



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


U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services



Date: **SEP 29 2014** Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

FILE: 

IN RE: Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(v), and section 212(d)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case.

This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or policy to your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 days of the date of this decision. **Please review the Form I-290B instructions at <http://www.uscis.gov/forms> for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements.** See also 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file a motion directly with the AAO.**

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ron Rosenberg".

Ron Rosenberg  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico. She was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more and seeking admission within ten years of her last departure, and section 212(a)(6)(E) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E) for having assisted her alien children to enter the United States. She is married to a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR). She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), and section 212(d)(11) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11).

The Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that the bar to her admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, her LPR spouse, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) on February 19, 2014.

On appeal, the applicant's spouse states that he has been diagnosed with a severe form of diabetes and needs his spouse to help him control his condition and to provide psychological and emotional support.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

Section 212(a)(6) of the Act states, in relevant part:

(E) Smugglers.-

(i) In general.-Any alien who at any time knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law is inadmissible.

(ii) Special rule in the case of family reunification.-Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of alien who is an eligible immigrant (as defined in section 301(b)(1) of the Immigration Act of 1990), was physically present in the United States on May 5, 1988, and is seeking admission as an immediate

relative or under section 203(a)(2) (including under section 112 of the Immigration Act of 1990) or benefits under section 301(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990 if the alien, before May 5, 1988, has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only the alien's spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual) to enter the United States in violation of law.

(iii) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (d)(11).

A conviction for smuggling is not necessary to render an alien inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(E) of the Act. *In Re Ruiz-Romero*, 22 I&N Dec. 486, 490 (BIA 1999)(reasoning that the title of the section was non-substantive, and did not describe the full extent of activities that may be regarded as "alien smuggling" or "related to alien smuggling," and were intended to describe activities which would suffice, even in the absence of a conviction, to exclude or deport an alien).

The record establishes that during an immigrant visa interview the applicant admitted to entering the United States without inspection in 2002 with her two children. She resided in the United States until she departed in 2008. Therefore, the applicant was unlawfully present in the United States for over a year from 2002 until 2008, and is now seeking admission within ten years of her last departure from the United States. Accordingly, the applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act. The applicant does not contest this finding. In addition, based on the fact that she assisted her two children to enter without inspection the Director found her inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(E) of the Act. The applicant did not contest this finding on appeal.

Section 212(d)(11) states, in relevant part:

(11) The Attorney General may, in his discretion for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest, waive application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(E) in the case of any alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of removal, and who is otherwise admissible to the United States as a returning resident under section 211(b) and in the case of an alien seeking admission or adjustment of status as an immediate relative or immigrant under section 203(a) (other than paragraph (4) thereof), if the alien has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only an individual who at the time of the offense was the alien's spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual) to enter the United States in violation of law.

Before exercising favorable discretion under section 212(d)(11), it must be determined that the applicant warrants a waiver based on extreme hardship to a qualifying relative under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v).

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides for a waiver of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) inadmissibility as follows:

The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established . . . that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one’s present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm’r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The entire record was reviewed and all relevant evidence considered in rendering this decision.

The applicant previously submitted a number of statements that were in Spanish. A Request for Evidence was sent to the applicant requesting additional evidence and translated copies of the previously submitted letters. The applicant did not submit any translated versions of the submitted statements. The regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3) require that any document containing foreign language submitted to USCIS be accompanied by a full English language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator's certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English. As such, we are unable to consider them for evidentiary purposes in this proceeding.

The applicant's spouse states on appeal that he has been diagnosed with a Diabetes Mellitus 2 and is having difficulty dealing with the ailment. He states that he needs the applicant in the United States to assist him financially and psychologically.

The record contains a statement from the [REDACTED] stating that the applicant is a patient of the clinic and that he was diagnosed with DMII and is under treatment. This statement is not sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant's spouse is unable to take care of himself, or that the applicant's absence has affected his ability to take care of himself.

With regard to financial hardship, the record contains a number of wire transfer receipts. The receipts are in Spanish, however, as noted above, we cannot consider them without a translation. There is no other statement or evidence which articulates how the applicant's spouse is unable to meet his financial obligations, or what his monthly financial obligations are and why his income is insufficient to meet his obligations. Without this information the record is not sufficiently documented to establish the degree of financial impact on the applicant's spouse or the extent that he would experience any financial hardship.

The record does not contain any other evidence which distinguishes the psychological or financial hardships to the applicant's spouse. The applicant has not articulated what hardships, if any, her qualifying relative will experience upon relocation. As such, we cannot find that the record as it is currently constituted establishes that the applicant's spouse will experience extreme hardship, either upon separation or relocation.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. We therefore find that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. Citizen spouse as required under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. As the applicant has not established extreme hardship to a qualifying family member no purpose would be served in determining whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

As the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative, there is also no point in determining whether she warrants a favorable exercise of discretion under section 212(d)(11).

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.