


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

PUBLIC COPY



HL6

Date: **SEP 16 2011**

Office: CIUDAD JUAREZ

FILE: 

IN RE: Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,



Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without authorization in September 2003 and did not depart the United States until November 2007. The applicant was thus found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant does not contest this finding of inadmissibility. Rather, she seeks a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse.

The field office director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Ground of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated January 20, 2009.

On appeal, the applicant's attorney contends in the Notice of Appeal (Form I-290B) that USCIS made an error of law in stating that "[a]s children are not qualifying members, possible hardships to the children are off point," and referenced section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) and *Matter of Recinas*, 23 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2002) to support the contention that USCIS made an error of law. The applicant's attorney also asserted that USCIS made an error of law by not giving full consideration to the hardship suffered by the qualifying spouse due to the separation from his family, referencing the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in *Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1998).

The record contains the following documentation: a declaration by the applicant's spouse, dated February 19, 2009, and a letter from the applicant's attorney, dated March 20, 2009. Additional documentation submitted with the Form I-601 included a letter verifying the applicant's spouse's employment in the United States, financial reports related to a home loan, medical reports for the applicant's children in Spanish, and an insurance claim report for the applicant's medical treatment in the United States in September 2007 (related to the birth of the applicant's second child). The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks

admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General (Secretary) that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien...

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec.

880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. See *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); but see *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The applicant’s attorney contends that USCIS made an error of law in stating that “children are not qualifying members,” and cites *Matter of Recinas*, 23 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2002), in support of this assertion. *Letter from Counsel* dated March 20, 2009. However, *Matter of Recinas* involved an application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Act, in which U.S. Citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident children are qualifying relatives. The applicant in the present case is seeking a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, which states that the Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Under this provision of the law, children are not deemed to be “qualifying relatives.” However, although children are not qualifying relatives under this statute, USCIS does consider that a child’s hardship can be a factor in the determination whether a qualifying relative experiences extreme hardship.

The applicant’s attorney asserts that USCIS made an error of law by not giving full consideration to the hardship suffered by the qualifying spouse due to the separation from his family, referencing the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in *Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1998). *Letter from Counsel*, dated March 20, 2009. Counsel further states that the separation is causing the

applicant's husband great psychological trauma, he is suffering from severe depression and sleep deprivation, and he is unable to eat because of the pain caused by separation from his wife. *Letter from Counsel* dated March 20, 2009. The applicant's husband states that he is severely depressed and is "an emotional wreck" without the applicant and their children, and further states that his children have had great difficulty adjusting to life in Mexico, his daughter suffers from enuresis, and his son suffers from asthma. *Declaration of* [REDACTED] dated February 19, 2009. The record contains no supporting evidence concerning the emotional hardship the applicant's spouse states that he is experiencing due to long-term separation from his spouse. Further, although the record includes documents in Spanish concerning the medical conditions of the children, these documents have not been translated and therefore cannot be considered.¹ Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Although the depth of the applicant's husband's concern and anxiety over separation from the applicant is neither doubted nor minimized, the fact remains that Congress provided for a waiver of inadmissibility only under limited circumstances. While the prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families, in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists.

The applicant's attorney also contends that the applicant's spouse is suffering from financial hardship due to the separation. *Letter from Counsel* dated March 20, 2009, and *Declaration of* [REDACTED] dated February 19, 2009. The record contains no supporting evidence concerning the financial hardship the applicant's spouse is experiencing. The record indicates that the applicant's spouse has been gainfully employed with [REDACTED] Inc. since 1997, and although documentation of his home mortgage and other expenses have been submitted, there is no indication that he is unable to meet his financial obligations in the applicant's absence.

The applicant's spouse states that it would be a hardship for him to relocate to Mexico because life in Mexico is very difficult, and that life will be more poverty ridden than when he left Mexico because economic conditions have gotten worse. *Declaration of* [REDACTED] dated February 19, 2009. Courts considering the impact of financial detriment on a finding of extreme hardship have repeatedly held that, while it must be considered in the overall determination, "[e]conomic disadvantage alone does not constitute "extreme hardship." *Ramirez-Durazo v. INS*, 794 F.2d 491, 497 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that "lower standard of living in Mexico and the difficulties of readjustment to that culture and environment . . . simply are not sufficient."). There is no evidence

¹ See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(3), which states:

(3) Translations. Any document containing foreign language submitted to the Service [now Citizenship and Immigration Services] shall be accompanied by a full English language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator's certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English.

in the record to support that applicant's spouse's contention that he will be unable to sustain himself and his family should he return to Mexico. Further, the applicant has not addressed whether he has family ties in Mexico, and the AAO is thus unable to ascertain whether and to what the extent he would receive assistance from family members for both himself and his spouse.

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse will face extreme hardship if the applicant is unable to reside in the United States. Rather, the record demonstrates that he will face no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States and/or refused admission. Although the AAO is not insensitive to the applicant's spouse's situation, the record does not establish that the hardship he would face rises to the level of "extreme" as contemplated by statute and case law.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.