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FILE: [REDACTED]  
MSC 06 097 12260

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date: **FEB 26 2009**


IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

  
John F. Grissom, Acting Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Los Angeles. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman (LULAC) Class Membership Worksheet. The director determined that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that she had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. In so finding, the director stated, in part:

As evidence of residence from 1981 to 1983, you submitted copies of school records and sworn affidavits from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. You did not provide any evidence of residence from 1984 to 1988.

On appeal, counsel asserts that United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) was required to issue a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) concerning the applicant's CSS class membership prior to issuing the Notice of Denial.

According to the settlement agreements, the director shall issue a NOID before denying an application for class membership. Here, the director adjudicated the Form I-687 on the merits and did not deny the application for class membership. Therefore, the director was not required to issue a NOID concerning the issue of class membership prior to making her determination.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term "until the date of filing" in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident Under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement, paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine the evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the facts to be proven are probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

The pertinent evidence in the record is described below.

1. A copy of a certificate dated December 13, 1980, from the Pastor of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish indicating the applicant first celebrated the sacrament of Penance and Peace.
2. A copy of a certificate dated May 9, 1981, from the Assistant Pastor of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish in Chicago, Illinois, indicating that [REDACTED] received The Sacrament of First Holy Communion.
3. A copy of a certificate dated June 17, 1983, from the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, awarding [REDACTED] a diploma of graduation from the eighth grade.
4. Signed statements from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] dated December 12, 2005, indicating they met the applicant on September 15, 1975, when she came to live with them in Chicago until she moved to California in 1983.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.”); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO’s *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

On her Form I-687, the applicant stated she lived in Chicago from September 1975 to July 1983. Her next residence is listed in California.

The director found the applicant had not provided any evidence of residence from 1984 to 1988. No further documentation to overcome the director's finding was submitted on appeal.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has furnished sufficient credible evidence to demonstrate entry into the United States prior to January 1, 1982, and continuous residence during the requisite period. The applicant asserted employment and residential histories on her I-687; however, these assertions are not accompanied by any evidence that she resided in the United States from July 1983 until May 4, 1988.

The evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility, and its amenability to verification. Given the paucity of credible supporting documentation, the applicant has failed to meet her burden of proof and failed to establish continuous residence in an unlawful status in the United States during the requisite period. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act. The application was correctly denied on this basis, which has not been overcome on appeal. Consequently, the director's decision to deny the application is affirmed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.