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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090
**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**



Date: **JUN 18 2013** Office: SAN SALVADOR FILE:

IN RE:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) and Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Form I-601, Application for Waiver of Ground of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) and the Form I-212, Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission Into the United States After Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) were concurrently denied by the Field Office Director, San Salvador, El Salvador, and are now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of El Salvador who entered the United States without authorization in July 2002. In January 2003, the applicant was granted voluntary departure on or before May 27, 2003 with an alternate order of removal. *See Order of the Immigration Judge*, dated January 27, 2003. The applicant did not depart pursuant to the voluntary departure order. The applicant was removed on August 19, 2010. The applicant was thus found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year, and under section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii), as an alien previously removed. The applicant does not contest these findings of inadmissibility. Rather, she seeks a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to reside in the United States with his U.S. citizen spouse and children, born in 2006 and 2011. In addition, the applicant seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii).

The field office director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative. The field office director further noted that approving the Form I-212 would serve no purpose as the Form I-601 was being denied. As such, the I-212 was denied as a matter of discretion concurrently with the Form I-601. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated August 1, 2012.

On appeal, the applicant submits the following: a letter from the applicant's spouse; a letter and translation from a psychologist in El Salvador concerning the applicant's spouse; and financial documentation. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(A) Certain alien previously removed.-

(i) Arriving aliens.-Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(b)(6)

(ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens' reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General [now, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security] has consented to the aliens' reapplying for admission.

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien...

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S.

citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. Hardship to the applicant can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a

result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse contends that she will suffer hardship were she to return to the United States to reside while the applicant remains abroad due to his inadmissibility. In a declaration the applicant's spouse states that were she to be separated from her husband on a long-term basis, she would experience emotional hardship. In addition, the applicant's spouse asserts that she does not want to separate her son, born in 2011, from his father as such a separation would cause her hardship. She notes that her father left her when she was one year old to go to the United States and she knows how hard it is to experience the absence of a parent and she does not want her son to experience the same hardship. Finally, the applicant's spouse contends that were she to return to the United States, she would not be able to be a caregiver and financial provider to her son. *Letter from*

The record does not contain supporting evidence concerning the emotional hardship the applicant's spouse states she and her child would experience were they to return to the United States to reside while the applicant remained abroad due to his inadmissibility. The AAO notes that the letter provided by the applicant's spouse's psychologist references the applicant's spouse's symptoms of anxiety and severe depression while she is residing in El Salvador. Nor has it been established that the applicant's spouse is unable to travel to El Salvador, her home country, on a regular basis to visit her husband. Furthermore, no documentation has been provided establishing that settling back in the United States and providing for herself and her child would cause the applicant's spouse hardship. The AAO notes that the applicant's spouse has a support network, including her father who has been financially assisting her and her family while they reside in El Salvador. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse will endure hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. However, her situation, if she returns to the United States to reside, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal or inadmissibility and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record.

In regards to relocating abroad to reside with the applicant due to his inadmissibility, the record establishes that the applicant's spouse has been residing with the applicant in El Salvador. The applicant's spouse contends that living with her husband and son in El Salvador is causing her anxiety and distress. She further notes that she and her husband are barely making ends meet and are relying on her father in the United States to provide financial support. In addition, the applicant's spouse asserts that she wishes to continue her education in the United States to improve her future. Finally, the applicant's spouse references the problematic situation in El Salvador, including gang violence and disease. *Supra* at 3-7.

In support, a letter has been provided establishing that the applicant's spouse has been participating in multiple therapeutic sessions for her anxiety and depression. *See Letter and Translation from* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition, documentation has been provided establishing that the applicant's spouse's father is sending money to El Salvador to help support his daughter and her family. Further, the record establishes that the applicant's spouse has been residing in the United States since her teen years and has a support network in the United States. Finally, the AAO notes that a Travel Warning has been issued for El Salvador, noting that El Salvador has the second highest murder rate in the world. *Travel Warning-El Salvador, U.S. Department of State*, dated January 23, 2013. It has thus been established that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship were she to remain abroad with the applicant due to his inadmissibility.

We can find extreme hardship warranting a waiver of inadmissibility only where an applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to a qualifying relative in the scenario of separation *and* the scenario of relocation. A claim that a qualifying relative will relocate and thereby suffer extreme hardship can easily be made for purposes of the waiver even where there is no actual intention to relocate. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 886 (BIA 1994). Furthermore, to relocate and suffer extreme hardship, where remaining in the United States and being separated from the applicant would not result in extreme hardship, is a matter of choice and not the result of inadmissibility. *Id.*, also *cf. Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996). As the applicant has not demonstrated extreme hardship from separation, we cannot find that refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to the qualifying relative in this case.

The record, reviewed in its entirety, does not support a finding that the applicant's spouse will face extreme hardship if the applicant is unable to reside in the United States. Rather, the record demonstrates that she will face no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States or is refused admission. There is no documentation establishing that the applicant's spouse's hardships are any different from other families separated as a result of immigration violations. Although the AAO is not insensitive to the applicant's spouse's situation, the record does not establish that the hardships she would face rise to the level of "extreme" as contemplated by statute and case law.

As noted above, the field office director concurrently denied the applicant's Form I-212 and Form I-601. *Matter of Martinez-Torres*, 10 I&N Dec. 776 (reg. Comm. 1964) held that an application for permission to reapply for admission is denied, in the exercise of discretion, to an alien who is

(b)(6)

Page 7

mandatorily inadmissible to the United States under another section of the Act, and no purpose would be served in granting the application. As the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) and is not eligible for a waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act no purpose would be served in granting the applicant's Form I-212.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.