

identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

PUBLIC COPY



tt6

FILE: [REDACTED] Office: VIENNA, AUSTRIA Date: MAR 24 2011

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) and § 1182(i)


ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer-in-Charge, Vienna, Austria. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Albania who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and again seeking admission within ten years of her last departure from the United States. She was also found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having attempted to procure admission to the United States through fraud or misrepresentation. The applicant is married to a lawful permanent resident. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with her spouse and family.

In a decision dated July 2, 2008, the Officer-in-Charge found that the applicant failed to establish that her qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship as a consequence of her inadmissibility. The application was denied accordingly. *See Decision of the Officer-in-Charge* dated July 2, 2008.

The record shows that the applicant was convicted of Retail Fraud in the Third Degree in District Court, Michigan on November 10, 2003. The Officer-in-Charge did not address whether or not this conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude rendering the applicant inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. Nevertheless, because the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act and demonstrating eligibility for a waiver under section 212(i) also satisfies the requirements for a waiver of criminal grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the AAO will not determine whether the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act.

On appeal, the qualifying spouse submitted a letter, asserting that he is encountering emotional, medical and financial hardships as a result of his separation from the applicant.

The record contains an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130), an Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601), a Notice of Appeal (Form I-290B), letters from the qualifying spouse, a medical document regarding the qualifying spouse, a bank statement for the qualifying spouse's savings account, a certified disposition for the applicant's conviction, the qualifying spouse's permanent resident card, the United States passports for the applicant and qualifying spouse's daughter and her family, birth certificates and a marriage certificate.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides for a waiver of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) inadmissibility as follows:

The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established . . . that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides:

(1) The [Secretary] may, in the discretion of the [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under sections 212(i) and 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or his child can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's husband is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-*

Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. See *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. See *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; see also *U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. See, e.g., *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The record indicates that the applicant entered the United States in August 2002 with a tourist visa and remained in the United States until February 2005 when she voluntarily departed. The applicant overstayed her visa for a period in excess of one year. In applying for an immigrant visa, the applicant is seeking admission within ten years of her departure from the United States. In addition, USCIS records reflect that the applicant attempted to enter the United States on November 14, 2005 with a visa that she procured through fraud. It was determined at the port of entry that the applicant concealed her previous overstay and larceny conviction in order to obtain a new visa. The applicant has not disputed her inadmissibility. Therefore, as a result of the applicant's unlawful presence and prior misrepresentation, she is inadmissible to the United States under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) and 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act.

The applicant's qualifying relative in this case is her husband, who is a lawful permanent resident. A waiver of the bar to admission under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative of the applicant. The AAO notes that extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse must be established in the event that he relocates to Albania and in the event that he remains in the United States, as he is not required to reside outside the United States based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request. The AAO will consider the relevant factors in adjudication of this case.

The documentation submitted relating to the potential hardships facing the applicant's spouse includes letters from the qualifying spouse, a medical document regarding the qualifying spouse, a bank statement for the qualifying spouse's savings account and copies of United States passports for the applicant's daughter and her family.

As previously stated, the qualifying spouse asserted that he is encountering emotional, medical and financial hardships as a result of his separation from the applicant.

The applicant must first establish that her qualifying spouse would suffer extreme hardship were he to remain in the United States while the applicant resides in Albania due to her inadmissibility. With respect to this criterion, the qualifying spouse contends that he is suffering emotional, medical and financial hardships due to his separation from the applicant. The record contains letters from the qualifying spouse stating that he feels "devastated without her," "hopeless," and without "the energy to go on." However, the qualifying spouse's letters failed to demonstrate that his emotional issues

are unusual and not ordinary consequences of removal. With regard to the qualifying spouse's medical hardships, the record contains a medical document from a doctor in Albania indicating that the qualifying spouse has been under "medical treatment and control at the cardiology department of this health department." The document also indicates that the applicant's spouse has been diagnosed with "Syndrome Wolf-Parkinson White, Fibrillation Afrial." However, the qualifying spouse has been a permanent resident since 2007, and has presumably lived in the United States during that period of time. There is no explanation as to whether he is currently undergoing treatment in the United States for his health issues. Further, the letter from the clinic in Albania contains no further detail concerning the severity and nature of the condition or the prognosis. Absent a current explanation in plain language from the treating physician of the exact nature and severity of any condition and a description of any treatment or family assistance needed, the AAO is not in the position to reach conclusions concerning the severity of a medical condition or the treatment needed, and whether such condition poses an extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse due to his separation from the applicant. Lastly, the qualifying spouse asserts that he cannot work and needs his wife to provide for him financially. The record contains a bank statement for the qualifying spouse's savings account indicating his balance. However, the record does not contain any documentary proof of the qualifying spouse's current income or expenses, such as tax returns or expenses. Although the distress caused by separation from one's spouse is not in question, a waiver of inadmissibility is only available where the resulting hardship would be unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon removal. As such, the applicant has not met her burden in showing that the qualifying spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he remained in the United States without her.

Likewise, the AAO finds that the applicant has not met her burden of showing that her spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he relocated to Albania. If the applicant's spouse relocated to Albania, he would no longer experience the emotional hardships associated with separation or bear the financial obligation of supporting himself without the applicant's assistance. It appears the qualifying spouse has close family ties in the United States, including his daughter and grandchild. However, the applicant does not address whether the qualifying spouse also has family in Albania, where he has lived for most of his life. Further, while there is evidence that the applicant's spouse may have health conditions, there is no evidence that he cannot receive and/or afford treatment in Albania as he did prior to moving to the United States. Accordingly, the record does not demonstrate that relocation to Albania would cause extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse.

In sum, although the record indicates that the applicant's spouse may be encountering hardships based on separation, it does not support a finding that the difficulties, considered in the aggregate, would rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. *See Perez*, 96 F.3d at 392; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631. Although the distress caused by separation from one's spouse is not in question, a waiver of inadmissibility is only available where the resulting hardship would be unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon removal. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her spouse, as required for a waiver of inadmissibility under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Act. As the applicant has not established extreme hardship to a qualifying family

member, no purpose would be served in determining whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under sections 212(a)(9)(B) and 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.