of this case.

The evidence submitted relating to the potential hardships facing the applicant's spouse was Form I-601, Form I-290B, an appeal letter from the qualifying relative, mortgage statements, home instructions for the qualifying spouse relating to his surgery, internet information regarding the qualifying spouse's claimed disease, a bank statement and home insurance coverage information. Although the applicant provided an additional letter from the qualifying spouse, a prescription for the qualifying spouse and a transcript for her coursework, all these documents were in Spanish and the requisite translations were not provided. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(3) states:

(3) Translations. Any document containing foreign language submitted to the Service [now the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Bureau"] shall be accompanied by a full English language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator's certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English.

As such, this evidence, without the required translations, cannot be considered in analyzing this case. In addition to the applicant's transcript of her coursework failing to comply with the necessary translations, such evidence is also not relevant to the hardship faced by the applicant's qualifying spouse.

As previously stated, the applicant's qualifying spouse asserted on appeal that he was encountering emotional, health-related and financial hardships as a result of the separation from his wife. In addition, the applicant's qualifying spouse indicated that he has family ties to the United States and that his mother, who lives in the United States, is dependent upon his help.

Although the qualifying spouse's separation from the applicant may be causing him emotional, medical and financial hardships, there is very little evidence in the record to demonstrate the hardships that he may be encountering. The applicant's husband claims that he is emotionally suffering in his letter from the separation from his wife, yet no corroborating evidence, such as letters from doctors or psychologists, was submitted. Further, the applicant's spouse claims to be facing financial hardships and states that he is sending money to Mexico to pay for his wife's utilities. However, no proof to confirm the transfer of money to his wife, e.g. receipts for such transactions, was provided. Moreover, although the applicant provided documentation relating to her husband's expenses with regard to their home mortgage and a bank account statement, there was no information provided regarding the income of her qualifying spouse. Therefore, the applicant failed to demonstrate that their mortgage payment and/or other expenses (which were not documented), or her qualifying spouse's support of her in Mexico, are difficult for the qualifying spouse financially on his salary. Further, there was also no documentation regarding possible financial contributions by the applicant when she lived in the United States.

Further, the qualifying spouse's letter asserted that he and his family have encountered several health issues. He indicated that, in 2004, he underwent a surgery for "Pilonidal Sinus" and that his wife helped him recover and saved him from the expense of treatments by learning how to care for his wound. Also, he asserted that his family has a history of diabetes, heart disease and cancer, and that his wife cooked for him when she was in the United States, which kept him healthier. However, no documentation regarding his risk for such illnesses or proof to show that the absence of his wife is adversely affecting his health was provided. With regard to his surgery for "Pilonidal Sinus," a page of "home instructions" for the qualifying spouse's surgery, providing very little information and failing to specify the surgery, was submitted. Additionally, the applicant provided internet information regarding "Pilonidal Sinus," however there was no corroboration from a doctor or any health provider that indicated the applicant's spouse had undergone the surgery and that explained the consequences of having such surgery and/or whether he had any issues relating to it or whether he has fully recovered from such illness. As such, we find that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that her qualifying spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he stayed in the United States without the applicant.

The AAO likewise finds that the applicant has not met her burden in showing that her spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he relocated to Mexico. If the applicant's spouse relocated to Mexico, he would no longer experience the emotional hardships associated with separation. Moreover, given the lack of information regarding the applicant spouse's income, the AAO cannot conclude that relocation would cause extreme financial hardship.

The applicant's spouse indicated that he currently has health benefits in the United States, which he would no longer have in Mexico. However, the applicant failed to provide evidence to confirm that his current employment includes health benefits.

The applicant's spouse also claims that he has ties to family in the United States, including his mother for whom he asserts is dependent upon him. He indicates that his mother is disabled and that he could not go to Mexico because he has to care for her. The applicant provided no evidence regarding his mother's disability and his care for his mother, such as a letter from his mother and from her doctor, to support his claim. The qualifying spouse also indicates that he has many friends in the United States and that it would be difficult for him to adapt to a new culture. However, there were no letters of support provided by his friends or family. Likewise, the record is silent regarding whether the applicant's spouse has family or friends in Mexico, as he was born in Mexico. There is also no evidence that the applicant's spouse has any significant health conditions that would be harmed by relocation to Mexico. Lastly, the record also contains no documentation regarding unsafe country conditions in Mexico, particularly in the location where the applicant resides or other locations where she and her spouse would likely reside. The qualifying spouse asserted that the roads in Mexico that his wife travels on are unsafe, yet no evidence for such statements was submitted. Even were the AAO to take notice of general conditions in Mexico, the record lacks evidence demonstrating how the applicant's spouse would be affected specifically by any adverse conditions there. Accordingly, the record does not show that relocation to Mexico would cause extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66.

In sum, although the record indicates that the applicant's spouse may be encountering hardships based on separation, it does not support a finding that the difficulties, considered in the aggregate, would rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. *See Perez*, 96 F.3d at 392; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631. Although the distress caused by separation from one's spouse is not in question, a waiver of inadmissibility is only available where the resulting hardship would be unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon removal. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her spouse, as required for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. As the applicant has not established extreme hardship to a qualifying family member, no purpose would be served in determining whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.