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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**



H6

FILE:



Office: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO  
(CIUDAD JAUREZ)

Date:

**FEB 09 2011**

IN RE:



APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v)  
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. section 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew

Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico. She was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more and seeking admission within ten years of her last departure. She is married to a United States citizen and has three U.S. citizen children. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).

The District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that the bar to her admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, her U.S. citizen spouse, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) on January 21, 2008.

On appeal, the applicant's spouse asserts that he is experiencing physical, financial and emotional hardship due to the applicant's inadmissibility. *Brief in Support of Appeal*, dated February 14, 2008.

The record includes, but is not limited to: a brief from the applicant's spouse; a statement from the applicant's spouse; copies of the applicant's children's birth certificates; a statement from [REDACTED] dated February 13, 2008; a statement from [REDACTED] dated February 13, 2008; a statement from [REDACTED] the applicant's spouse's employer, dated February 12, 2008; a statement from [REDACTED] dated February 11, 2008; a statement from [REDACTED] dated February 13, 2008; a statement from [REDACTED] dated February 8, 2008; a statement from [REDACTED] an acquaintance of the applicant, dated February 10, 2008; copy of a mortgage statement; copies of utility bills, bank statements, credit card bills and a loan statement; a copy of an inoculation record for the applicant's son; and copies of technical training certificates for the applicant's spouse.

The entire record was reviewed and all relevant evidence considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such

alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

The record indicates that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in July 1992 and remained until she departed in November 2006. Therefore, the applicant was unlawfully present in the United States for over a year from April 1, 1997, the effective date of the unlawful presence provision of the Act until November 2006. She is now seeking admission within ten years of his last departure from the United States. Accordingly, the applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides for a waiver of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) inadmissibility as follows:

The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established . . . that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and

not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

*Id.* See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The AAO will first examine hardship upon relocation. The applicant's spouse asserts that his children would suffer extreme hardship if they relocated to Mexico because they would be separated from him. *Brief from the applicant's spouse*, dated February 14, 2008. He explains that the applicant and their two younger children currently reside in Mexico while the older resides with him in the United States, and that he would not be able to relocate to Mexico with the applicant because he needs to remain in the United States to work.

As noted above, children are not qualifying relatives in this proceeding, and as such any impact on them is only related as it impacts the qualifying relative, in this case the applicant's spouse. There is no evidence in the record that the applicant's children will experience hardship to a degree that will indirectly result in extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse. The applicant's spouse has failed to articulate any other basis of hardship upon relocation, and as such the record fails to establish extreme hardship should he reside in Mexico.

With regard to hardship upon separation, the applicant's spouse asserts primarily that he will experience financial and emotional hardship should he remain in the United States without the applicant. Specifically, the applicant's spouse asserts that he has been experiencing depression since the departure of the applicant and his two youngest children, and that this has affected his health and his ability to work.

The record includes a statement from a social worker, [REDACTED] which states that the applicant's spouse is experiencing emotional hardship, financial hardship and physical hardship due to the applicant's inadmissibility. *Statement of [REDACTED]*, dated February 13, 2008. She asserts that his employment has suffered, that he has had to sell his house and that this type of separation from a parent can result in psychological damage to children.

There is a statement from the applicant's spouse's employer noting a change in his demeanor at work and stating that the applicant's inadmissibility has affected the applicant's spouse's performance. *Statement of [REDACTED]* dated February 12, 2008. Other statements in the record from schools, church members and acquaintances attest to the emotional hardship experienced by the applicant's spouse and children.

These statements support the assertion that the applicant's spouse is experiencing significant emotional hardship and as such this factor will be considered in an overall determination of extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse.

The applicant's spouse also asserts that he has Diabetes Mellitus Type 2 which requires a special diet, exercise and stress management that only the applicant can provide. The applicant's spouse asserts that the stress of their situation, including having to work additional hours to support his family, make it difficult to care for himself properly and is resulting in physical hardship to him. The record includes a letter from the applicant's spouse's treating physician noting the applicant's spouse has Diabetes Mellitus type 2 and that the applicant's spouse would be better served with his

family in the United States. This evidence is sufficient to support the assertion that the applicant's spouse is experiencing some physical hardship due to the applicant's inadmissibility.

The applicant's spouse also explains that he has been unable to maintain his financial obligations due to the absence of the applicant and has had to sell his home in order to support his family in Mexico.

The record contains a number of documents relating to the applicant's assertions, including bank statements, a copy of a mortgage activity statement, utility bills and other statements of financial obligation. While this documentation is sufficient to establish the applicant's spouse has significant financial obligations in the United States, there is no evidence of the applicant's spouse's yearly income. There is no evidence that the applicant's spouse has had to, or actually has, sold his home. Nor is there documentation that the applicant's spouse has been supporting her in Mexico. Although it is clear the applicant's spouse has financial obligations, without evidence of his income it cannot be determined what degree of financial impact he is experiencing or how it is distinct from the financial hardship commonly experienced by the relatives of inadmissible aliens who remain in the United States.

When the emotional and physical hardship factors are considered in the aggregate, they are sufficient to distinguish the hardship impacts on the applicant's spouse from those which are commonly experienced by the relatives of inadmissible aliens and as such rise to the level of extreme hardship.

Although the record indicates that the applicant's spouse would experience extreme hardship upon separation, it does not establish that he would experience extreme hardship upon relocation, and as such, the applicant has failed to meet her burden to show extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse as required under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.