


(b)(6)

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090





U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services



Date: **APR 17 2013**


Office: PANAMA CITY

FILE: 

IN RE: Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B), and Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Do not file any motion directly with the AAO. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Panama City, Panama. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Venezuela who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and again seeking admission within ten years of his last departure from the United States, and under section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A), as an alien previously removed from the United States. The applicant entered the United States in May 2000 as a visitor, but remained beyond his authorized period of stay, was denied asylum, and was removed in 2009. The applicant is the spouse of a United States citizen. He seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with his wife.

The Field Office Director found that the applicant failed to establish that his qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship as a consequence of his inadmissibility. The application was denied accordingly. *See Decision of the Field Office Director* dated July 12, 2012.

On appeal counsel for the applicant asserts that the Service erred in denying the applicant's waiver application. With the appeal counsel submits a brief in support of the applicant's waiver application. The record also contains a statement from the applicant's spouse and brother. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

**(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-**

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

.....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides for a waiver of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) inadmissibility as follows:

The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is

established . . . that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act states:

Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.-Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens' reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General [now, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security] has consented to the aliens' reapplying for admission.

The record reflects that the applicant entered the United States on May 25, 2000, as a visitor with authorization to remain until November 24, 2000. The applicant remained beyond that date, accruing unlawful presence until applying for asylum in December 2003. That application was denied by an Immigration Judge in June 2004 and the applicant given until August 2004 to voluntarily depart the United States. An appeal of that decision was denied by the Board of Immigration Appeals in September 2005 and the applicant given 60 days to voluntarily depart the United States. Subsequent motions filed with the BIA were denied in June and August 2006. The applicant failed to depart the United States and was then removed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement in October 2009. As such, he is inadmissible under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) and 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S.

citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. The applicant's wife is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to

speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

On appeal counsel asserts the Service did not give sufficient weight to conditions in Venezuela and concerns for the safety of the applicant's spouse as the country is explosive with human rights problems and anti-American sentiments. Counsel states the cumulative effect of emotional and financial hardship as stated by the applicant's spouse rises to the level of extreme.

In her declaration the applicant's spouse states she is suffering hardship since the applicant was deported. She states that as a single parent she struggles to afford daycare and basic needs. She states she cannot raise a child alone and her son has stopped attending an early childhood center and extra activities. She asserts the separation is devastating emotionally for the family as her son and the applicant had a deep bond. She states that she has moved in with a brother-in-law because it was difficult with only one income to keep up with expenses. She fears if she relocates to Venezuela it would be a life-threatening risk to her and her son because crime is pervasive and there is a threat of kidnapping. She cites warnings to U.S. citizens. She states the Venezuelan government wants a socialist model, which has caused demonstrations, murders, violence, and anti-U.S. sentiment, and she asserts that schools indoctrinate children into socialist values. She further contends there is limited access to public education while private schools are expensive. She contends that in Venezuela preventative healthcare is limited, there is no medical insurance, and she could not access a comparable level of medical expertise as in United States. She also asserts that the risk of infectious diseases is high and she fears becoming pregnant there because of high infant mortality rates. The spouse further asserts that she would need to leave her job in the United States to relocate to Venezuela where there is high unemployment and poverty.

The applicant's brother states that the applicant's spouse and son have moved in with him for financial reasons as the spouse could not keep up with expenses. He asserts that since the applicant's departure it is difficult for his son to understand losing his father, home and school.

The AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish that his qualifying spouse will suffer extreme hardship as a consequence of being separated from the applicant. Counsel and the applicant's spouse contend the spouse experiences emotional hardships, but the record contains no detail or supporting evidence concerning the emotional hardships the applicant's spouse states she is experiencing or how such hardships are outside the ordinary consequences of removal. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence generally is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

Counsel and the applicant's spouse also cite financial hardship, but submitted no evidence to document such hardship. Nor has any documentation been submitted establishing the applicant's spouse's current income, expenses, assets, liabilities, and overall financial situation, or the applicant's previous financial contributions, to establish that without the applicant's physical presence in the United States the applicant's spouse will experience financial hardship. Courts considering the impact of financial detriment on a finding of extreme hardship have repeatedly held that, while it must be considered in the overall determination, "[e]conomic disadvantage alone does not constitute "extreme hardship." *Ramirez-Durazo v. INS*, 794 F.2d 491, 497 (9th Cir. 1986).

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse will endure hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. However, her situation if she remains in the United States is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. The difficulties that the applicant's spouse would face as a result of her separation from the applicant, even when considered in the aggregate, do not rise to the level of extreme as contemplated by statute and case law.

The applicant also has failed to establish that his spouse would experience extreme hardship if she were to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant. The applicant's spouse cites crime, unemployment, poor quality education, limited health care, and anti-American sentiment in Venezuela. The applicant submitted no country information and the reports described by the applicant's spouse give generalized conditions in Venezuela, where the spouse was born. The record does not indicate how conditions specifically affect the applicant's spouse. The submitted country conditions information fails to establish that the applicant's spouse would be at the risk she fears. Thus, the record does not document this hardship.

The record contains references to hardship the applicant's child would experience if the waiver application were denied. It is noted that Congress did not include hardship to an alien's children as a factor to be considered in assessing extreme hardship under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v)) of the Act. In the present case, the applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative for the waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v)) of the Act, and hardship to the applicant's child will not be separately considered, except as it may affect the applicant's spouse. Here the evidence is insufficient to establish that any difficulty for the applicant's child creates hardship for the spouse rising to the level of extreme.

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse will face extreme hardship if the applicant is unable to reside in the United States. Rather, the record demonstrates that she will face no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States. Although the AAO is not insensitive to the situation of the applicant's spouse, the record does not establish that the hardship she would face rises to the level of "extreme" as contemplated by statute and case law.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

The AAO notes that the Field Office Director denied the applicant's Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) in the same decision. *Matter of Martinez-Torres*, 10 I&N Dec. 776 (reg. Comm. 1964) held that an application for permission to reapply for admission is denied, in the exercise of discretion, to an alien who is mandatorily inadmissible to the United States under another section of the Act, and no purpose would be served in granting the application. As the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act no purpose would be served in granting the applicant's Form I-212.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.