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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090  
**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**



H6

FILE:



Office: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO  
(PANAMA CITY, PANAMA)

Date: FEB 25 2011

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), and section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico. A subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The matter is now before the AAO on a motion to reconsider. The motion will be granted and the previous decisions of the district director and the AAO will be affirmed.

The applicant, a native and citizen of Colombia, was found inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for procuring admission and attempting to procure a visa and admission into the United States by fraud and/or willful misrepresentation. The applicant, therefore, seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i). In addition, the applicant was found inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking readmission within ten years of his last departure. The applicant, therefore, also seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).<sup>1</sup>

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on any qualifying relative and denied the Form I-601, Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated December 13, 2006. The AAO subsequently found that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), for accruing over one year of unlawful presence and then entering the United States without being admitted, and that as the applicant is statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant's spouse would experience extreme hardship or whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion. *AAO Decision*, dated March 19, 2009

The record includes, but is not limited to, counsel's motion to reconsider and statements from the applicant and her spouse. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act states, in pertinent part, the following:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act states, in pertinent part, the following:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General (Secretary), waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien

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<sup>1</sup> The applicant does not contest the district director's findings of inadmissibility.

lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General (Secretary) that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien....

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens: Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General (Secretary) that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien....

Regarding the applicant's ground of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), the record establishes that the applicant purchased falsified Colombian entry and exit stamps to mask previous unauthorized overstays in the United States. Due to the applicant's fraud and/or misrepresentation, she was granted admission to the United States. The applicant subsequently attempted to procure a visa and admission into the United States by presenting the same falsified entry and exit stamps. The applicant is therefore inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) for procuring admission and attempting to procure a visa and admission to the United States by fraud and/or willful misrepresentation.

Regarding the applicant's ground of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), the record establishes that the applicant entered the United States in

January 1998, presumably with permission to remain for six months. She remained without authorization until December 1999. In addition, the applicant re-entered the United States in April 2000, presumably with permission to remain for six months. She remained without authorization until December 2001. As the applicant had resided unlawfully in the United States for more than one year and then sought admission within ten years of her last departure on May 31, 2003, she is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

The AAO previously found the applicant to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), as further discussed below.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act states in pertinent part:

....  
(C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.-

(i) In general.-Any alien who-

(I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or

(II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other provision of law,

and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible.

Counsel states that the applicant did not reenter the United States without inspection, rather she was admitted by a U.S. official. *Motion to Reconsider*, dated April 15, 2009. The AAO finds counsel's contention to be correct. The applicant is not inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act as she was admitted to the United States. As such, the AAO will now determine whether the applicant is eligible for a waiver of her inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act and section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

A waiver of inadmissibility under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relatives in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

*Id.* See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign

country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. See *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. See *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; see also *U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. See, e.g., *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly

where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The first prong of the analysis addresses hardship to the applicant's spouse if he relocates to Colombia. The applicant's spouse states that there is no work for him in Colombia; Colombia has a very high crime rate; he fears for the health of his family in Colombia and the medical care in Colombia is vastly inferior to that of the United States; his daughter's educational prospects are grim in Colombia and she will not be able to catch up with her U.S. citizen peers when she returns to the United States; his stepdaughter is mildly mentally handicapped and severely physically handicapped, she is 13 years old with a the mental capacity of a 10 year old, she cannot move one side of her body, she has little to no opportunities to grow and learn in Colombia, special education is not a priority as it is in the United States and he is afraid that someone will hurt or discriminate against his stepdaughter because of her differences; and his daughter is confused and upset in Colombia. *Applicant's Spouse's Statement*, at 2-3, undated. The applicant's spouse states that there is a lot of violence and a lack of security in Colombia. *Applicant's Spouse's First Statement*, undated. The record does not include supporting documentary evidence for most of the applicant's spouse's claims. Going on record without supporting documentation will not meet the applicant's burden of proof in this proceeding. See *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). The AAO notes the November 10, 2010 U.S. Department of State Travel Warning for Colombia as evidence of general country conditions. However, the record does not include sufficient evidence of financial, medical, emotional or other types of hardship, which in their totality, establish that the applicant's spouse would experience extreme hardship if he joined the applicant in Colombia.

The second prong addresses hardship to the applicant's spouse upon remaining in the United States. The applicant's spouse states that he cannot separate his U.S. citizen daughter from her mother and sister; he would not be able to work as much living with his five year old daughter, as he would need to care for her after school; he would not be able to bring her to Colombia to visit her mother and sister very often due to the expense; he has to send money to his family in Colombia and support himself in the United States; he makes approximately \$1,000 a month; he sends at least half of his money to his family in Colombia; he has to borrow money to visit his family in Colombia; maintaining two households has become a nearly impossible financial burden; he is under constant stress that he will not have enough money to pay his bills or visit his family; and he has not been

able to keep a steady job due to his extended visits to Colombia. *Applicant's Spouse's Statement*, at 2. The applicant's spouse states that he feels depressed, anxious and worried every day; he misses his family and worries that they will be hurt as they are living alone in Colombia. *Applicant's Spouse's Statement*, at 2. The applicant's spouse provides that he is experiencing significant concern for the applicant, his daughter and his stepdaughter in Colombia due to the factors noted in the first prong of the analysis.

The record does not include supporting documentary evidence for most of the applicant's spouse's claims. The record does not include sufficient evidence of financial, medical, emotional or other types of hardship, which in their totality, establish that the applicant's spouse would experience extreme hardship if he remained in the United States.

The applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her spouse under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) and section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the previous decisions of the district director and the AAO will be affirmed.

**ORDER:** The previous decisions of the district director and the AAO are affirmed.