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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
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Services

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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: VIENNA, AUSTRIA

Date: SEP 22 2010

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:


This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Thank you,

Argum Sikka
for

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office



DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge, Vienna, Austria. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Albania who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii), as an alien ordered removed, and section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant is married to a U.S. citizen and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to reside with his wife and child in the United States.

The officer in charge found that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to his spouse. The officer in charge denied the waiver application as well as the applicant's Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission Into the United States After Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) accordingly. *Decision of the Officer in Charge*, dated January 10, 2008.¹

The record contains, *inter alia*: a copy of the marriage certificate of the applicant and his wife, Ms. Cene, indicating they were married on December 21, 2003; a letter from Ms. Cene; two letters from Ms. Cene's physician and a copy of a prescription; a letter from the applicant; copies of checks; photographs of the applicant and his family; documentation addressing country conditions in Albania; and an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130). The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act provides:

(A) *Certain aliens previously removed.*

....

(ii) *Other aliens.* Any alien not described in clause (i) who –

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

¹ In situations where an applicant must file a Form I-212 and a Form I-601, the adjudicator's field manual clearly states that the Form I-601 is to be adjudicated first. Chapter 43.2(d) of the Adjudicator's Field Manual states, "If the alien has filed both applications (Forms I-212 and I-601), adjudicate the waiver application first. If the Form I-601 waiver is approved, then consider the Form I-212 on its merits; if the Form I-601 is denied (and the decision is final), deny the Form I-212 since its approval would serve no purpose." Thus, based on this rule, in a situation like the applicant's, where there is one appeal that has been filed and either the Form I-212 or the Form I-601 could be considered on appeal, generally, the AAO will review the Form I-601.

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding,

and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal . . . is inadmissible.

(iii) *Exception.* – Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security] has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) In General - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who -

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

In this case, the record shows, and the applicant concedes, that he attempted to enter the United States on February 13, 2002 without proper documentation. He was apprehended by border patrol agents and was permitted to remain in the United States pending a hearing before an immigration judge in removal proceedings. On February 6, 2003, the applicant filed an Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal (Form I-589). On September 7, 2004, the immigration judge denied the applicant relief, ordering him removed to Albania. The applicant filed an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal on April 26, 2006. The applicant departed the United States on May 7, 2007. *See Applicant's Brief*, undated, at 1-2.

The record shows that the applicant did not depart the United States until over one year after the BIA dismissed the his appeal. Therefore, the applicant accrued unlawful presence of over one year. He now seeks admission within ten years of his May 2007 departure. Accordingly, he is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for being unlawfully present in the United States for a period of one year or more and seeking admission to the United States within ten years of his last departure. In addition, the record shows that the applicant had been ordered removed and that he departed the United States while he had an outstanding order of removal. Therefore, he is also inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act. The applicant does not contest his inadmissibility on appeal.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or his children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's wife is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. See *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. Cf. *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one’s present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm’r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be

considered in analyzing hardship. See *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; see also *U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. See, e.g., *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

In this case, the applicant’s wife, [REDACTED], states that since her husband departed the United States, she has experienced anxiety and depression. [REDACTED] contends she is battling her life as a single parent to a three-year old daughter and is struggling to pay her bills. In addition, she states that she is concerned about her security given that she lives in the Florida Keys and it is hurricane season. [REDACTED] also states that her husband is a great father, supportive husband, and hard worker. *Letter from [REDACTED]* undated.

A letter from [REDACTED] physician states that [REDACTED] has been in her care since August 2007 for the management of Major Depressive Disorder, Severe. According to [REDACTED] physician, [REDACTED] has been overwhelmed with severe depression and “barely able to carry out her activities of daily living,

despite intensive treatment, including therapy and medication,” since her husband’s departure from the United States. The physician states that [REDACTED] was at risk for depression, having had severe post-partum depression after her daughter’s birth. The physician concludes that [REDACTED] “is at risk for the serious complications of depression.” *Letters from [REDACTED]* dated February 13, 2008, and August 15, 2007.

After a careful review of the record, it is not evident from the record that the applicant’s wife has suffered or will suffer extreme hardship as a result of the applicant’s waiver being denied.

The AAO recognizes that [REDACTED] has endured hardship since the applicant departed the United States and is sympathetic to the family’s circumstances. However, if [REDACTED] decides to stay in the United States, their situation is typical of individuals separated as a result of inadmissibility and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. Federal courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. For example, *Matter of Pilch, supra*, held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *See also Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991) (uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported). Furthermore, in cases such as this one, where inadmissibility is of limited duration, the hardship of separation is unlikely to be as severe as that experienced in cases involving permanent inadmissibility.

With respect to [REDACTED]’s depression, the letters from her physician fail to provide sufficient details to establish extreme hardship. Although [REDACTED]’s physician contends that [REDACTED] is “barely able to carry out her activities of daily living, despite intensive treatment, including therapy and medication,” the letter fails to specify what activities [REDACTED] is either unable or barely able to perform. Significantly [REDACTED] does not allege that she requires any assistance with her activities of daily living and the record shows that she has been able to maintain her employment. In addition, the letter does not specify what intensive treatment or therapy [REDACTED] has received. [REDACTED] does not claim she has undergone any type of mental health counseling and the record does not contain information addressing what test, if any, were used to diagnose [REDACTED] with severe depression. Without more detailed information, the AAO is not in the position to reach conclusions regarding the severity of any medical or mental health condition or the treatment and assistance needed.

Regarding the financial hardship claim, although [REDACTED] submits evidence regarding her living expenses and submits four weeks worth of paychecks showing she earns between \$300 per week to \$580 per week, there is no evidence addressing the applicant’s income or wages while he lived in the United States, and thus, no evidence addressing the extent to which he helped to financially support the family. Without more detailed information, the AAO is not in the position to attribute any financial difficulties [REDACTED] may be experiencing to the applicant’s departure. In any event, even assuming

some economic hardship, the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship. *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship).

Furthermore, the record does not show that [REDACTED] would experience extreme hardship if she relocated to Albania, where she was born, to be with her husband. The record shows that [REDACTED] is currently twenty-nine years old and lived in Albania until she was twenty years old. In addition, the AAO notes that the U.S. Department of State describes Albania's crime rating as "medium." Specifically, "Crime against foreigners is rare in Albania, as targeting foreigners is often viewed as too risky. When traveling in Albania, you should maintain the same personal security awareness that you would in any metropolitan U.S. city. . . . Criminals do not seem to target U.S. citizens or other foreigners deliberately, but do seek targets of opportunity, selecting those who appear to have anything of value." *U.S. Department of State, Country Specific Information, Albania*, dated April 29, 2010. After considering all of the evidence cumulatively, the applicant has not established that his wife has or will suffer extreme hardship if his waiver application were denied.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's wife caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.