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
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

tlg



FILE: [Redacted]


Office: PHOENIX, AZ

Date: **APR 04 2011**

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. section 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Phoenix, Arizona. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico. She was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more and seeking admission within ten years of her last departure. She is married to a United States citizen and has one U.S. citizen child. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

The District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that the bar to her admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, her U.S. citizen spouse, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) on November 18, 2008.

On appeal, counsel the applicant asserts that the applicant's waiver should have been granted and that the District Director did not provide an adequate opportunity to demonstrate extreme hardship. *Form I-290B*, received on November 28, 2008.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

The record indicates that the applicant entered the United States with a border crossing card in 2000 and overstayed her authorized period of stay. She departed the United States for one day in 2007, triggering the unlawful presence provision of the Act. As the applicant has resided unlawfully in the United States for over a year and is now seeking admission within ten years of her last departure from the United States, she is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

The record includes, but is not limited to, counsel's brief; a statement from the applicant's spouse; a psychological evaluation of the applicant's spouse by [REDACTED] dated September 10, 2008; a Biopsychosocial Evaluation of the applicant's spouse by [REDACTED] MSSA, MSUS, [REDACTED] dated September 5, 2008; a document labeled "mini-mental status examination" and other raw medical documents; a statement by [REDACTED], dated October 3,

2008; pictures of the applicant, her husband and their daughter; a letter from the applicant's employer, tax records and pay stubs for the applicant's spouse.

The entire record was reviewed and all relevant evidence considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides for a waiver of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) inadmissibility as follows:

The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established . . . that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one’s present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm’r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. See *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. See *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; see also *U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. See, e.g., *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The AAO will first examine hardship upon relocation. Counsel asserts on appeal that the applicant’s spouse would suffer emotional and financial hardship upon relocation. He explains that the applicant would be separated from his children who reside in the United States if he relocated. He asserts that based on the wage inequality, high unemployment and quality of life in Mexico, the applicant’s spouse and children would experience extreme hardship. He also asserts that having to relocate would exacerbate the mental health issues suffered by the applicant’s spouse.

The record contains a document comparing wages throughout Mexico, and counsel states that the differences in the Mexican economy and the U.S. economy are "well established." While the AAO acknowledges there is an obvious difference in the economies of the United States and Mexico, this is not sufficient to establish extreme hardship. The evidence submitted is not sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant's spouse, who has worked in the cleaning services industry for over fifteen years and who can speak Spanish and English, would be unable to find employment in Mexico. Further, the fact that there is a difference in economic conditions is not considered an uncommon hardship factor. *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 1994). Without evidence that specifically demonstrates that the applicant, based on where he would reside and/or attempts to find employment, would be unable to find employment in Mexico, counsel's assertions are not sufficient to establish that the applicant's husband would be unable to meet his needs in Mexico. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaighena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

With regard to counsel's assertion that relocation would exacerbate the applicant's husband's mental health condition, the AAO notes that none of the mental health examinations submitted address any potential impact on the applicant's spouse if he were to relocate. Without evidence to support counsel's assertions they cannot be considered as evidence, nor do they help in meeting the applicant's burden. *Id.*

On appeal counsel asserts that if the applicant's children were to accompany the applicant's spouse to Mexico they would be deprived of the educational, social, community and career opportunities available to other U.S. citizen children. As noted above, children are not qualifying relatives in these proceedings, and as such any hardship impact to them is only relevant to the extent that it impacts the qualifying relative, in this case the applicant's spouse. There is insufficient evidence in the record to establish that the applicant's children would experience uncommon hardships which would indirectly result in a significant impact to the applicant's spouse.

Even when these hardship factors are considered in aggregate, they fail to establish that the impacts on the applicant's spouse rise above the challenges commonly experienced by the relatives of inadmissible aliens who relocate abroad with family members. As such, the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship upon relocation.

Counsel notes that the District Director found extreme hardship upon separation. However, the AAO disagrees with the District Director's conclusion. An examination of the record does not reveal sufficient evidence to establish extreme hardship upon separation.

Counsel previously asserted that the applicant would experience extreme emotional hardship upon separation and cited to evidence submitted into the record, including two mental health examinations and a brief statement from the applicant's spouse's primary care physician.

The record contains an examination by [REDACTED] dated August 27, 2008. In the examination Dr. [REDACTED] briefly narrates self-reported symptoms of the applicant's spouse and then diagnoses the applicant's spouse with Psychotic Disorder, Sleep Terror Disorder, Dysthemic Disorder and Acute Distress Disorder. She states that his conditions could lead the applicant's spouse to become a threat to himself and others and possibly suicide.

At the outset the AAO would note that [REDACTED] diagnosed the applicant with all of these disorders based on a two hour interview. The examination is inconsistent with [REDACTED] examination in which the applicant's spouse denied any suicidal ideation or thoughts of violence, and which only diagnosed him with Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood. [REDACTED] notes that the examination was conducted "for immigration purposes" and not based on any medical referral due to the applicant's spouse's condition or any history of mental illness. She also states that the applicant's spouse was prescribed Sertraline by [REDACTED] does not state this in her letter. The AAO also observes that at the time the applicant filed for her adjustment of status she and the applicant had only been married for two years. Based on these observations the AAO finds that the examination by [REDACTED] is of limited value in determining extreme hardship.

[REDACTED] Biopsychosocial examination diagnoses the applicant's spouse with Adjustment Disorder. [REDACTED] letter says the applicant's spouse is under treatment for severe anxiety and major depression, however, the AAO notes that neither of the mental health examinations contained in the record state that he has been diagnosed with severe anxiety and major depression.

Despite the inconsistencies noted with the medical evidence, the AAO can conclude that the applicant's spouse will experience significant emotional hardship due to separation. However, the evidence is insufficient to establish that he will experience extreme hardship based solely on the emotional impact.

Counsel for the applicant asserts that the applicant cares for five children, but the record does not contain any evidence that the applicant's spouse is providing financial support for the children who do not reside with him. Counsel's assertions of financial hardship are likewise unsupported. Although the AAO can accept that the applicant's spouse may have to make child care accommodations for his children due to the applicant's absence, this is a common impact of separation.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal or inadmissibility are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse as required under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.