



(b)(6)


U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090  
**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**



Date: **APR 05 2013**


Office: PANAMA CITY

FILE: 

IN RE: Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

for

Ron Rosenberg  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Panama City, Panama and a subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The matter is now before the AAO on motion. The motion will be granted and the underlying application remains denied.

The record establishes that the applicant is a native and citizen of Colombia who entered the United States with a valid nonimmigrant visa in July 2001. She remained beyond the period of authorized stay. The applicant did not depart the United States until August 2007. The applicant was thus found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant does not contest this finding of inadmissibility. Rather, she seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse and child, born in 2009.

The field office director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated April 22, 2010.

On appeal, the AAO determined that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative. The appeal was subsequently dismissed. *Decision of the AAO*, dated July 13, 2012.

In support of the motion, counsel submits a duplicate of items sent to the AAO on July 4, 2012, more than two years after the appeal filing, in support of extreme hardship to the applicant. Said documentation includes a statement from the applicant's spouse, evidence of the applicant's daughter's U.S. citizenship and a letter from the director of the applicant's child's school. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General (Secretary) that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien...

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. Hardship to the applicant or the child can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. See *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); but see *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

On appeal, the AAO noted that counsel had failed to establish that the applicant’s spouse was experiencing emotional hardship beyond others who are in the same situation based on long-term separation from his wife. Moreover, the AAO stated that the applicant had failed to establish that her daughter was experiencing extreme hardship as a result of long-term separation from her mother. Finally, regarding the financial hardship referenced, the AAO concluded that counsel had not provided any documentation on appeal establishing the applicant’s and her spouse’s current financial situation, including income and expenses assets and liabilities, to support the assertion that as a result of his wife’s absence, the applicant’s spouse was suffering financial hardship or career disruption. *Supra* at 4-5.

On motion, counsel submits a statement from the applicant's spouse. In said statement, the applicant’s spouse details that he owns a landscaping company and being primary caregiver and provider to his young daughter while maintaining his business is causing him hardship. Further, the applicant's spouse explains that his daughter has become ill frequently and when she is ill, he has to stay away from work and his absence from his business has had a significant negative impact on his business. Finally, the applicant's spouse maintains that he is now both the father and the mother to his child and the child needs her mother by her side. *Additional Statement from Miguel Velasquez*, dated July 3, 2012. Counsel, on motion, further notes that the applicant's spouse is suffering

immensely knowing that his wife is experiencing emotional difficulties abroad. *See Form I-290B*, dated August 1, 2012.

To begin, no supporting documentation has been provided establishing the existence of the applicant's spouse's business, its obligations and the applicant's spouse's specific role and duties, to establish that maintaining his business while being primary caregiver to his child is causing him extreme hardship. Nor has any supporting documentation been provided establishing the emotional hardship the applicant's spouse is experiencing as a result of his daughter being raised without her mother's daily presence. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Moreover, although a letter has been provided from the applicant's daughter's school director expressing hope that the applicant will be reunited with her daughter, the documentation fails to establish the specific hardships the applicant's daughter is experiencing as a result of long-term separation from her mother. As noted by the director, the applicant's daughter is "very well-behaved and smart..." *Letter from* [REDACTED] dated June 29, 2012. Further, with respect to the applicant's daughter's frequent illnesses and hospitalizations, as noted by the AAO when it dismissed the appeal, the only medical documentation pertaining to the applicant's daughter is from August 2011 when she was diagnosed with a cold and was prescribed medication. Finally, with respect to counsel's assertion that the applicant's spouse is experiencing hardship knowing that his wife is experiencing emotional difficulties while in Colombia, the AAO notes that the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). The AAO recognizes that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse will endure some hardship as a result of long-term separation from the applicant. However, his situation, if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record.

With respect to relocating abroad to reside with his wife due to her inadmissibility, the AAO concluded that it had been established that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship were he to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant due to her inadmissibility. As such, this criterion will not be re-addressed on motion.

We can find extreme hardship warranting a waiver of inadmissibility only where an applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to a qualifying relative in the scenario of separation *and* the scenario of relocation. A claim that a qualifying relative will relocate and thereby suffer extreme hardship can easily be made for purposes of the waiver even where there is no actual intention to relocate. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 886 (BIA 1994). Furthermore, to relocate and suffer extreme hardship, where remaining in the United States and being separated from the applicant would not result in extreme hardship, is a matter of choice and not the result of inadmissibility. *Id.*, also *cf. Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996). As the applicant has not demonstrated extreme

hardship from separation, we cannot find that refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse in this case.

On motion, the record does not support a finding that the applicant's spouse will face extreme hardship if the applicant is unable to reside in the United States. Rather, the record demonstrates that he will face no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States or is refused admission. There is no documentation establishing that the applicant's spouse's hardships are any different from other families separated as a result of immigration violations. Although the AAO is not insensitive to the applicant's spouse's situation, the record does not establish that the hardships he would face rise to the level of "extreme" as contemplated by statute and case law.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Accordingly, the motion will be granted and the underlying application remains denied.

**ORDER:** The motion to reopen will be granted and the underlying application remains denied.