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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
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U.S. Citizenship  
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FILE: [REDACTED]  
MSC-06-101-27689

Office: OKLAHOMA

Date: AUG 05 2009

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

John F. Grissom  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Oklahoma. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. In denying the application, the director determined that the applicant's Form I-687 application was postmarked on January 9, 2006, and therefore had been filed after the December 31, 2005 filing date. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(a). The director noted, "pursuant to the CSS/Newman (LULAC) Settlement Agreements (Paragraph 4), 'applications shall be deemed filed on the date postmarked in accordance with the provisions at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(a).'" The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had failed to timely file his Form I-687 application.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that he did file his Form I-687 application prior to December 31, 2005. The applicant submits a copy of his United States Postal Service Certified Mail Receipt as evidence.

In the instant matter, the record of proceeding contains an envelope with a United States Postal Service sale date of December 30, 2005. However, the original envelope does not contain a postmarked date showing that the package was actually mailed by the applicant to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on that date. It is determined by the AAO that the application was received by the USCIS office on January 9, 2006, and was not postmarked prior to the deadline date of December 31, 2005.

Even if the application were to be accepted as postmarked prior to December 31, 2005, the evidence of record would be insufficient to establish the applicant's continuous residence in the United States throughout the requisite period.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. *See* CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

At issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has submitted sufficient credible evidence to meet his burden of establishing continuous unlawful residence in the United States during the requisite period. Here, the applicant has failed to meet this burden.

The applicant submitted as evidence copies of his identification cards dated 1987 and 1988. While the copies are evidence of the applicant's presence in the United States in 1987 and 1988, they are insufficient to demonstrate his continuous residence in the country throughout the requisite period.

The applicant submitted the following attestations:

- A declaration from [REDACTED] who stated that he has known the applicant from June of 1981 to 1988 and that they would play games together at school and on the play ground in El Paso, Texas. He also stated that they would go to the race track together and that the applicant was invited to many of the declarant's father's dinner parties. This statement is inconsistent with the applicant's Form I-687 application at part #30 where he listed his address as [REDACTED] in Casa Grande, Arizona from October of 1981 to February of 1989. Here, the inconsistencies cast doubt on the applicant's proof. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1988).
- A letter from [REDACTED] who stated that he employed the applicant from 1981 to 1986. This statement is inconsistent with the applicant's Form I-687 application at part #33 where he stated under penalty of perjury that he was employed at Baro Home in Phoenix, Arizona from November of 1981 to December of 1989. In addition, the letter does not conform to regulatory standards for attestations by employers. Specifically, the letter does not specify the address(es) where the applicant resided throughout the claimed employment period, or the exact dates of employment. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i). Here, the declarant fails to indicate whether the employment information was taken from company records. Neither has the availability of the records for inspection been clarified. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i).
- A statement from [REDACTED] who stated that he has known the applicant since 1985.
- A statement from [REDACTED] who stated that he has known the applicant since 1987.

The declarants fail to establish the applicant's continuous unlawful residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality; an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony; and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility.

None of the declarants' statements provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with him, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence during the time addressed in the affidavits. Upon review, the AAO finds that the declarants' statements, individually and collectively, do not indicate that their assertions are probably true. Therefore, they have little probative value.

In the instant case, the applicant has failed to provide sufficient credible and probative evidence to establish his continuous unlawful residence in the United States since prior to January 1, 1982, and during the requisite period.

The absence of sufficiently detailed documentation to corroborate the applicant's claim of continuous residence for the entire requisite period and the inconsistencies noted above seriously detract from the credibility of this claim. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the inconsistency in the statements found in the record and the applicant's reliance upon evidence that is lacking in probative value, it is concluded that he has failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.