

(b)(6)

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090
**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**



Date: **FEB 08 2013** Office: ROME, ITALY FILE:

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank You,

Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Rome, Italy. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Spain who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant is married to a U.S. citizen and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act in order to reside with her husband and children in the United States.

The field office director found that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant contends that her husband has lived in the United States for twenty-three years and supports their family with his union job. According to counsel, the couple's daughter has special needs and their son is in college.

The record contains, *inter alia*: letters from the applicant's husband, [REDACTED]; a letter from the couple's daughter's school; a letter from [REDACTED] employer; letters of support; letters from the couple's children; copies of photographs of the applicant and her family; and an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130). The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) In General - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who -

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien

would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

In this case, the record shows, and the applicant does not contest, that she entered the United States in August 1989 as a visitor for pleasure and remained beyond her authorized stay until her departure in June 2008. The applicant accrued unlawful presence from April 1, 1997, the date of enactment of unlawful presence provisions under the Act, until her departure from the United States in June 2008. The applicant accrued eleven years of unlawful presence. Accordingly, she is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for being unlawfully present in the United States for a period of one year or more and seeking admission to the United States within ten years of her last departure.

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one’s present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm’r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the

combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. See *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); but see *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

In this case, the applicant’s husband, [REDACTED] states that he and the couple’s two children have been depressed since being separated from the applicant the past two years. He contends that the couple’s daughter, [REDACTED] missed her mother so much that she went to live with her in Spain. However, after spending a year in school in Spain, [REDACTED] could not understand Spanish enough to keep up with school and returned to the United States to attend summer school. According to [REDACTED] has special education needs that could not be addressed in Spain. Furthermore, [REDACTED] states he cannot live in Spain with his wife because he has to work and pay for the house and allow his children to finish their education. He states he has lived in the United States for the last twenty-three years and would lose his pension benefits if he left his job.

After a careful review of the record, the AAO finds that if [REDACTED] returned to Spain to avoid the hardship of separation, he would experience extreme hardship. The AAO recognizes his contention that he has lived in the United States for more than twenty-three years, almost his entire adult life, and a letter from his employer shows he has worked for the same company for more than eleven years. The AAO acknowledges that relocating to Spain would mean leaving his stable employment and all of the benefits associated with it. In addition, the record contains a letter from [REDACTED] school corroborating [REDACTED] contentions that [REDACTED] withdrew from school to go to Spain to be with her mother and that [REDACTED] has special education needs. According to the Assistant Principal, [REDACTED] is a Special Education student and her learning disability is a language processing deficit. The Assistant Principal states that [REDACTED] is at a disadvantage with English language instruction and is not able to function at all in a Spanish speaking classroom. Therefore, if [REDACTED] returned to Spain to be with his wife, their daughter would be unable to function in school. Considering these unique circumstances cumulatively, the AAO finds that the hardship [REDACTED] would experience if he returned to Spain is extreme, going beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with inadmissibility.

Nonetheless, [REDACTED] has the option of staying in the United States and the record does not show that he has experienced or will experience extreme hardship if he remains in the United States. If [REDACTED] decides to stay in the United States, their situation is typical of individuals separated as a result of inadmissibility or exclusion and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. With respect to [REDACTED] emotional hardship, although the AAO is sympathetic to the family's circumstances, the record does not show that the applicant's situation is unique or atypical compared to other individuals in similar circumstances. *See Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defining extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected). To the extent the record contains letters from the couple's two children, who are currently eighteen and twenty years old, stating they miss their mother, the only qualifying relative in this case is [REDACTED]. The record does not show that any emotional hardship the children are experiencing causes extreme, atypical, or unique hardship to [REDACTED]. Even considering all of these factors cumulatively, there is insufficient evidence showing that the hardship the applicant's husband has experienced or will experience amounts to extreme hardship.

We can find extreme hardship warranting a waiver of inadmissibility only where an applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to a qualifying relative in the scenario of separation and the scenario of relocation. A claim that a qualifying relative will relocate and thereby suffer extreme hardship can easily be made for purposes of the waiver even where there is no actual intention to relocate. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 886 (BIA 1994). Furthermore, to relocate and suffer extreme hardship, where remaining in the United States and being separated from the applicant would not result in extreme hardship, is a matter of choice and not the result of inadmissibility. *Id.*, also *cf. Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996). As the applicant has not demonstrated extreme hardship from separation, we cannot find that refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to Mr. Blanco, the qualifying relative in this case.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's husband caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.