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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

41

FILE:

MSC 05 348 13649

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date:

**APR 29 2009**

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

John F. Grissom  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Los Angeles. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman (LULAC) Class Membership Worksheet. The director denied the application because the applicant did not establish that she continuously resided in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. The director stated that at her interview on April 16, 2007, the applicant stated that she arrived in the United States for the first time in November 1981, that she stayed in the U.S. for one month and returned to India in December 1981. The director related that the applicant further stated that she attended school in India from 1982 until 1987, that she returned to the U.S. in May 1987 until July 1987 and then returned to India in July 1987 until 2003 when she returned to this county with a visitor's visa.

On appeal, counsel states the applicant first entered the United States in November 1981 and resided in this country continuously with one departure. Thereafter, she immediately applied for amnesty at a Wilshire office but was turned away due to allegedly traveling outside the United States without permission. Counsel further states that in July 1987, she left the United States, went to India and did not return until 2003. Counsel argues it is quite foreseeable and reasonable for the applicant not to have any other documents corroborating her presence in the United States since she was only 10 at the time she applied for amnesty and was turned away by INS due to her departure in 1981 from the United States.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine the evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the facts to be proven are probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

The pertinent evidence in the record is described below.

1. Declarations from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who state they are aware that the applicant resided continuously in the United States since her entry on October 1, 1981 through May 4, 1988.

The declarations have been reviewed (Items # 1 above). These documents are not sufficiently probative to establish the applicant's continuous residence in the United States from January 1, 1982 through the requisite time period. Without corroborative evidence, declarations from acquaintances and family do not substantiate clear and convincing evidence of an applicant's residence in the United States.

On her Form I-687, the applicant stated the only time that she left the United States since January 1, 1982 during the requisite period was when she left the United States in November 1987 for a visit to Mexico and that she returned in December 1987. However, the director stated that at her interview on April 16, 2007, the applicant stated that she arrived in the United States for the first time in November 1981, that she stayed in the U.S. for one month and returned to India in December 1981. The director related that the applicant further stated that she attended school in India from 1982 until 1987, that she returned to the U.S. in May 1987 until July 1987 and then returned to India in July 1987 until 2003 when she returned to this county with a visitor's visa. Now on appeal, counsel states that in July 1987, the applicant left the United States, went to India and did not return until 2003. The applicant's testimony, her assertions on her Form I-687 and counsel's statement in her behalf concerning her absences from the United States forwarded on appeal are not reconcilable.

Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. Further, the applicant must resolve any inconsistencies in the record with competent, independent, objective evidence. Attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence sufficient to demonstrate where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). These inconsistencies cast doubt not only on the evidence containing the conflicts, but on all of the applicant's evidence and all of her assertions. The applicant has failed to offer any explanation for the substantive discrepancies.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982, and continuous residence during the requisite period. The applicant's asserted absence and residential histories on her Form I-687 are accompanied by inconsistent evidence.

Based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. Therefore, the applicant is ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.