


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



H6

FILE:



Office: MEXICO CITY


Date: FEB 11 2011

IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), and Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

filed a Form I-601. On November 21, 2006, the director denied Form I-485 and simultaneously denied the Form I-212 in the same decision.

On February 20, 2008, the Acting District Director denied the Form I-601, finding that the applicant accrued more than a year of unlawful presence and failed to demonstrate extreme hardship to her lawful permanent resident spouse. In the same decision, the director simultaneously denied the Form I-212, Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission Into the United States After Deportation or Removal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general.-Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

.....
(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

The applicant accrued unlawful presence from September 23, 1999, until October 31, 2000, when she filed for asylum. The applicant is attempting to seek admission into the United States within 10 years of her January 30, 2007, departure from the United States. The applicant is, therefore, inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for being unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides for a waiver of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) inadmissibility as follows:

The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established . . . that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996)

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec.

at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be

considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The applicant's spouse states that "[he] desperately want [his] wife and children to be with [him] so [they] can raise [their] children together;" that he wants his children to be educated in the United States; and, "[he] wish to be with his wife;" that he "loves [his] wife so deeply that [he] cannot comprehend a life without her." He states that he fears for his wife and children in Colombia due to the high crime rates and guerilla warfare there. The applicant states that "it has been extremely difficult for [her] husband to be so far from his children." Counsel states that the applicant's spouse sent the two children to Colombia with the applicant because he cannot work to support the family and take care of the children; that the applicant's spouse "has fallen in deep depression since his wife and children returned to Colombia." Counsel references medical letters pertaining to [REDACTED] the applicant's spouse, from [REDACTED], and from [REDACTED], both of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] states that the applicant's spouse has "feelings of helplessness and injustice." That, he "has constant fear and worry of not being able to protect his children and wife in a war torn country where guerilla warfare and crime are escalating. [REDACTED] concludes that "[REDACTED] and his entire family are depressed;" that, "His primary diagnosis is post-traumatic stress syndrome will never be cured. His only treatment is to be reunited with his wife and children who all need each other for survival. This separation is costing him emotionally, physically as well as financially."

[REDACTED], who indicates that he is [REDACTED] family practice doctor at [REDACTED] states that "[he] believe[s] the absence of [REDACTED] family has resulted in extreme hardship both mentally and physically for him;" that [the applicant's spouse] feels guilty and helpless because he cannot do anything to bring his family back together again." [REDACTED] also states that "[REDACTED] has no previous history of depression, but due to all of this he has had to seek the care of a psychiatrist ... and has been placed on medications;" that, "[REDACTED] is not sleeping and eating properly, and he has also suffered physically with a recent bout of gastrointestinal bleeding."

In a separate letter written on behalf of [REDACTED] two sisters who work as [REDACTED] medical assistants at the [REDACTED] describes financial and emotional hardships the two sisters endure and "watching their brother physically decline due to his inability to eat, sleep, or focus on anything other than the dismantling of his family." Also, in the record are several letters from family members and acquaintances, including [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]. These letters indicate that the applicant and her spouse have close bonds in the United States which have been broken due to the separation. The AAO notes, however, that the applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative, and hardship his sisters, relatives, and acquaintances experience will not be considered.

The AAO finds that the emotional impact described results in emotional hardship in the United States beyond what would normally be expected as a result of separation.

The applicant's husband further states that he cannot relocate to Colombia as he is from Nicaragua; that he fears that he, his wife and children will be victims of rampant criminal and terrorist groups who target United States citizens in Colombia. Counsel states that the applicant's spouse would experience financial hardship in Colombia because he will not be able to get comparable employment there; that the applicant's spouse's siblings and family are all in the United States and he does not have family in Colombia. As previously noted by the AAO, the applicant's children are not qualifying relatives for a waiver under section 212(i) of the Act and any hardship they suffer will not be considered except as it affects the applicant's spouse, the qualifying relative. In this case, however, the AAO finds that the hardship that the children will experience will cause hardship to the applicant's spouse as he will be concerned about their welfare, future, and safety in Colombia. The AAO also notes that recently the United States Department of State warned of dangers in Colombia. *See, United States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Washington, DC, Travel Warning, November 10, 2010.*

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has established that her spouse would suffer extreme emotional hardship were the applicant unable to reside in the United States. Moreover, it has been established that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship were he to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant. Accordingly, the AAO finds that the situation presented in this application rises to the level of extreme hardship. However, the grant or denial of the waiver does not turn only on the issue of the meaning of "extreme hardship." It also hinges on the discretion of the Secretary and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as she may by regulations prescribe.

The favorable factors in this matter are the hardships the applicant's United States citizen spouse and children would face if the applicant were to relocate abroad, regardless of whether they relocate to Colombia or remain in the United States, and the passage of more than 10 years since the applicant's entry to the United States. The unfavorable factor in this matter is the applicant's unlawful presence, in the United States. This negative factor, however, is not enough to outweigh the positive factors.

While the AAO does not condone the applicant's actions, the AAO finds that the hardship imposed on the applicant's spouse as a result of the applicant's inadmissibility outweighs the unfavorable factors in this application. Therefore, a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The applicant has sustained that burden. Accordingly, this appeal will be sustained and the application approved.

The AAO notes that the Acting District Director denied the applicant's Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States After Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) in the same decision. The Form I-212 was denied solely based on the denial of the Form I-601. As the AAO has now found the applicant eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under section Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, it will withdraw the Acting District Director's decision on the Form I-212 and render a new decision.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act states:

Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.-Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens' reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General [now, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security] has consented to the aliens' reapplying for admission.

On October 15, 2001 the applicant was ordered removed from the United States. As such, she is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act and must request permission to reapply for admission.

A grant of permission to reapply for admission is a discretionary decision based on the weighing of negative and positive factors. The AAO has found that the applicant warrants a favorable exercise of discretion related to the adjudication of the Form I-601. For the reasons stated in that finding, the AAO finds that the applicant's Form I-212 should also be granted as a matter of discretion.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained. The application is approved.